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Zusammenfassung (German Summary) 
Diese Arbeit widmet sich der Analyse korrupter Strukturen in Zentralbanken 
und deren Auswirkungen auf die Geldpolitik. Die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche 
Theorie unterstellt grundsätzlich in der Modellierung des Verhaltens von 
Zentralbanken, dass Zentralbanken sich in ihren Entscheidungen an dem 
wohlverstandenen Zielen der Gesellschaft orientieren. Im Rahmen dieser 
Modelle haben die Entscheidungen von Zentralbankern negative Folgen für 
die Gesellschaft, gerade weil die Entscheidungsträger versuchen, durch ihre 
Entscheidungen die Lage der Gesellschaft zu verbessern. Das wohlwollende 
Verhalten des Zentralbankers führt in diesen Modellen zu 
Wohlfahrtseinbußen der Gesellschaft.  
 
Betrachtet man Zentralbankverhalten in der Realität, muss man 
erkennen, dass die Annahme eines benevolenten Verhaltens nicht immer 
gegeben sein muss. Fallstudien aus so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie Zaire 
(demokratisch Kongo), Indonesien, Brasilien und Japan werden im Rahmen 
dieser Arbeit präsentiert. Sie sollen darlegen, dass korruptes Verhalten in 
einer Zentralbank nicht nur denkbar ist, sondern auch tatsächliche Relevanz 
hat. Eine Fallstudie aus Indonesien bildet den Ausgangspunkt der Analyse. 
 
Die Arbeit beginnt mit einer Beschreibung eines Skandals, der im 
Anschluss an die südostasiatische Finanzkrise Indonesien im Atem hielt. 
Bedingt durch Schließungen und Übernahmen von Banken durch die 
staatlichen Regulierungsbehörde mussten verschiedene Interbank-
Geldmarktgeschäfte abgewickelt werden. Im Rahmen dieser Abwicklungen 
kam es zu einer Reihe von Unregelmäßigkeiten und Korruptionsfällen. Von 
diesen wird der „Bank Bali“- Fall vorgestellt. Basierend auf die 
Fallbeschreibung werden Umstände identifiziert, die der Korruption in diesem 
Fall der Bankenregulierung und Bankenkontrolle Vorschub geleistet haben. 
 
Nach dieser ersten Annäherung an das Problem korrupter 
Transaktionen von Zentralbanker wird ein erstes Modell eines korrupten 
Zentralbankers entwickelt. Dieses Modell basiert auf der Modellierung 
 X
zeitinkonsistenten Verhaltens der Zentralbank. Eine nominale Rigidität des 
Geldlohnsatzes ermöglicht es der Zentralbank; temporär realwirtschaftliche 
Effekte durch Veränderung der Geldmengenwachstumsrate zu erreichen. In 
dieses Modell wird neben den traditionellen Zielen der Preisniveaustabilität 
und der Stabilisierung der Beschäftigung das Seigniorageaufkommen als 
zusätzliches Ziel berücksichtigt. Dieses Modell beschreibt auch eine Situation, 
in der die politische Führung eines Landes selbst die Rolle des 
Zentralbankers übernimmt und der Gouverneur der Bank lediglich die 
Aufgabe hat die beschlossene Politik zu implementieren. Diese Einmischung 
in die Entscheidungen der Zentralbank resultiert in einem zusätzlichen 
Inflationsbias. 
 
Das zweite Modell untersucht, wie sich Verkäufe von 
Insiderinformationen durch Zentralbankangestellte auswirken. Der 
Modellrahmen ähnelt bis auf den korrupten Anreiz des Zentralbankers und 
den stochastischen Angebotsschocks dem ersten Modell. In diesem Modell 
ist sowohl eine prozyklische als auch eine antizyklische Reaktion des 
Zentralbankers auf die Angebotsschocks möglich. Wie er auf die Schocks 
reagiert hängt von der Präferenz des Zentralbankers für das Ziel der 
Preisniveaustabilität ab.  
 
Eine empirische Studie bildet den Abschluss dieser Arbeit. Für eine 
große Stichprobe von 80 Ländern und eine kleinere von 23 
Transformationsländern wird untersucht, inwieweit Korruption in 
Zentralbanken sich auf die durchschnittliche Inflationsrate auswirkt. Die 
empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen teilweise die in dieser Arbeit entwickelten 
Modelle. Länder scheinen eine höhere durchschnittliche Inflationsrate 
aufzuweisen, wenn ihr Bankensystem korrupter ist. Das korrupte 
Bankensystem erlaubt es der Zentralbank eher im Rahmen ihrer Funktion 
der Bankenaufsicht und Bankenregulierung korrupte Nebeneinnahmen zu 
erlangen, indem sie die Geschäftsbanken zwingen (oder es ihnen 
ermöglichen), übermäßig Kredite zu vergeben. Diese erhöhte Kreditvergabe 
der Geschäftsbanken führt zu einer vermehrten Geldschöpfung und zu 
steigenden Inflationsraten. Dieses Ergebnis ist jedoch vorsichtig zu 
 XI
interpretieren, da es – zumindest in der Analyse der großen Stichprobe – 
durch die Aufnahme zusätzlicher erklärender Variablen seinen Einfluss und 
seine Signifikanz verliert. Die Untersuchung für die kleinere Stichprobe von 
23 Transformationsländern zeigt, dass auch hier ein vermehrtes Maß an 
Korruption innerhalb der Zentralbank mit höheren Inflationsraten in 
Verbindung steht.  
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I. Introduction: Why Study Corruption in Central 
Banks? 
Central banks are viewed by the general public as reputable institutions, a 
perception bolstered by economic theory and modeling. By extension, central 
bankers are thought of as benevolent, as decent men and women attempting 
to maximize societal welfare through their decisions. Yet, cases of central 
bank corruption abound. Corruption within the central bank? This seems 
almost sacrilegious! However, consider, for example, the recent scandal 
involving the German Bundesbank’s (now former) President Ernst Welteke. 
 A German commercial and investment bank, Dresdner Bank, invited 
Welteke to the prestigious Hotel Adlon in Berlin to celebrate the New Year 
and the establishment of the Euro as the single circulated currency in the 
Euro Area. Welteke not only accepted this invitation, but he enlarged it to 
include his wife, their young child, and Welteke’s grownup son as a babysitter 
for the child, all staying at the Hotel Adlon at the expense of Dresdner Bank. 
As the scandal broke, Mr. Welteke excused this behavior by explaining that 
he always expects anybody inviting him on a business trip to cover expenses. 
However, it was soon discovered that Mr. Welteke might have accepted a 
benefit in money’s worth, which might have influenced his dealings. This 
incident started a media investigation into Mr. Welteke’s behavior. Several 
other lavish and suspicious invitations came to light. It was discovered, for 
instance, that the German carmaker BMW had invited (and paid for) Mr. 
Welteke to attend the Formula 1 car race in Monte Carlo in 2003. Perhaps 
not coincidentally, one of BMW’s branches is a commercial bank that 
engages in the leasing and financing of cars. As a result of these discoveries, 
the Minister of Finance Eichel stated that for Mr. Welteke to stay in his 
current position would be unacceptable (Associated Press, April 16, 2004).  
 Mr. Welteke’s acceptance of gifts and invitations from companies and 
banks that his government body is meant to supervise created possible 
future conflicts of interest, but due to the gray area of the law in regard to 
these matters, Mr. Welteke was not charged with corruption. Nor is Mr. 
Weltete’s story unique. Consider the case of German Bundesbanker Erwin 
Blumenthal, who worked for some time in Zaire as the vice-governor of the 
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Banque du Zaire. Zaire needed to re-negotiate its foreign liabilities. 
Stabilization attempts prior to 1978 of the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Paris Club countries did not bear the expected 
results. The two Bretton Woods institutions decided to send their own experts 
to Zaire to take over key-positions in the central bank and the ministry of 
finance Callaghy (1984: 199-200). Blumenthal was sent to Zaire as a 
representative of the International Monetary Fund in 1979, where he 
discovered a case of extreme corruption. In Mobutu’s Zaire there was no 
clear dividing line between the state budget and President Mobutu’s personal 
property. Blumenthal was repeatedly forced to disburse funds from the 
central bank’s currency reserves for the president’s entirely private purposes. 
Another example is the former Peruvian President Fujimori who appears to 
have embezzled gold from the reserves of the Peruvian Central Bank, Casa 
de la Moneda, and transferred it to Japan. These two cases will serve as the 
starting point for the model of a corrupt central banker. 
 These cases are examples of “pure” corruption in central banks and 
are proof that such exists. However, there are other behaviors that are not so 
clear cut but are just as clearly closely related to corruption, for example, Mr. 
Welteke’s case of taking advantage of invitations freely offered, behavior that 
is not criminal, but is certainly questionable. Only a few studies address 
corruption and similar, but not necessarily criminal, behavior of central bank 
employees and governors, even though corruption in the central bank is 
obviously possible. By the very nature of their position, central bankers 
possess a treasure trove of information. Knowledge of possible intervention 
prices in the foreign exchange market, future interest rates, or the details of 
new tender offers the central bank intends to make is very valuable 
information to investment bankers and commercial bankers. Knowing in 
advance what the central bank will decide enables these other bankers to 
place sure bets on officially “unexpected” moves of the central bank. 
 Furthermore, it is not only the information central bankers possess that 
makes them vulnerable to corruption. Klitgaard (1988) identifies conditions 
that favor corruption in any institution. He suggests that corruption is endemic 
and flourishes in institutions that are vested with a monopoly position, have 
the freedom to make discretionary decisions, and are subject to only weak 
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accountability. Central banks fulfill all three conditions: (1) central banks are 
usually the only institutions that provide their respective economies with high-
powered money; (2) they have some discretionary freedom in the choice of 
instruments they use; and (3) even for the central banks that are perceived to 
be somewhat transparent, secrecy about their decisions and their inner 
structures abounds. In fact, central banks themselves are critical of this lack 
of transparency. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis devoted a large part 
of its annual conference in 2001 to issues of central bank transparency (see 
Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis 2002). In a statement at this conference, 
Alan Greenspan stressed the need for transparency: 
 
financial markets work more efficiently when their participants do 
not have to waste effort inferring the stance of monetary policy 
from diffuse signals …” (Greenspan 2002: 5) 
 
A higher degree of transparency in central bank dealings makes it 
easier to identify the bank’s political stance and lowers information costs for 
players in the financial markets. Increased transparency also makes corrupt 
dealing within the central banker more difficult because there will be a better 
chance of the central banker being caught, and thus he or she will be less 
likely to engage in such behavior. 
It is not the aim of this inquiry into corruption at central banks to 
stigmatize an institution that is generally held in well-merited regard. So, why 
study corruption in central banks at all? As the initial collection of cases and 
the analysis of Klitgaard (1988: 75) showed, there does exist the possibility 
that central bankers might become corruptible and engage in deals that 
surely will benefit themselves but not necessarily the society they are 
expected to serve. Therefore, the present analysis will conduct thought 
experiments in the form of theoretical models that are rooted in actual 
corruption cases at different central banks. These models are used to 
illustrate the effects a corruptible central banker has on monetary policy. The 
results from these thought experiments will be used to point out the adverse 
effects of corruption in a central bank. Two empirical investigations will 
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illustrate that there are indeed discernable effects of central bank corruption 
on monetary policy. 
The analysis presented here consists of empirical and theoretical 
elements. The empirical analysis and the theoretical models are intertwined 
because the modeling takes actual corruption cases as a starting point. 
Chapter II. A Corruption Case in the Central Bank of Indonesia, is a case 
study of a corruption case. This case study provides details of the actual 
case and the surrounding conditions of the Indonesian economy that favored 
the corrupt deal. 
After this empirical qualitative review of an actual case, the first model 
of a self-seeking and malicious central banker is given in Chapter III. Central 
Banks in a Corrupt Environment: How Corruption Drives Inflation. Chapter IV 
introduces a second model of a corrupt central banker, one who sells inside 
information. 
Chapter V reports the results of empirical research. It has already 
been shown by previous empirical research that corruption in general seems 
to increase the inflation rate. My model of the corrupt central banker provides 
a new explanation of this effect. Formerly, it was the general conclusion that 
due to the bigger share of the underground economy in more corrupt 
societies, the state needs higher seigniorage revenue to generate the 
necessary income to cover government expenditure. These two theories, that 
is, that corruption leads to a higher rate of inflation and/or higher seigniorage, 
will be tested for a cross-section of 80 countries. Chapter VI concludes. 
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II. A Corruption Case in the Central Bank of Indonesia 
II.1. Introduction 
The illicit nature of corrupt deals limits research on corrupt behavior by 
central bankers to press accounts of corruption cases. However, the list of 
stories that can be obtained from traditional newspaper sources and, more 
recently, from the Internet is astonishingly long and covers a wide range of 
such cases. In this chapter, a case of central bank corruption in Indonesia will 
be illustrated of the basis of media reports and the results of audits. 
 Indonesia has been the setting for several high-profile corruption 
cases. These cases usually involved members of the Soeharto clan or 
persons with well-established ties to this family. Soeharto acted as 
Indonesia’s president from 1968 to 1998. Despite the fact that Soeharto was 
removed from office in the aftermath of the “Asian Current Account Crisis,” 
corruption continued. The crisis itself offered ample opportunity to engage in 
corrupt dealing. This chapter describes one such case in detail. This case 
was special because it involved several high-ranking members of Soeharto’s 
Golkar Party and the Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia. As described 
below, it also came at a very sensitive time for Indonesia. The case is also a 
good one for analysis because it was well covered in the Indonesian and 
international media and because the auditing firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
conducted a forensic audit of the case in August/September 1999. Before 
presenting the actual case, a few details on the impact of the financial crisis 
and the pre-crisis state of the Indonesian commercial banking sector are 
given. These facts highlight the impact of the crisis and why this case dubbed 
the “Bank Bali Scandal” after the private bank that is at the core of the 
scandal can be viewed as representative of central bank corruption.  
II.2. The Indonesian Situation: The Crisis Unfolds 
The Bank Bali scandal and the BLBI1 liquidity program graft occurred in 1998 
after the resignation of Soeharto and his fifth “New Order” government. Both 
scandals are deeply rooted in the time of the Soeharto reign and must be 
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interpreted in relation to the Asian Current Account Crisis. As stated by a 
World Bank (2003) report on Indonesia, the commercial bank system of 
Indonesia and especially the state-owned commercial banks were an integral 
part of the New Order’s rent-collection system. The credit portfolios of 
Indonesian state-owned commercial banks were full of questionable loans to 
cronies and members of the Soeharto clan. Before the 1988 deregulation of 
the Indonesian banking market, the common lending policy of the state-
owned banks usually allowed for large commissions to be shared by the bank 
officials and others. Loans were often decided on by members of the Golkar 
Party, not by bankers. The bankers were given large commissions in 
exchange for going along with economically and legally unjustified loans. 
The first blow to the state-owned commercial banks came in 1988 when 
Indonesia deregulated the banking system. This reform lowered the barriers 
of entry to the Indonesian commercial banking market and increased the 
number of private commercial banks from 63 in 1988 to 165 in 1997. 
Furthermore, it required only a very low threshold of US $6 million to set up a 
commercial bank. As a direct consequence, the market share of state-owned 
banks dropped considerably from 1988 to 1997 (World Bank 2003: 60). A 
further contributing factor to the weakening of the Indonesian commercial 
banks was the way the newly founded private commercial banks went about 
making loans. These new private commercial banks typically had granted 
large-volume loans to their owners and politically important persons. Bank 
Indonesia, was not allowed to exercise any independent control over the 
decisions and supervision of the banking sector. Instead, the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance played an active role in the management and the 
regulation of the state-owned banks and private commercial banks.2 Before 
the crisis broke in 1997, the private banks sought protection from the Bank 
Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance by maintaining close connections to 
politically important persons, and one obvious way to ensure these intimate 
                                                                                                                                          
1 BLBI stands for Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia. This program supplied liquidity support 
to Indonesian banks during the Current Account Crisis. 
2  Bank Indonesia was only granted political independence from the Ministry of Finance 
through a presidential decree in February 1998 as part of the reforms the International 
Monetary Fund imposed on Indonesia (see International Monetary Fund, June 24 1998: 
Appendix). 
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ties was by providing these politically important persons with favors, such as 
loans.  
 
Banks tended to grant credit without due regard to the purpose of 
the loan, or the borrower’s viability and capacity to generate the 
cash flow, particularly since the borrower was often either politically 
important or related to the owner of the bank. (World Bank 2003: 60) 
 
As a consequence, the banking sector was burdened with bad loans. 
The weak exposure regulations and almost nonexistent capital requirements 
resulted in the Indonesian commercial banks standing on a very fragile 
foundation. 
 
These distortions led to a growing share of non-performing loans on 
the banks’ balance sheets … (World Bank 2003: 60) 
 
The Asian Current Account Crisis provided the Indonesian banking 
sector with several problems. The Asian Current Account Crisis started in 
July 1997. Within three months it developed into a worldwide threat to 
economic stability. For the most part, the crisis caught the countries in the 
region unaware. Pre-crisis, the countries had enjoyed an unprecedented 
economic success. Southeast Asia experienced a steady inflow of foreign 
capital. It was confidently believed that the Asian countries were immune to 
the sort of economic collapse that had occurred three years earlier in 
Mexico—the “tequila” crisis. However, in 1997 there was a reassessment of 
the risk associated with investments in these countries. Among analysts the 
notion started to spread that the “Asian Miracle” might be oversold and they 
began to question the soundness of the Asian model economies. This new 
speculation on the actual shape of economies such as Malaysia and South 
Korea resulted in a reversal of capital flows to these and other previously 
“miracle” economies. For the year 1997, the International Financial Statistics 
of the IMF reported a foreign direct investment worth US $4.7 billion for 
Indonesia. In 1998, there was an outflow of US $2.4 billion from the 
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Indonesian economy, a development that fundamentally changed the foreign 
exchange market. 
The first country to consider a new foreign exchange regime was 
Malaysia. The Ringgit became pressured to devaluate as the demand for 
foreign currencies in Malaysia increased. The Malaysian central bank, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, used 12% of its foreign exchange reserves in order to 
maintain the Ringgit’s fixed peg to the U.S. dollar, but on July 2, 1997 it 
caved in and floated the Ringgit. The Filipino central bank faced a similar 
situation a few days later. It quickly decided to float the national currency. 
The very same day, July 11, 1997, the Indonesian central bank, Bank 
Indonesia, widened the exchange rate band from 8% to 12% (see Stern 2004: 
2). 
Prior to the crisis, when the exchange rate band was widened, private 
agents reacted by increasing the inflow of capital into Indonesia and thus the 
Rupiah gained in value. This time the reaction was the contrary: the Rupiah 
weakened in value against the U.S. dollar (see Stern 2004: 2). This was an 
indication of the problems Indonesia was facing. Before the Asian Current 
Account Crisis, Bank Indonesia had achieved quite a reputation for being 
able to keep the exchange rate of the Rupiah against the dollar at the target 
level and there had been a longstanding commitment to a crawling peg. Now, 
however, along with the increasing exchange rate band, Bank Indonesia 
intervened on the foreign exchange market and sold US $1.5 billion on the 
spot and forward markets. These interventions did not help. By August 13, 
the Rupiah was trading against the top of the intervention band. 
This relatively high exchange rate against the U.S. dollar led to severe 
problems for Indonesian companies. During Bank Indonesia’s period of very 
successful exchange rate stabilization, they had incurred a large degree of 
foreign denominated debt. These loans were used to expand their business 
in Indonesia. Thus, the return on these investments was mainly paid in 
Rupiah, which needed to be exchanged into U.S. dollars. Now, however, the 
companies realized that the exchange rate was not in their favor and they 
thus sought to cover their positions and acquire U.S. dollars, which, of course, 
simply exacerbated the devaluation trend. The situation culminated in Bank 
Indonesia abandoning its longstanding commitment to the crawling peg on 
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August 14, 1997. On that day, the Indonesian foreign exchange market 
opened with the Rupiah at 2650 Rp./US$; it closed at 2800 Rp./US$. 
Devaluation continued to gather momentum and on August 19 the Rupiah 
traded at 3000 Rp/US$, regarded as the crossing of an important threshold. 
In reaction, Bank Indonesia tightened the liquidity supply considerably. As a 
result there was a general increase in the interest rates. The Sertifikates 
Bank Indonesia (SBI)3 one-month rate rose from 12% to 30%. Furthermore, 
the state-owned enterprises were obliged to withdraw their deposits from 
commercial banks and deposit them with the central bank (Stern 2004: 4). 
This led to a further liquidity contraction in the commercial bank sector. The 
increased drain of liquidity from the banks increased the interest rates and 
contributed to the stabilization of the Rupiah. 
The high interest rates and the restricted liquidity situation in the 
commercial bank sector began to take its toll on the entire Indonesian 
economy. Although the Rupiah regained a portion of its former value and 
dropped to 2700 Rp/US$, there was increasing pressure on the government 
to reverse the monetary policy. This pressure originated in part from weaker 
banks because by the end of August a number of commercial banks were not 
able to meet the required 5% reserve minimum. As more companies 
defaulted on their national and international debt, rumors began to circulate 
about the soundness of private banks. By September 1997 the Bank 
Danamon and the Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (BDNI), two of the 
largest private commercial banks in Indonesia, had 50% of their U.S. dollar 
denominated deposits withdrawn by their customers (Stern 2004: 8). This 
problem prompted Bank Indonesia to accommodate the failing banks’ 
liquidity problem with the help of the BLBI program. 
These events were followed by a chaotic period of contradictory policy 
decisions and announcements. In September, Bank Indonesia reversed its 
policy stance. Instead of restricting the liquidity of the banking sector and 
driving interest rates up, the central bank gave in to pressure from the failing 
banking sector and injected new liquidity into the market. Additionally, the 
country’s international reputation suffered several setbacks. First, the 
Indonesian government declared that it was terminating several economically 
                                                 
3 The Sertifikates Bank Indonesia is a money market certificate offered by Bank Indonesia. It 
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questionable infrastructure projects, a position that was designed to generate 
confidence in Indonesia’s ability to take the necessary policy measures to 
cope with the situation at hand. However, any confidence thus gained was 
shattered the same month when President Soeharto announced that several 
of his pet projects would be continued. International analysts interpreted this 
as a further sign of indecisiveness on the part of the Indonesian government 
and as a sign of the influence enjoyed by private banks. These events led to 
a further loss in confidence in the Indonesian currency. The Rupiah quickly 
depreciated by a higher margin than any other currency affected by the crisis. 
This alarming new development led to a request for international 
assistance and at the beginning of November 1997 two lines of assistance 
were prepared for Indonesia. The first assistance package, valued at US $23 
billion, was pledged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The second line of 
assistance was granted by the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Australia, and 
Singapore. The amount of this package was never disclosed and is still 
unknown but it is widely believed that it was worth some US $15 billion (Stern 
2004: 6).4 This assistance from the IMF and the other international donors 
did not come without conditions. Among other things, the IMF ordered 
Indonesia to: 
 
•  achieve a public sector surplus of 1% of GDP, 
•  change its policy of administered prices for electricity and oil and of 
numerous monopolies, 
•  close 16 banks as a first step, 
•  commit to closing additional banks in the future and to merge state-
owned banks, and  
•  improve regulation of the financial sector (Stern 2004: 24). 
 
                                                                                                                                          
is one of the tools Bank Indonesia used in its conduct of monetary policy. 
4 A document from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta does not provide details on the amounts 
pledged in the secondary package by the United States, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Australia. It does specify that the IMF contribution to the first package was a stand-by loan of 
US $10 billion, while the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank contributed US $4.5 
billion and US $3.5 billion, respectively. See United States Embassy, Jakarta (2001). 
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The IMF-administered closing of 16 banks has often been cited as one 
pivotal reason for the emergence of a bank run. This argument overlooks the 
fact that Indonesian depositors were already withdrawing their funds from 
private banks and either exchanging them for U.S. dollars or transferring 
them to state-owned banks. This process had started even before conclusion 
of negotiations for the IMF emergency package. The depositors suspected 
continued instability of the private banks. The Rupiah continued to slide 
downward in value. Before Christmas 1997, Sjahril Sabirin, who was at World 
Bank, Washington, returned to Jakarta to become the managing director of 
Bank Indonesia, a position bestowed on him by President Soeharto. On 
February 17, 1998, Sabirin officially replaced the previous governor of Bank 
Indonesia, Mr. Sudradjad Djiwandono (Asia Times, February 21, 2003). 
II.3. The Bank Bali Matter 
The aftermath of the Asian Current Account Crisis for Indonesia was bad 
enough, but the financial sector’s ensuing stabilization and restructuring 
attempts were smeared by several high-profile scandals involving the 
embezzlement of state money meant to stabilize the failing commercial 
banking sector. The first corruption scandal of this period to become public 
and that involved Bank Indonesia’s prudential supervision function was the 
Bank Bali scandal in 1999. The scandal concerned irregularities in the 
reimbursement of interbank claims in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 
Implicated in the scandal were President Habibie’s election campaign team 
(Tim Sukses) and highly placed Indonesian state institutions, including 
among others the Indonesian central bank and the newly founded Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). 
II.3.1. How the Scandal Broke and its Political Reverberations 
The “Bali-Gate” scandal became public in July 1999. The whistleblower was 
an independent management consultant and banking law expert, Mr. 
Pradjoto,5 who was linked to the opposition party of Mrs. Megawatti. Mr. 
Pradjoto learned about the scandal in a dramatic fashion. In the early 
morning hours of July 8, 1999, an anonymous person delivered a package to 
                                                 
5 Like many Indonesians Mr. Pradjoto only uses a single name. 
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Mr. Pradjoto’s office. Documents in the package described in detail a 
“Cessie” agreement between the management of Bank Bali and two private 
companies, PT Era Giat Prima and PT Persada Harum Lestari. Cessie 
agreements are a type of Dutch contract common in Indonesia, in which the 
title to a claim is transferred by way of an assignment (Cessie). The debtor 
must be notified of the ceding and must register the claim on its books. 
In this agreement, Bank Bali agreed to cede certain claims on other 
banks that had been taken over by the government to Era Giat Prima and 
Persada Harum Lestari in return for a 60% discount on the value of the 
outstanding debt (Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1999). What is puzzling 
about this deal is that the Indonesian government, under its former president 
Soeharto, had issued a guarantee scheme in January 1998. This guarantee 
promised that 
 
all the obligations for repayment by commercial depositor’s banks 
to their debtors and creditors will be met. …. (Republic of 
Indonesia 1998a) 
 
The decree further stipulated that the guarantee could be invoked for all 
commercial banks established under Indonesian law (Article 2.1) and stated 
that the guarantee is valid regardless of whether the obligations are 
denominated in Indonesian or international currency units (Article 2.2). The 
repayment of foreign denominated liabilities would be made in Rupiah on the 
basis of the market exchange rate on the date of payment (Article 2.3). In a 
second decree (Republic of Indonesia 1998b), Soeharto ordered the 
formation of a new government body, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA). 
This new body had two tasks. First, it was to help recapitalize 
Indonesian commercial banks. Second, it was to settle all outstanding 
interbank claims. To accomplish these objectives, the IBRA was given the 
power to seize control of commercial banks and close them. On March 6, 
1998, further details of the claim submission procedure were published. This 
document, which was jointly drafted by IBRA and Bank Indonesia, became 
known as the “March 1998 SKB.” However, the rules and regulations 
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applicable to the settlement of claims under the government guarantee 
scheme, as set forth in the March 1998 SKB, were at times inconsistent with 
Ministry of Finance regulations. For example, the SKB rules stated that the 
debtor must file the claim with IBRA, whereas the Ministry of Finance 
regulations ordered the creditor of a claim to lodge an appeal. Another 
example of this inconsistency involves claim-filing deadlines. To be valid, the 
SKB rules require a claim to be filed with IBRA within a three-day period prior 
to the maturity date of the obligation; Ministry of Finance regulations, on the 
other hand, say nothing specific about deadlines (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
1999: 41 – 43). These inconsistencies had important and devastating 
consequences. 
With this background in mind, it should now be obvious that due to the 
government guarantee scheme, Bank Bali did not need to worry about 
reclaiming debt from commercial banks that the government had closed in 
the wake of the Current Account Crisis—those obligations were guaranteed 
to be paid. Yet, Bank Bali made a deal under which it would receive only 60% 
of the debt owed to it. Why? Consider the two private companies involved in 
the deal: PT Era Giat Prima and PT Persada Harum Lestari, each owned by 
businessmen who were well connected to then President Habibie and, as it 
turns out, well connected with each other, too. Era Giat Prima was owned by 
Mr. Setya Novanto, Secretary Treasurer of the ruling Golkar Party (Asia 
Times, August 12, 1999). PT Persada Harum Lestari was partially owned by 
Mr. Djoko Tjandra, who also served as its president 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999, Flow of Funds Analysis) and was Mr. 
Novanto partner in Era Giat Prima (Asia Times, January 16, 2004). 
Investigations into the scandal by the auditors of PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 
August/September 1999 soon revealed that a portion of the funds from the 
so-called fee or commission ended up in the reelection campaign coffers of 
President Habibie.  
The Bali-Gate scandal could not have come at a worse time for the 
Indonesian economy. The accounting discrepancies were discovered in a 
due diligence audit of Bank Bali by Standard Chartered Bank. The London-
based Standard Chartered Bank was assessing a possible takeover of 20% 
of Bank Bali’s stocks, an event that, should it occur, was viewed as an 
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important step in Indonesia’s recovery from the crisis. Standard Chartered 
pulled out of the proposed deal because of the scandal and the campaign 
launched against Bank Bali by the Indonesian media (BBC December 16, 
1999). Moreover, on May 14, 1999, the government of Indonesia had signed 
a new letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund, spelling out the 
policy measures Indonesia would have to implement to receive continued 
assistance from the IMF. Indonesia’s settlement of interbank claims was one 
of the IMF’s top priorities, and in the letter of intent, Jakarta promised that all 
interbank claims would be settled by May 28 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 
63). 
The current election campaign, the need for further international 
assistance post-crisis, and the Bali-Gate scandal all subjected Indonesia to 
international scrutiny. International lenders pressured the Indonesian 
government for an independent audit of the case. Hubert Neiss, IMF Director 
for Asia Pacific, stated: 
 
“An unsatisfactory solution [to Bank Bali] would be a disaster 
scenario.” (Asiaweek, September 3, 1999a) 
 
To apply pressure on the Indonesian Government  
 
 … the IMF had privately threatened to stop its loan program. 
(Asiaweek, September 3, 1999a) 
 
In mid-August 1999, Bank Indonesia responded to the controversy by 
freezing accounts identified as linked to the scandal. IBRA hired 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers for an independent audit and senior Golkar Party 
leader A. A. Baramuli announced that: 
 
the money will be returned to the bank “as a gesture of good faith” 
by Messrs Novanto and Tjandra. (Express India, August, 17 1999) 
 
Bali-Gate did not die an easy death: it dragged its way through the 
courts and tainted Indonesian politics. The parties involved soon started 
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“stabbing each other in the back” and publicly discrediting each other. Rudy 
Ramli, president of Bank Bali, wrote a letter to the opposition leader Mrs. 
Megawatti in which he implicated key Golkar Party members in the scandal. 
President Habibie’s reelection team (Tim Sukses) retaliated by allegedly 
forging a statement from Mr. Ramli. This statement claimed that Ramli had 
been abducted by an unnamed member of the opposition party and forced to 
provide details of the scandal. Strangely enough, the statement was signed 
“Rudi” instead of “Rudy,” which is the correct spelling of Mr. Ramli’s first 
name (Scoop, September 24, 1999). 
The aftermath of the scandal in the courts led to the acquittal of Tjandra 
and Novanto, and the conviction, in March 2002, of one key player, Bank 
Indonesia Governor S. Sabirin, which was overturned later that year in a 
second trial (BBC, April 4, 2003). Even though it was overturned, this 
conviction implies that Bank Indonesia had a key role in the scandal and I will 
explain the central bank’s role in detail below, relying on the report of the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditors. 
II.3.2. The Problems of Bank Bali 
Bank Bali began to feel the impact of the crisis in 1997 and 1998. It was 
having difficulty meeting the running requirements mandated by Bank 
Indonesia and IBRA. The bank, and especially Rudy Ramli, whose family 
controlled the bank at that time, was desperate to recover interbank claims. 
To secure the survival of the bank, Ramli needed US $320 million, or at least 
20% of this amount, by July 22, 1999 in order to qualify for a bailout. If Ramli 
was unable to meet this requirement, IBRA would seize control of his bank 
(Asiaweek, September 3, 1999b). 
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 Bank Bali had several claims on certain other banks that IBRA had 
taken over and subsequently closed down or merged with other banks. The 
details of these claims are set out in Table II.1. 
 
Table II.1: Claims of Bank Bali Against Failed Banks in 1998 
Parties 
Date of 
Agreement 
Date of 
Maturity 
Value of the 
Deal 
01.12.1997 03.03.1998 US $20 Mil. 
10.12.1997 12.03.1998 US $10 Mil. 
11.12.1997 16.03.1998 US $15 Mil. 
03.12.1997 05.06.1998 US $40 Mil. 
Bank Bali and Bank 
Dagang Nasional 
Indonesia 
 10.12.1997 12.06.1998 US $5 Mil. 
Bank Bali and Bank Tiara 22.12.1997 04.03.1998 US $10 Mil. 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999: 43). 
 
Recouping this money or at least part of it would help secure the bank 
for Ramli and his family. However, due to mistakes made by Bank Bali’s 
debtors, none of these claims were eligible for the government guarantee 
scheme. How this happened has to do with the inconsistencies, mentioned 
above, between the SKB rules and the Ministry of Finance regulations. 
Bank Bali notified IBRA of the interbank claims. However, because 
IBRA and Bank Indonesia applied the SKB rules, which require the debtor to 
register the claims, Bank Bali’s notification did not constitute a proper 
registration of the claims. And, unfortunately, the debtor banks failed to 
comply with the rules and did not register the claims either. However, even if 
the claims had been registered by the proper party, the claim-filing time limit 
was not met. The SKB rules specify that registration must be accomplished 
within a three-day period prior to the maturity date of the obligation. Bank 
Bali’ debtors never made the filing deadline for their interbank liabilities to 
Bank Bali. As one example, Bank Bali had a swap agreement with Bank 
Dagang Nasional Indonesia that was set to mature on March 12, 1998. On 
March 16, Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia informed IBRA in a letter that it 
would default on the payment to Bank Bali (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 
43–44). In this case, even though Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia was the 
proper party to file the claim, due to its late filing, Bank Bali was not eligible 
for the government guarantee scheme. In short, all the interbank claims of 
Bank Bali, as detailed in Table II.1, failed to qualify for the government 
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guarantee because they were either too late or filed by the wrong party. And 
because Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia and the other debtors, PT Bank 
Tiara and PT Bank Umum Nasional, were in bad financial shape, there was 
no hope that Rudy Ramli and Bank Bali could recoup the necessary funds.  
Further complicating the process for lodging a claim under the 
guarantee scheme was the divided nature of responsibility between IBRA 
and Bank Indonesia. IBRA had begun its existence with a tremendous 
workload and thus the responsibilities and duties in administering the 
government guarantee scheme were shared between Bank Indonesia and 
IBRA. IBRA had the final decision on the reimbursement of claims, but Bank 
Indonesia had responsibility for registering and verifying the claims. This 
verification could be performed offsite, in which case the Banking Regulation 
and Development Division of Bank Indonesia would check the claims and the 
supporting documentation submitted by the claimants. Onsite verification was 
also possible. A team from Bank Indonesia would visit both the creditor bank 
and the debtor bank and check the claims for validity. This shared 
responsibility of IBRA and Bank Indonesia made monitoring and enforcing 
the government guarantee scheme problematic. 
 
Interviews with senior staff from both [the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency] and [Bank Indonesia] highlight the lack of 
clear distinction which entity was ultimately responsible for 
authorizing the claims under the [government guarantee 
scheme] …. (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 46) 
 
This situation was ripe for corruption and fraud. Both institutions 
refused to take credit for decisions. IBRA referred to the necessity of 
verification from Bank Indonesia. Bank Indonesia stressed that only IBRA 
had the power to make a reimbursement decision and that its verification 
function was a mere technicality. The closure of several banks and IBRA’s 
concentration on bank recapitalization produced a large backlog of 
unprocessed interbank claims (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 46-7). 
In October 1998, Bank Indonesia notified Bank Bali and Bank Dagang 
that the claims filed by them under the guarantee scheme would not be 
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processed. This was only one of such notifications Bank Bali received that 
month. On October 21, Bank Bali wrote a letter to the IBRA chairman, Glenn 
Yusuf, and asked for help in the recouping its interbank claims. Bank Bali 
also sent several letters to Bank Indonesia, complaining about the decision 
not to process the claims. Bank Indonesia and IBRA did not respond. On 
October 28, in yet another attempt to resolve the issue, two senior staff 
members of Bank Bali made an unscheduled visit to Bank Indonesia. During 
this impromptu meeting, the central bank informed Bank Bali that it was not 
eligible under the guarantee scheme because of administrative problems 
arising from actions, or failures to act, by the debtor banks 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 51). 
II.3.3. The Bank Bali Deal 
Bank Bali’s situation seemed to take a turn for the better, as will be explained 
below, with the advent of Mr. Pande Lubis as a second chairman of IBRA. 
Minister of Finance Bambang Subianto offered Mr. Lubis the position in 
October 1998 and Mr. Lubis began work in December 1998. The relationship 
between Pande Lubis and the other chairman, Mr. Glenn Yusuf, was tense. 
Yusuf had not been asked for his opinion on hiring Mr. Lubis and had not 
been permitted to interview him. In an interview with the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditors, Mr. Pradjoto, the Bali-Gate whistleblower, 
alleged that Pande Lubis was a close friend of A. A. Baramuli, a chairman of 
the Supreme Advisory Council,6 and that Baramuli tried to have Lubis replace 
Mr. Yusuf (see PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 53). 
On January 11, 1999, Mr. Ramli signed the now infamous Cessie 
agreements with Mr. Setya Novanto from Era Giat Prima and with the 
company Persada Harum Lestari. The claims on Bank Dagang Nasional 
Indonesia and Bank Umum Nasional, totaling 798 billion Rupiah, were 
swapped by Era Giat Prima for valuable securities worth 798 billion. From 
this amount the commission for the brokers was to be deducted. Persada 
Harum Lestari took over the 38 billion Rupiah claims on Bank Tiara under the 
same conditions. As is mandatory in these Cessie deals, the debtors were 
                                                 
6 The Supreme Advisory council is comprised of 45 members, who are appointed by the 
president of Indonesia. Its task is to respond to any questions from the president concerning 
affairs of state. 
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informed of the swap agreement concerning their debt. Because it received 
legal advice that the deal was illegal, Bank Tiara refused to accept the 
assignment of its debt to Persada Harum Lestari.  
 
The [Persada Harum Lestari] agreement was explicitly rejected by 
[Bank Tiara], who apparently obtained legal advice that it was 
invalid. … (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 55) 
 
After the deal and details on the “commission” became public, Mr. 
Setya Novanto is cited in a newspaper report as claiming that the fee was 
indeed normal and saying: 
 
Such things happen all the time in Indonesia …. (Wall Street 
Journal, September 21, 1999) 
 
If his money problems and those of his bank were so acute, why would 
Mr. Rudy Ramli engage in a deal to recoup interbank claims that were 
guaranteed by the Indonesian government? And furthermore, why would he 
agree to a 60% discount on the value of the claims, especially since Era Giat 
Prima did not make any payment in the swap agreement to take over the 
interbank claims (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 55)? Era Giat Prima took 
over the debt titles from Bank Bali but nether fulfilled its part of the swap 
agreement. For the time being, Bank Bali seemed to be in a very desperate 
position, because it held interbank claims that were eligible for repayment 
under the Government Guarantee Scheme if only the rules of the filing 
process had been adhered by the debtor banks, which are now controlled by 
IBRA.  
February 1999 saw a reversal of attitude toward Bank Bali’s claims, 
thanks to the active involvement of Mr. Pande Lubis, now second chairman 
of IBRA. Remember that up to this point, Bank Bali was unable to recoup its 
claims under the guarantee scheme because of errors made in the 
registration process by Bank Bali’s debtors. At the beginning of February, Mr. 
Dragono Lisan of Bank Indonesia’s Regulation and Banking Development 
                                                                                                                                          
Source: http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/indonesia/indonesia131.html 
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Division, the division responsible for both onsite and offsite verification of 
claims, met with officials from Bank Bali and again informed that due to 
administrative problems Bank Bali’s claims were not qualified for 
reimbursement. However, later that month, Mr. Lubis saw to it that all files 
related to Bank Bali’s claims were entrusted to him 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 31). 
Media reports and the PriceWaterhouseCoopers report suggest that a 
secret meeting took place in Jakarta’s Mulia Hotel (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
1999: 30). According to Bank Bali Vice President Mr. Soetjahja, the meeting 
was attended by Bank Bali’s director Rudy Ramli, Mr. Setya Novanto (deputy 
treasurer of the Golkar Party and owner of Era Giat Prima), Mr. A. A. 
Baramuli (chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council), Mr. Tanri Abeng 
(Minister of Privatization of State Enterprises), Mr. Syrahil Sabirin (Governor 
of Bank Indonesia), and Mr. Pande Lubis (chairman of IBRA). Pande Lubis 
and Governor Sabirin denied taking part in the meeting. All denied 
Soetjahja’s testimony (Tempo Online Magazine, June 11, 2000). 
On February 12, Bank Bali again wrote to Pande Lubis to ask for help 
in settling its outstanding interbank claims with Bank Dagang Nasional 
Indonesia, Bank Tiara, and Bank Umum Nasional. On February 14, Mr. Lubis 
arranged a meeting between IBRA, Bank Indonesia, and Bank Bali to again 
discuss a possible settlement of the interbank claims. Mr. Lubis insisted that 
Mr. Lisan and his team attend this meeting. Mr. Lisan reemphasized that 
Bank Indonesia did not see any reason to change its stand on these claims, 
stressing that under the rules set out by the March 1998 SKB, the claims 
were not eligible for the government guarantee scheme. However, Lubis 
continued to lobby Bank Indonesia for a settlement of Bank Bali’s claims in 
the meeting, but to no avail. Lubis then wrote a letter to Bank Indonesia 
requesting an “onsite” verification of Bank Bali’s claims. Bank Indonesia 
performed the onsite verification reluctantly, only because IBRA—or, more 
precisely, Mr. Lubis—had made the request (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 
58–59). The onsite verification took place at Bank Bali on February 19. The 
examination revealed that the deals between Bank Bali and Bank Dagang 
Nasional Indonesia and Bank Tiara were valid and genuine, common 
banking transactions and — in principle — eligible under the government 
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guarantee scheme (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 59 – 60). The 
transactions between Bank Bali and Bank Umum Nasional, however, did not 
fulfill the requirements of the scheme and were not eligible. These results 
were confirmed by onsite checks at the debtor banks, which were begun on 
March 4, 1999. 
From March 1999 on, Mr. Ramli tried to get out of the Cessie 
agreements. On March 9, he approached Mr. Edwards, managing director of 
the World Bank’s program for banking sector reform (see World Bank, 
August 20, 1999). Mr. Ramli asked Mr. Edwards to block the release of Bank 
Bali’s claims, which he ceded to Era Giat Prima. One can only speculate 
about Mr. Ramli’s motivation. His request for Mr. Edwards to try to block the 
release probably stems from two reasons: (1) so far Era Giat Prima did not 
fulfill its part of the swap agreement, and (2) the results from the onsite 
verification showed that in principle the claims are eligible under the 
Government Guarantee Scheme. Ramli possibly wanted to use Bank 
Indonesia’s onsite verification of at least some of the claims as leverage to 
renegotiate his deals with the swap partners. Edwards asked Ramli whether 
he had been approached by third parties offering to help with the interbank 
claims and Mr. Ramli responded in the affirmative. Neither the identity of the 
third party nor the size of the fee for the help was discussed by Edwards and 
Ramli (World Bank, August 20, 1999). The PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
auditors’ investigation uncovered other similar Cessie agreements 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 14).  
After hearing from the central bank that most of Bank Bali’s claims 
were verified and appeared to be substantial, Lubis instructed the Bank 
Liability Division of IBRA to process Bank Bali’s claims on March 24, 1999 
(see PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 33). The order was given to the head of 
the division, Mr. Sunyoto. Lubis told his staff he wanted to use the Bank Bali 
case as an illustration of the loopholes in the SKB rules 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 61). Lubis pressed for a fast two-day 
verification of the Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia claims. As a result of this 
verification, the Bank Liability Division of IBRA circulated an internal 
memorandum, hand drafted by Pande Lubis, reaffirming the eligibility of the 
Bank Bali claims and recommending reimbursement, excluding past due 
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interest. The memorandum suggested two possible ways of settling Bank 
Bali’s claims: (1) a new set of SKB rules, closing the loopholes through which 
Bank Bali had slipped, could be drafted and issued jointly by IBRA and Bank 
Indonesia; or (2) an exception letter could be applied for from the Minister of 
Finance, Bambang Subianto. The memorandum favored the second solution. 
The draft memorandum was given to a subordinate in the division to prepare 
in final form. 
However, Bank Liabilities staff did not appreciate Pande Lubis’s 
interference and wrote their own recommendations in the memorandum. 
Lubis was not fooled so easily though, and he reworked the Bank Liabilities 
staff memorandum, changing two key recommendations: 
 
1. He stated that reimbursement approval did not necessarily have to be 
at the minister level; and that 
2. Bank Bali should also receive past due interest 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 62). 
 
This memo was forwarded to Glenn Yusuf and finally approved on 
April 16, 1999. Previous to this, on March 29, Era Giat Prima issued a power 
of attorney to Bank Bali to collect debt from Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia. 
On April 22, IBRA sent a note to the Ministry of Finance requesting a power 
of attorney so as to settle Bank Bali’s interbank claims.  
Bank Bali’s Rudy Ramli still tried to renegotiate the swap agreement or 
try to cancel it. On May 25, to this end he met with an official from the 
Ministry of Finance, Mr. Manimaren, a meeting that was arranged by 
Bambang Subianto. Mr. Manimaren later claimed to have no memory of what 
the meeting was about. On May 26, Ramli and Djoko Tjandra met with 
Minister Manimaren at his house. The minister, during an interview with the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditors, was also unable to remember any details 
of this meeting except that he was assured by the others that every thing was 
OK. Previous to the meeting at the minister’s home, there were, allegedly, 
two other meetings.7 The first one, which allegedly occurred at 12:30 p.m., 
was between Mr. Ramli, Mr. Manimaren, and Mr. Siregar, a Golkar Party 
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member, during which Mr. Manimaren informed Rudy Ramli that President 
Habibie needed only 300 billion Rupiah (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 35). 
At this meeting Ramli did not succeed in canceling the Cessie agreement 
with Mr. Djoko Tjandra. At 6 p.m. of the same day, Ramli met Mr. Tjandra in 
the Mulia Hotel, where they were joined by Messrs. Baramuli, Tanri Abeng, 
and Mr. Manimaren. At this meeting Ramli was supposedly informed that 
Minister Bambang Subianto would make the transaction harder. Finally, 
around 7 p.m. that day, Mr. Ramli met the minister at the minister’s house 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 35). On May 31, the Ministry of Finance 
issued IBRA with the power of attorney to pay out the money to Bank Bali. 
On June 1, 1999, Lubis telephoned Erman Munzir, head of the 
Regulation and Banking Development Division of Bank Indonesia, to inform 
the central bank that IBRA would make payments under the government 
guarantee scheme to Bank Bali. Mr. Munzir advised his staff to be of 
assistance to Mr. Lubis. Letters requesting payment of 905 billion Rupiah to 
Bank Bali were prepared by Lubis and his staff. At 7 p.m., Pande Lubis met 
with Mr. Munzir and was taken by Mr. Dragono Lisan to the accounting 
department where Lubis intended to deliver another letter ordering the 
payment of 905 billion Rupiah into Bank Bali’s account at Bank Indonesia. 
While Lubis was on his way to the accounting department, Mr. Munzir 
prepared a memorandum for the bank’s governor advising that these 
advance payments should not be made as the claims had not been verified. 
This memorandum, once delivered, garnered Governor Sabirin’s immediate 
attention: 
 
the Governor concurred with Mr. Erman Munzir’s recommendations 
and wrote endorsements on the two letters. 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 66) 
 
Why he concurred with Mr. Munzir’s views and but wrote 
endorsements on the two letters for the accounting department is yet unclear. 
This ambivalent reaction of the governor may be seen as a sign of his 
involvement. The letters were then hand carried to Mr. Lubis in the 
                                                                                                                                          
7 PriceWaterhouseCoopers was not able to confirm these meetings. The only confirmation of 
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accounting department. After some small technical problems had been 
corrected, the letters were accepted and payment was arranged.  
On June 2, Mr. Rusli Suryadi, a director at Bank Bali, was notified of a 
900 billion Rupiah discrepancy in the balance of one of Bank Bali’s accounts 
belonging to a bank’s money dealer. Several hours later, Mr. Suryadi was 
informed that the missing money was the settlement of the interbank claims 
against Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia and that the money did not belong 
to Bank Bali because of the Cessie agreement with Era Giat Prima. On June 
1, Bank Bali transferred 546 billion Rupiah to its Era Giat Prima clearing 
account. Subsequently, the money was paid to Era Giat Prima and Djoko 
Tjandra. On June 3, Bank Bali transferred 120 billion Rupiah to Era Giat 
Prima’s account at another Indonesian bank (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 
71). After that, the money was subdivided and spread among several 
persons and companies. On the September 13, 1999, an investigation into 
the dealings of Setya Novanto was ordered (BusinessWeek Online, 
September 13, 1999). 
There is some indication that these Cessie agreements were used in 
other situations as well. The witness Pradjoto claimed that Mr. Pande Lubis 
approached other troubled banks with similar propositions. According to 
Pradjoto, on July 30, Mr. Pande Lubis met with the director and the 
commissioner Bank International Indonesia, promising to settle their claims in 
one week, provided they went through a mediation program. Lubis informed 
Bank International Indonesia that this process 
 
was for the sake of BJ Habibie. He also stated that Mr. Glenn 
Yusuf was not to be informed. Mr. Pande Lubis requested [Bank 
International Indonesia] to sign a cessie agreement. 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 53) 
 
The ensuing prosecution of the case was to a large extent a political 
process. The Golkar Party lost the elections. Several key participants in the 
scandal, including Pande Lubis, were acquitted (Asia Times, July 10, 2001). 
Djoko Tjandra was freed due to a technicality. The new Indonesian 
                                                                                                                                          
the meetings comes from media reports. 
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government used the case as grounds for removing Sjahril Sabirin from his 
position as governor at Bank Indonesia and placed him under detention for 
half a year (BBC, December 6, 2000). Sabirin was found guilty by Central 
Jakarta District Court’s Judge Subardi and in March 2002 was sentenced to 
three years in jail. The judge commented that there was sufficient “valid and 
convincing evidence” of “on going corruption” (Financial Times, March 14, 
2002). He accused Sabirin of either enriching himself or others (Yahoo 
Finance, March 13, 2002). Mr. Sabirin appealed the verdict. Several media 
sources expressed surprise over Mr. Sabirin’s sentence of imprisonment, 
commenting that in Indonesia the elites usually avoid such a sentence by 
paying (www.geocities.com, March 21, 2002). In August 2003, the appeal 
court overturned the verdict against Sabirin (BBC, April 4, 2003). 
II.4. Bank Bali Scandal—A Case of Central Bank Corruption? 
Does the Bank Bali scandal qualify as an instance of central bank corruption? 
Certainly, the Indonesian courts did not seem sure of it. Of the three key-
actors, two, Mr. Djoko Tjandra and Mr. Pande Lubis, were not found guilty at 
all. Banker Sabirin was prosecuted and held in detention by the new 
government, which was trying to oust him from his job. Sabirin’s first trial 
ended with a guilty verdict; his second trial result in the initial sentence being 
overturned. 
 However, by looking at the facts that can be gleaned from international 
media coverage of the scandal and the PriceWaterhouseCoopers audit 
(1999), it seems plausible that the present case is indeed a case of 
corruption in the central bank. 
The scandal implicated individuals at different levels of Bank 
Indonesia’s hierarchy. The most prominent figure implicated was the bank’s 
governor S. Sabirin. His involvement in the scandal is suggested by three 
important pieces of information. 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Advisory council is comprised of 45 members, who are appointed by the 
president of Indonesia. Its task is to respond to any questions from the president concerning 
affairs of state. 
Source: http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/indonesia/indonesia131.html 
9 PriceWaterhouseCoopers was not able to confirm these meetings. The only confirmation of 
the meetings comes from media reports. 
 26
First, Rudy Ramli’s statement placed Sabirin at the crucial meeting of 
February 11, 1999 in the Mulia Hotel. It was immediately after this meeting 
that Bank Indonesia reevaluated Bank Bali’s. Governor Sabirin claimed that 
he did not attend this meeting. However, Mr. Firman Soetjahja, Vice-
President of Bank Bali, corroborated Ramli’s testimony that Sabrin had 
indeed attended (Tempo Online Magazine, June 11, 2000). 
Second, Sabirin’s involvement in the disbursement of funds to Bank 
Bali on June 1, 1999 implicates him (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 119–
21). As the reader will remember, Pande Lubis went to Bank Indonesia late in 
the afternoon of June 1. All the pieces of the deal were falling into place and 
Pande Lubis was there to see the transaction through. To this end, he had 
prepared two letters for Sabirin. These letters, which requested the payment 
of Bank Bali’s claims, were hand carried to Mr. Sabirin’s personal office by a 
staff member from the Regulation and Banking Development Division along 
with a memo for Sabirin by the division’s head Mr. Erman Munzir. Sabirin 
gave his immediate attention to these documents. He endorsed the two 
letters by writing: 
 
please action after coordination with Mrs. Miranda Goeltom. 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 36) 
 
Third, the PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditors claimed that Bank 
Indonesia, of which Sabirin was the top officer, withheld important from them. 
 
For example [Bank Indonesia] has yet to provide 
[PriceWaterhouseCoopers] with the entire access to its working 
papers which prevents [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] from assessing 
fully the scope of their work. Moreover, [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] 
cannot verify completely the accuracy of the work for which we do 
not have access to the working papers because private bank 
access has been denied in several cases. 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 120) 
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Sabirin threatened legal action over these accusations, but chose not to 
press charges. The auditing team was able to track about 70% of the funds 
disbursed to Era Giat Prima given these restrictions (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, December 23, 1999). 
Two other Bank Indonesia staff members might also have been 
involved in the corrupt deal. The director of the Regulation and Banking 
Development Division, Mr. Erman Munzir, and his Deputy Director Mr. 
Dragono Lisan were responsible for Bank Indonesia’s unprecedented 
reevaluation of Bank Bali’s claims. After Mr. Pande Lubis lobbied them at a 
string of meetings in February 1999, the two arranged onsite verification of 
the claims at the creditor bank and debtor banks. On March 22, Messrs 
Munzir and Lisan wrote a letter of verification for the claims in which they 
stressed the validity of the claims on Bank Tiara and Bank Dagang Nasional 
Indonesia. Regarding the Bank Tiara claims, it transpires that Mr. Munzir and 
Mr. Lisan knew or should have known of the existence of a Cessie 
agreement between Bank Bali and PT Persada Harum Lestari 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999, 120–21) and yet the verified Bank Bali’s 
claims. IBRA management has repeatedly stated that funds would not have 
been disbursed to Bank Bali under the guarantee scheme if IBRA had known 
about the Cessie agreements (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999: 56). 
II.5. Circumstances Favoring Corruption 
As detailed above, shared responsibility for the guarantee scheme between 
IBRA and Bank Indonesia led to confusion by commercial banks about where 
to file the claims. Adding to this uncertainty were the inconsistencies between 
the SKB rules, allegedly followed by IBRA and Bank Indonesia, and the 
Ministry of Finance regulations, most particularly regarding who should file 
the claim—debtor (SKB rules) or creditor (Ministry of Finance regulations)—
and when (within three days of the obligation’s maturity under the SKB rules 
vs. no particular time specified by the Ministry of Finance regulations). Given 
this chaotic climate, it is not too surprising that Bank Bali found itself in such 
dire straits. It was also a climate very conducive to the growth of corruption. 
Uncertainty about rules and regulations has been identified in the 
literature as a contributing factor to corruption or, at least, as creating an 
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environment favorable to corrupt dealing. The Bank Bali case involved two 
different sets of rules for the registration of interbank claims, resulting in 
confusion as to which set of rules was applicable and, when a bank chose 
the wrong set of rules and thus forfeited its right to reimbursement of claims 
under the government guarantee scheme, a situation in which desperate 
bankers were vulnerable to approaches from so-called brokers who offered 
to help recoup the funds. Several empirical studies illustrate how an 
uncertain situation, that is, confusing rules, can lead to corruption. In a cross-
section study of 26 African countries, Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000) point 
to the fact that corruption is positively correlated with the degree to which 
“government regulation[s] are vague and lax.” Vague and lax regulations, 
Lambsdorff and Cornelius argue, provide decisionmakers with discretionary 
leeway in application and enforcement. Corrupt officials can deliberately use 
the confusion over rules to put applicants in desperate positions and thus 
increase these applicants’ their willingness to pay bribes. A similar argument 
is developed by Gatti (1999). She reports on the impact of highly diversified 
trade tariff menus in comparison to uniform trade rates. She finds, in a 
sample of 34 countries, that there is a positive association between the 
standard deviation of the trade tariffs and the level of corruption. However, 
endogeneity may make these results may be questionable as it is not clear 
whether the corruption was produced by the differentiated tariff systems 
giving corrupt officials too much discretionary power or whether the tariff 
system was tailored to the needs of already corrupt officials. Gatti reports that 
in her cross-section of countries the results survived tests for endogeneity, in 
which she employed the Gini-coefficient and terms of trade shocks as 
instrument variables.  
Another element in the Bank Bali scandal climate of corruption was 
that there was a large backlog of claims waiting to be dealt with by IBRA. 
Given the long period between filing claims and receiving information on their 
status, desperate banks facing closure due to liquidity problems were on the 
lookout for a faster solution. Financial brokers such as Era Giat Prima took 
advantage of this situation, offering to help in the collection of debt via swap 
agreements. 
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A lack of transparency in the banking sector further contributed to the 
case. Bank Bali was a failing bank in 1999 and had been for much of 1998. 
Because it had failed to meet Bank Indonesia’s capital requirements, Bank 
Bali came under partial supervision by IBRA and its management lost some 
autonomy. Perhaps because no one knew, or wanted to know, who was truly 
in charge, lines of communication became muddled or possibly deliberately 
obscured and the Cessie agreements were not reported to IBRA, Bank Bali’s 
shareholders, the securities regulators, or its auditors (World Bank 2003: 62–
63). Furthermore, the central bank failed to properly supervise the banking 
sector. Bank Indonesia refused to take credit for its decisions and portrayed 
itself as a mere fiscal agent. 
All these factors—uncertainty about rules, length of time for claim 
settlement, and lack of bank transparency—contributed to the climate that 
made Bali-Gate possible. 
Although I have concentrated on this one case, Bank Bali was not the 
only bank involved in scandal during this period of Indonesia’s history. The 
year 2003 saw the jailing of the former director of bank supervision at Bank 
Indonesia, Mr. Heru Supraptomo. He was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment. Mr. Supraptomo is connected to the so-called BLBI scandal. 
BLBI is an acronym for the name of a liquidity support program initiated by 
Bank Indonesia in aid of failing banks at the height of the crisis. Bank 
Indonesia lent out 144.5 trillion Rupiah (roughly US $16.3 billion) as 
emergency loans (BBC April 4, 2003) to not fewer than 43 banks, although 
Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia, Bank Central Asia, Bank Danamon and 
Bank Umum Nasional received two-thirds of the total BLBI funds. These four 
private commercial banks allegedly enjoyed close relationships with 
President Soeharto (World Bank 2003: 61). An investigative audit of the BLBI 
scheme by the Indonesian National Audit Agency reported that of the 144.5 
trillion Rupiah loaned, approximately 96% of the funds are lost and cannot be 
recovered; 59% was misused to provide loans without sufficient collateral. 
The audit found out that only 35 trillion Rupiah were actually accounted for 
(World Bank 2003: 61). The audit report concluded that most of the 
misappropriation was due to criminal offenses and corruption (Asia Times: 
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February 21, 2003), and recommended a criminal investigation of Bank 
Indonesia staff. 
The Indonesian corruption examples are, of course, directly connected 
with the Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis and its aftermath facilitated the 
corrupt dealing engaged in by Indonesian commercial banks. However, a 
crisis is not always necessary for corruption to alter and influence monetary 
policy, as will be shown for countries as diverse as Brazil and Japan. In the 
next chapter, I will address the effects of central bank corruption on the 
inflation rate. 
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III. Central Banks in a Corrupt Environment: How 
Corruption Drives Inflation 
III.1. Introduction 
Economic theory on central bank behavior normally posits that the central 
bank and its employees toil for the common good of society. If problems arise 
due to the central bank’s course of action, these do not stem from a lack of 
commitment to the common goals but from the central bank’s desire to 
further these goals in the interest of society. In a critique of monetary policy 
decisions during the Great Depression (1929–1942) and the Great Inflation 
(1965–1984), Meltzer (2002) points out that these events and developments 
 
were not caused by willful, evil men and women. They did not 
persist because of malevolent central bankers wanted to harm their 
countries and the world. I am persuaded that errors of judgment 
and mistaken theories or interpretations had a large role in causing 
the policy mistakes to be made and perpetuating them once they 
were made. 
 
This statement reflects a common assumption in theoretical models. 
Economic theory perceives central bankers as the pursuers of the common 
good on behalf of society. In reality, this assumption is usually only true for 
central banks in developed countries where the banks and their policies are 
under scrutiny from the press and the government. However, even with this 
scrutiny and despite the recent commitment to transparency on the part of 
central banks, there is still a considerable amount of secrecy surrounding the 
central bank and its decisions. Greenspan (2002: 5) points out: 
 
The undeniable, though regrettable, fact is that the most efficient 
policy making is done out-side the glare of the press. But that 
notion and others have been used too often in the past to justify a 
level of secrecy that turned out to be an unnecessary constraint in 
our obligation to be transparent in conducting the public’s business. 
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Klitgaard (1988: 75) identifies circumstances that favor corruption: 
monopoly power, discretionary decision making by bureaucrats, and weak or 
nonexistent accountability on the part of these decisionmakers. It is easy to 
see that all three conditions could exist in a central bank. When one adds Mr. 
Greenspan’s statement from above to Klitgaard’s conditions for corruptibility, 
one arrives at the theoretical possibility that a central bank may in fact not be 
benevolent—the central banker very well might use his or her position to 
further the banker’s own end. 
Hellman et al. (2000) offer support for this idea. They report on a survey 
of businesspeople in the transition counties of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. In the survey, respondents 
assessed the impact of the central bank’s mishandling of funds on the 
business environment. Hellman et al. report that over one-third of the 
respondents reported suffering onerous effects stemming from the central 
bank’s mishandling of funds. These effects, the respondents claim, result in 
considerable obstacles to development of their businesses. Several other 
surveys have included questions concerning businesspeople’s perception of 
the central bank. I use one of these, the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS; 2002) of the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in my empirical 
investigation into the consequences of corruption in 26 transition countries 
(see Chapter V). 
Corruption in the central bank could result in a realignment of 
monetary policy. One way of seeing how corruption drives monetary policy is 
to look at the inflation rate, which has been the focus of several theoretical 
studies. Braun and DiTella (2000) point to a positive relationship between 
corruption and inflation, arguing that inflation increases corruption. According 
to Braun and DiTella, inflationary processes make it easier for corrupt agents 
to obfuscate a corrupt transaction because the principals are less able to 
check the information from their agents. Although the Braun and DiTella 
study does not directly relate to central banks, Al-Marhubbi (2000) does 
make such a connection. Al-Marhubbi found that corruption increases when 
the amount of a nation’s GDP that can be attributed to the unofficial economy 
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increases. This argument becomes compelling when one takes into account 
that cumbersome regulation forces formerly legitimate business to go 
underground or to pay bribes (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998: 
391). To compensate for the loss in tax revenue due to business going 
underground, the state turns to seigniorage revenue. Interestingly, a larger 
underground economy also increases money demand because its medium of 
exchange is usually strictly cash. These factors suggest that the government 
will find it easier to finance its expenditure by inflation rather than income tax. 
In a similar spirit, Huang and Wei (2003) develop a model in which an honest 
central bank acts in a corrupt surrounding. In their model, corruption leads to 
a deterioration of tax revenue and thereby increases the government’s need 
for additional income, one source of which, Huang and Wei argue, is inflation 
tax revenue. Huang and Wei’s model shows how corruption in the 
government can influence central bank policy but does not explicitly deal with 
corruption in the central bank itself. This situation is addressed by Lambsdorff 
and Schinke (2002), who show how corruption within the central bank 
changes monetary policy. In this approach, where central bank officers “leak” 
bank decisions, leading to illegal gains, it becomes obvious that the central 
banker is not always altruistically devoted to publicly approved goals. As a 
result of this sort of corrupt transaction, the inflation rate is likely to increase.  
These theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence illustrate 
that central banks can indeed be corrupt and that their officers and staff are 
probably not immune from corruption, either. However, I believe that the 
corrupt central banker is the exception, rather than the rule. Even in highly 
corrupt countries, we tend to find central banks with a relatively good 
reputation among local experts. For example, Mozambique rates a poor 2.8 
in the 2005 TI-Corruption Perceptions Index, but in personal correspondence 
local experts stated that the central bank is reputable and honest. Its head of 
banking supervision, Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua, courageously attempted 
to investigate a bank lending fraud in August 2001 and was killed as a result 
of his endeavors (BBC, May 25, 2003). Central bankers in many countries 
are principle-oriented individuals who are not easily involved in corruption. 
However, central bankers, no matter how honest and principled, do 
not live in a vacuum. They can be subjected to pressure from many angles, 
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pressure that may force them onto the slippery slope of corruption. These 
pressures could be related to partisan politics, with its related implications for 
central bank policy, or from profit-seeking private banks that will not hesitate 
to offer a bribe, perhaps cleverly disguised, for information on future central 
bank decisions. Seemingly small corrupt acts by the central bankers 
themselves, however, can shape actual central bank policy. The small, 
beginning acts will eventually be just the tip of the iceberg. My argument in 
this chapter is that acts of individual corruption can have nationwide 
consequences. 
The analysis of the effects of corruption in the central bank is 
organized as follows. Section III.2 introduces the underlying, general natural 
rate model and discusses the basic macroeconomic model. Section III.3 
describes actual corrupt incidents at central banks derived from media 
reports. These actual incidents are the basis for the model of the corrupt 
central banker. Section III.4 shows the natural rate model in action. The 
equilibria are derived and the social implications of the inflationary bias are 
highlighted. Section III.5 uses the modified version of the model to deal with 
welfare implications of corruption in the sphere of the central bank. The 
modified model illustrates how acts of extortion by a central banker can result 
in higher realized inflation rates. Section III.6, An Extension of the Model: The 
Corrupt Central Banker Revisited, discusses an extension of the model that 
allows the identification of different types of central bankers. Section III.7. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations, concludes the analysis. 
III.2. The Basic Macroeconomic Model 
The aim of this section is the derivation of a natural rate model with rational 
inflation expectations of private agents. The model contains a nominal 
rigidity, which allows monetary policy to have short-term real effects on 
employment and, thus, income. The model assesses the welfare effects on 
society of different monetary policy regimes by means of a social objective 
function. The basic model is taken from Jarchow (2003) and modified to suit 
the needs of the present analysis. Traditionally, the natural rate model 
consists of three functions: a macroeconomic demand function, a 
macroeconomic supply function, and a cost function to represent the 
 35
incentives of the central banker and the public. These three functions, as well 
as the social objective function, are explained in detail below.  
The demand function assumes that increases in the real monetary 
stock, t
t
M
p
⎞⎛ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, or the real government expenditure, rG , raise the real national 
income, rY . However, in my model, the influence of real government 
expenditure is omitted because it is not the aim of the present analysis to 
review the effects of government expenditure on the economy. It is the 
effects of corrupt central bankers on monetary policy and the resulting 
welfare effects that are at the heart of my inquiry. Therefore, the real national 
income of an economy as seen from its demand side is: 
(III.1)  ( )r r MpY Y= , ( ) 0
r
d
M
p
d Y
d
> . 
This demand function (III.1) ignores several effects of inflation on the 
demand side of the economy. The model does not take into account the 
influence of inflation on private investments and consumption. Also not taken 
into account is the fact that the expectation of inflation has a negative 
influence on the demand for real cash balances as inflation devalues cash 
holdings. Private agents will try to protect themselves from this loss of 
purchasing power and start to economize their real cash holdings in 
situations of inflation. In the extreme case of hyperinflation, private agents 
might trade their national currency for foreign currencies or exchange their 
cash holdings for gold or other goods perceived to be more price and/or 
value stable. 
To derive a dynamic model in which the central bank controls the 
growth rate of the monetary stock, the aggregate demand function must be 
rewritten as: 
(III.2)  r tt t
t
Mk Y
p
= . 
The factor k is the reciprocal value of the income velocity of money. In 
the present dynamic model, the demand function should show how the real 
national income as seen from the demand side of the economy changed 
between two consecutive periods, t and t-1. Assuming a constant value for k, 
this change in the real national income is given by: 
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(III.3)  ( ) 11
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t t
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M Mk Y Y
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−
−
−
− = − , 
⇔  ( ) 1 11
1
r r t t t t
t t
t t
M p M pk Y Y
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− −
−
−
⋅ − ⋅− = ⋅ . 
Using the definition of the inflation rate yields: 
⇔  ( ) 1 11
1
r r t t t t
t t
t t
M p M pk Y Y
p p
− −
−
−
⋅ − ⋅− = ⋅ . 
Adding and subtracting 1 1t tp M− −  yields: 
⇔  ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
r rt t t t t t t t
t t
t t
p M p M p M p M Y Y k
p p
− − − − − −
−
−
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ = − ⋅⋅ , 
⇔  ( )1 1 1
1
r rt t
t t
t t
p M M p Y Y k
p p
− −
−
−
⋅ Δ − Δ = − ⋅⋅ . 
Applying the definition of the inflation rate ( )1 1t tp p π−= +  and rewriting 
the fraction yields: 
⇔  ( )1 1r rt t t
t t
MM Y Y k
p p
π− −Δ − = − ⋅ , 
⇔  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 11 1 r rt t t tt t t
M M M Y Y k
p M p
ππ π
− −
−
− − −
Δ ⋅ − = − ⋅+ ⋅ ⋅ + , 
⇔  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 11 1 r rt t t tt t
M Mm Y Y k
p p
π
π π
− −
−
− −
⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅+ + . 
Setting the real national income level for the period t-1 equal to 1 
yields: 
1
1
t
t
Mk
p
−
−
= . 
Substituting for the real monetary stock of period t-1: 
⇔  ( ) 11 rt
m Yππ
− = −+ . 
Assuming that the inflation rate stays within reasonable limits and thus 
eliminating the possibility of hyperinflation simplifies the demand function in 
the following way: 
 ⇔ 1
1
r
t
mY ππ
−= + + , 
(III.4)  ⇔ 1rtY m π= + − . 
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Equation (III.4) is the demand function of the present model. Usually, 
natural rate models use a logarithmic approach for the demand function. The 
present model deviates from this standard procedure because the logarithmic 
approach presented difficulties in the derivation of the central banker’s 
corrupt income. However, the simple linear relationship of my model 
produces results that are not significantly different from the results produced 
by the demand function normally used in natural rate models. The real 
national income of the period t still depends on the income of the previous 
period t-1, which is standardized to the value 1 and the difference between 
the growth rate of the money supply, m, and the inflation rate, π . It is 
important to note that the present demand function (III.4) has the same 
properties as the traditional version — it is downward sloping in a 
/ rYπ − diagram. An increased growth rate of the monetary stock shifts the 
curve to the right because for a given constant inflation rate the increased 
growth rate of the money supply stimulates demand and brings about an 
increased level of real national income. 
The labor market behavior of private agents and firms is at the core of 
the macroeconomic supply function. Private agents offer labor units to the 
firm via a trade union, which negotiates the nominal wage w. In wage 
negotiations, the trade union’s stance will depend on the prevailing 
employment situation and the expected inflation rate. Trade unions are able 
to raise the nominal wage if the actual unemployment rate is lower than the 
natural unemployment rate. Furthermore, the unions want to stabilize the real 
wages, and thus they take into consideration the expected inflation rate. 
Therefore, a linear Phillips curve determines the growth rate of the nominal 
wage, w
w
Δ ⎞⎛⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . This curve is augmented by the private agents’ inflation 
expectation, *π : 
(III.6)  ( )*w U Uw π αΔ = + − ,  0α >  
where U  denotes natural unemployment level and U the actual 
unemployment level. Natural unemployment is a factor of this model because 
jobless benefit systems and income taxation distort private agents’ labor 
market decisions (Persson and Tabellini 1990: 9). Natural unemployment is a 
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structural type of unemployment. The rate of unemployment is the difference 
between all the members of a society who are fit enough for work, W 
(workforce), and those who are actually working, N: 
  W NU
W
−= . 
Wage negotiations proceed as follows. If the actual level of 
unemployment exceeds the natural level U , then the wage growth rate is 
negative in order to lower the unemployment level. If the actual 
unemployment rate is lower than its natural value, then the nominal wage 
growth rate is positive. By taking the inflation rate—or, at least, expectations 
about the inflation rate—into account, unions try to achieve a wage that will 
compensate the workers for the real purchasing power that will be lost due to 
future rates of inflation. 
Firms sell their products at a price derived in the following fashion. 
Because the major production factor in this economy is labor, firms calculate 
the price of their products at the average labor cost AvNC  plus a profit margin 
g: 
(III.7)  ( )1 AvNp g C= + ⋅ . 
The average labor costs in this economy are: 
Av
N r
N wC
Y
⋅= , 
where N is the amount of labor units used in the production process and rY  
is the production output measured by the national income. Therefore, one 
can transform Equation (III.7) into: 
(III.7´)  ( )1 rN wp g Y
⋅= + . 
Assuming that the profit margin g and the average work productivity 
are constant, then the inflation rate (the growth rate of prices) equals the 
growth rate of the nominal wage w: 
(III.8)  p w
p w
πΔ Δ= = . 
Substituting for the growth rate of the nominal wage, w
w
Δ ⎞⎛⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , (see 
Equation (III.8)) for the unemployment variable, U, in Equation (III.6), one can 
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derive a special Phillips curve augmented by the inflation expectation of 
private agents: 
(III.9)  * tt t
t
N N
W
π π α ⎞⎛ −= + ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ . 
The assumption of constant, average labor productivity gives rise to an 
implicit specification for the type of production function for this model: 
  rt tY Nβ ′= ⋅ , β ′  is constant and positive. 
Substituting for the labor input N and setting 1
' W
β β
⎞⎛ = ⎟⎜ ⋅⎝ ⎠  in Equation 
(III.9) yields the so-called price function or supply function of the present 
model: 
(III.10) ( )* r rt t tY Yπ π θ= + ⋅ − , 
 ⇔ 
*
r rt t
tY Y
π π
θ
−= + , 
where αβ θ= . 
The price function shows a positive influence of the real income rtY  on 
the inflation rate for given values of the expected inflation rate *tπ  and the 
value of the natural level of real income rY , which is consistent with natural 
level of employment. It is positive sloping in a rY π  diagram. The private 
agents’ inflation expectations are rational. 
The social objective function used in my model is similar to those used 
in most of the research concerned with optimal monetary policy in a natural 
rate framework (see, e.g., Barro and Gordon 1983a; Rogoff 1985; Kydland 
and Prescott 1977). The function assumes that inflation rate or income 
deviations from target values ( )ˆˆ, rYπ  result in costs to society. Deviations 
from the inflation target are termed inflation costs. These costs can manifest 
as so-called shoe leather costs, menu cost of inflation, cost of adjusting the 
tax system when the income taxes are not indexed, and costs stemming from 
unexpected inflation (see Feldstein 1999; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1997). 
The usual response to this type of cost is a call for a reduction in 
inflation to a level close to zero; however, there are other points of view in 
disagreement. Some theories posit that moderate inflation can be welfare 
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enhancing for society. Phelps (1973) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
point out that the socially optimal target value of the inflation rate may be 
positive. This will create a positive inflation tax revenue or seigniorage 
income and this additional income may allow the state to refrain from levying 
other, more distorting taxes. These authors show, however, that the decision 
for (see Phelps 1973) or against (see Friedman 1969) inflation tax revenue 
depends crucially on the theoretical assumptions underlying the model. On 
theoretical grounds alone it cannot be determined whether no seigniorage 
revenue at all (Friedman 1969) or some revenue (Phelps 1973) is optimal. 
The question must be answered empirically (see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 
1997). 
Not meeting the income target causes unemployment costs. The 
societal costs of unemployment arise if the real national income is below its 
socially optimal level of ˆ rY . Unemployment means that not all the resources 
(workers) are being used in the production process, leading to an actual 
national income lower than its potential level. This in turn decreases the 
state’s tax revenue, in states with income taxation, and increases the amount 
society will have to spend on unemployment benefits. The target value of the 
national income is: 
 ˆ r rY n Y= ⋅ , 1n > , 
Recalling ( )1rY = , the socially optimal value simplifies to n. The value 
of n is greater than 1. This assumption is necessary to create an incentive for 
policymakers not to settle for long-term employment ( )1rY =  - the natural 
rate of employment; policymakers must want a rate of employment higher 
than the natural rate. This is also a sound economic assumption. 
Theoretically, the natural employment level, and the corresponding national 
income, is the result of individual profit- or utility-maximizing behavior on the 
part of private firms and agents. In the real world, however, usually there are 
labor market distortions cause by, for example, income taxation or 
unemployment benefits. From the viewpoint of society, the employment 
levels realized in these economies are suboptimal because the relative price 
for leisure is lower than its optimal level (Barro and Gordon  
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1983a: 593). Therefore, Equation (III.11) sums up the costs to society from 
inflation and unemployment: 
(III.11) ( ) ( )22ˆ rC Y nπ π λ= − + − , 0λ > , 
where λ  denotes society’s preference for employment-creating policies 
relative to the inflation target, whose weight is set to 1. If the value for λ  is 
rather high, then the absence of price stability is not very harmful to society, 
whereas not reaching the employment (national income) goal results in 
considerable social cost. 
Substituting for the real national income with the help of the supply 
function changes the social objective function. It is the condition under which 
the central bank minimizes social costs. Assuming that society prefers price 
stability simplifies the algebra. Therefore, the desired inflation rate πˆ  is set to 
0: 
(III.12) ( )
2*
2 1t tC nπ ππ λ θ
⎞⎛ −= + − − ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. 
With the demand function (III.5), the supply function (III.10), and the 
social objective function (III.12), a standard version of the natural rate model 
of the time inconsistency of monetary policy is complete. The following 
section illustrates how corrupt incentives might affect a central banker’s 
decision-making process. 
III.3. Corruption and Seigniorage 
Over the years 2001–2005, I screened reports on corruption at central banks. 
The cases encompass diverse incidents. Very often, the behavior induced 
policy distortions. One apparent distortion, albeit rare, arises with central 
banks that just print money and embezzle it for their own private purposes, or 
those of politicians they depend on. Corrupt income for the central banker (or 
those politicians who control his or her activities) would directly increase the 
money supply. This is exactly what happened in the 1920s in Portugal when 
Alves Reis faked documents that entitled him to order the printing and receipt 
of banknotes from the central bank’s authorized London-based printing firm. 
Although he told his business collaborators that a payment of $850,000 in 
bribes had been made to the Governor and other officials at the Bank of 
Portugal, there was in reality no such payment and no actual malfeasance by 
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the central bank. However, there certainly were serious loopholes in the 
central bank’s oversight system. So although there was no actual corruption 
at the central bank, the case of Alves Reis can be regarded a type of 
corruption with respect to central bank transactions (Bloom 1966). 
In 1979, Erwin Blumenthal, who served as an IMF representative in 
Zaire and was the central bank’s vice-governor there, came up against 
another case of corruption (Blumenthal 1982). In Zaire at the time, there was 
no clear dividing line between the state budget and President Mobutu’s 
personal account. The president and his cronies largely regarded the central 
bank as their personal property. Blumenthal was repeatedly forced to 
disburse central bank funds for the purely private purposes of the president 
and his cronies. At one point, Blumenthal refused to make a payment and 
was threatened by a group of soldiers with submachine guns. In a similar 
vein, President Fujimori in Peru embezzled gold reserves from the central 
bank and transferred them to Japan.10 Seigniorage revenue can cover a loss 
in a central bank’s net equity. Doing so enables the central bank to avert 
bankruptcy and the resulting unstable monetary system.  
The common theme of these last two examples is that there seemed 
to be no dividing line between the private budget of the head of state and that 
of the state itself. President Mobuto and President Fujimori each treated the 
central bank as their private property. They used their power over central 
bank officials to extort money from the bank. When leaders treat the central 
bank as private property, they will seek to maximize their income from 
seigniorage. The relevance of seigniorage to the credibility of a central bank’s 
commitments was mentioned by Barro and Gordon (1983a: 602–03); 
however, they did not provide a formal analysis of the issue. 
Central bankers are often in a position where they might be tempted 
by, or threatened to engage in, corruption. What welfare effects does 
corruption within a central bank have on society? The simplest example 
would involve bank employees simply stealing a part of the bank’s 
seigniorage revenue. (Seigniorage consists of the resources obtained by the 
central bank when issuing currency units.) Unfortunately, the real-world 
occurrences of corruption are never this straightforward. Still, this idea proves 
                                                 
10 See BBC (May 2, 2001) and Financial Times (May 4, 2001). 
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useful. The cases of Mobuto and Fujimori can be used to illustrate. By 
embezzling reserves and gold from the central bank, they increased bank’s 
dependency on seigniorage revenue, which it needed to compensate the 
sustained losses. The more currency units the bank issues, the more 
revenue it makes. If the political leadership views the central bank as its 
property, it will naturally seek to maximize the income it might get from 
seigniorage or increase the central bank’s dependency on the revenue 
therefrom. The central banker becomes the puppet of his masters. 
The present model also allows for subtler forms of self-seeking. 
Niskanen (1975), for example, has been prominent in arguing that the 
bureaucracy has a strong position vis-à-vis Congress and uses its power to 
advance its own bureaucratic goals. Increasing the bureaucratic agency’s 
budget by putting pressure on Congress is an example of more subtle self-
seeking—and one that could apply to central banks. 
It is possible for central bankers to profit from decreasing the money 
supply. For example, they might sell inside information on market operations 
that reduce the monetary stock. However, an increasing money supply is a 
better source of corrupt income. If high officials, either of the government or 
the bank, consider all central bank income to be their personal property, they 
have a direct interest in maximizing seigniorage. Even if it is lower-level 
officials or staff who are involved in corrupt dealing, increasing the 
seigniorage revenue is likely for two reasons. First, a bigger cake means 
bigger slices for everyone. Second, as advanced by Wintrobe and Breton 
(1986), low-level bureaucrats can supplement their income by unofficial 
earnings only by colluding with colleagues because cheating superiors 
requires mutual trust and cooperation among the subordinates, a situation 
equally true of corrupt agreements, which are arduous to seal and enforce: 
denunciation by a disaffected (or excluded) colleague is a constant threat 
(Lambsdorff 2002). Trust is essential to a successful corrupt operation. For 
example, say a central banker is taking side payments for decreasing the 
money supply. He is thus lowering the potential income of corrupt colleagues 
and is decreasing his own income from seigniorage. Trust begins to break 
down and the risk of denunciation increases. This example illustrates why 
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corruptly increasing the money supply better serves to assure loyalty among 
subordinates. 
Let us assume a simple relationship between the bribe received by the 
central banker (B) and the increasing monetary stock: 
  1t tB M M M −= Δ = − . 
The weight κ  is introduced. It will serve to measure the central 
banker’s preference for additional corrupt income. It enters the central 
banker’s objective function to show how he values the bribe payment in 
relation to the social costs that will occur due to his policy decisions (see 
Equation (III.12)). For simplicity, any risk premiums the central banker might 
request are ignored. In this model, the central bank is assumed to be either 
sufficiently independent or involved in interactions so complex that it is 
almost impossible for supervisors to know about, much less control, all the 
deals between the central bank and private sector. If the weight κ  is set to 0, 
bribe payments do not influence the central banker at all. He is incorruptible. 
Corrupt income is not the only justification for including this additional 
term into the objective function of the central bank’s employees. Legal 
incentives, such as bonuses based on a share of inflation tax revenue 
generated, can be modeled in a similar way. Even nonmonetary incentives, 
such as better working conditions or a luxurious new bank building paid for 
by seigniorage revenue, can change the objective function in the same way 
as a bribe payment or a bonus system. 
Because the central banker does not suffer from money illusion, the 
real bribe will be introduced into the social objective function. The growth rate 
of the monetary stock is the central bank’s primary policy tool in the natural 
rate framework. The demand function determines the growth rate 
endogenously. To determine the bribe term as a function of the central 
bank’s policy tool, the real change in the money supply between the period t 
and period t-1 needs to be related to the growth rate of the money supply m: 
(III.13) 1r t t
t
M MB
p
κ −−= , 
  ⇔ 1 1 1
1
r t t t t
t t t
M M M MB m
M p p
κ κ− − −
−
−= = . 
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Using the definition of the inflation rate ( ) 11t tp pπ −= + ⋅  yields: 
  ⇔ 1
11
r t
t
MmB
p
κ
π
−
−
= + . 
The amount of the real bribe payment received by the central banker 
can now be determined with the help of the demand function (III.4) and the 
supply function (III.10). Substituting for the growth rate of the monetary stock 
m and using the supply function yields: 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 11r rt ttMB Ypκ π ππ − −= − + ++ , 
 ⇔ 1
1
1
1
r rt
t
t
MB Y
p
κ π
π
−
−
⎞⎛= − +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . 
Because the real national income for the period t-1 was set equal to 1, 
k substitutes for the real monetary stock of this period: 
 ⇔ 1
1
r r
tB k Y
πκ π
⎞⎛= − +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . 
Inserting the supply function and assuming that the inflation rate π  
stays within reasonable limits, one can approximate 
1
π ππ ≈+ : 
(III.13’) 
*
rB k π πκ πθ
⎞⎛ −= + ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. 
Inserting the real bribe into the objective function of the general public 
yields: 
(III.14) ( )
2* *
2 1C n kπ π π ππ λ κ πθ θ
⎞ ⎞⎛ ⎛− −= + − − − +⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎝⎠ ⎠
. 
For the sake of simplicity, the corrupt incentive enters the standard 
model of time inconsistent monetary policy in the way stated above. The 
central bank employee (e.g., the Governor) weighs the positive benefit to him 
of the corrupt income against the overall effects that the new monetary policy 
and its consequences for inflation and unemployment will have on him. For 
example, a rise in the unemployment rate might affect him negatively in that 
society tends to become more unstable when a high unemployment rate 
prevails for some time; thus, he might not feel safe driving his new Mercedes. 
The negative effects of inflation on his personal welfare would be the same 
as for all members of society, that is, his money will buy less and less.  
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The objective function of the corrupt central banker now depicts this 
incentive to gain additional corrupt income. Because this extra income lowers 
the damaging effects inflation will have on the central banker personally, the 
real bribe term rB  is subtracted from the social objective function (III.12). The 
objective function (III.14) is written here with the exponent ( )0κ ≥ . The 
present objective function can encompass the incentives of the corrupt as 
well as the incorruptible central banker from the basic underlying model. If κ  
is set to equal 0, Equation (III.14) simplifies to the relevant objective function 
for an incorruptible central banker (see Equation (III.12)). The exponent 
( )0κ =  points to the situation of an incorruptible central banker. When 
corruption is prevalent within the central bank, it will have the exponent 
( )0κ > . 
Walsh (1995) uses a similar approach to derive a wage contract for 
central bankers that will overcome the inflationary bias in monetary policy 
and still allow the central bank discretion in its response to stochastic shocks 
from the supply side of the economy. He analyzes an incentive scheme for 
central bankers that makes their wages dependent on the bank’s 
performance. The scheme can take the form of a direct income-increasing 
payment to the central banker or be an increase in the central bank’s budget, 
which the central bank may use to enhance working conditions for its 
employees. Walsh (1995) implemented this incentive scheme into his model 
by changing the standard objective function (similar to Equation (III.12)) into 
a utility function. This utility function depends on the government’s direct 
payment to the central banker; the usual cost function is then subtracted from 
this direct payment. 
III.4. Monetary Policy of an Incorruptible Central Bank 
The following deliberations on the standard model of time inconsistent 
monetary policy follow the well-trodden paths of Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
and other authors such as Barro and Gordon (1983a) or Rogoff (1985). The 
starting point of this welfare analysis is a state of price stability. This price 
stability equilibrium is necessary to provide an incentive for the politically 
active central bank to defect from its announced policies. The economy is in 
a stationary equilibrium. The real national income is equal to its natural level 
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1rY = . The central bank announces that it wants to continue the price stable 
policy in the next period. Price stability then demands that the growth rate of 
the quantity of money is equal to zero. If the public and, especially, the trade 
unions find credible, it will be the foundation for wage negotiations in the next 
period. If private agents believe in the central bank’s anti-inflation policy, they 
set their expectations accordingly: 
  * 0tπ = . 
If the central bank sticks to its policy announcement, the real national 
income can only equal its natural level ( )1r rY Y= = . Substituting for the 
inflation rate ( )0π =  and the realized real income level ( )1rY =  in the cost 
function allows assessing the social costs that arise in this situation: 
(III.15) ( ) ( )2 220 1 1RC n nλ λ= + − = − . 
However, the price stability equilibrium announced by the bank may 
not reflect its true intent. But if it can persuade the trade unions to believe 
that the price-stability policy will be followed (even when it intends not to), the 
deception can be used to lower social costs as compared to the situation 
characterized by Equation (III.15) and an inflation rate of zero. In the 
literature, this equilibrium is often called the “deception solution.” To 
differentiate better between the discretionary policy equilibrium and the 
deception equilibrium the present paper speaks of a trick the central bank is 
pulling on society. Trick and deception will henceforth be used 
synonymously. The letter T stands for the trick equilibrium. A discretionary 
policy equilibrium is denoted by the letter D. 
In this model, private agents are assumed to behave rationally: they 
are aware of the model the central bank uses to optimize its strategy. The 
difference between the trick and the discretionary policy equilibriums is as 
follows. In the trick equilibrium, agents possess complete information but are 
deceived by the central bank regarding future monetary policy. In the 
discretionary policy equilibrium, agents use their knowledge to prevent the 
central bank from deceiving them. They realize that the central bank will 
cheat them and thus they force the central bank to set an inflation rate that 
will fulfill their expectations. 
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Substituting for the real national income, one obtains an objective 
function, which only depends on the expected inflation rate and the actual 
realized inflation rate. The cost minimum of this function is given by the first 
derivative under the condition that private agents expect the inflation rate will 
equal zero ( )* 0π = : 
(III.16) ( ) 20 2 1ttC nκ ππ λ θ=
⎞⎛= + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
  ( )0 2 2 1 0tt
t
C n
κ πλππ θ θ
=∂ ⎞⎛= + − − =⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ , 
(III.17) ( )2 1t nλθπ θ λ
−= + . 
The corresponding costs that occur in the case of surprise inflation can 
be established by first looking at the real national income of that period: 
  1r ttY
π
θ= + , 
 ⇔ ( ) 221rt nY λ θ λθ λ
− + += + , 
 ⇔ 
2
2
r
t
nY λ θθ λ
+= + . 
Substituting the real national income and the inflation rate of the trick solution 
one obtains: 
  ( ) ( ) 2 2222 2 21rT t n nC Y n nλθ λ θπ λ λθ λ θ λ⎞⎛ − ⎞⎛ += + − = + −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ , 
 ⇔ ( )
2 22 2
2 2
1
T
n n n nC
λθ λ θ θ λλθ λ θ λ
⎞⎛ − ⎞⎛ + − −= +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, 
 ⇔ ( )
2 2
2
2 2
1 1
T
n nC
λθ λ θθ λ θ λ
⎞⎛ − − ⎞⎛= + −⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, 
 ⇔ ( )( )
( )
( )
2 22 2 4
2 22 2
1 1
T
n n
C
λ θ λθ
θ λ θ λ
− −= +
+ +
, 
 ⇔ ( )( ) ( )
22
2
22
1
T
n
C
λθ λ θθ λ
−= +
+
, 
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 ⇔ ( )2 22 1TC nθ λθ λ= −+ . 
The social costs of the trick equilibrium initially are lower than the 
costs caused by the initial price stability equilibrium. However, after the end 
of the first period, the costs will rise again. Private agents will realize their 
mistake and will adjust their expected inflation rate. The economy will head 
toward a long-run equilibrium with a higher inflation rate and a national 
income at its natural level. The higher inflation rate is a direct result of the 
central bank’s decision to defect from its original announcement of a 
monetary policy aiming price stability, which defection was undertaken so as 
to lower the social costs of inflation and unemployment. To maintain the initial 
equilibrium, it is imperative for the central bank to convince private agents 
that it will pursue price stability. Once it has achieved this goal, the central 
bank alters its policy; but because private agents are not yet aware of this 
sea change, the bank can achieve a temporary increase in the employment 
rate by allowing the monetary stock to expand. The increased employment—
albeit at the cost of a positive inflation rate—lowers the central bank’s cost 
below the level of the initial equilibrium. An unbound central bank will use the 
trick solution to its own advantage. 
Of course, in a rational expectations model, because private agents 
use the social objective function to predict the course of monetary policy, 
they are fully aware of the central bank’s strategy and are not fooled by its 
announcements regarding price stability. This knowledge is then 
implemented in wage negotiations. The necessary condition for the trick 
equilibrium is an expected inflation rate *tπ  that is equal to zero. However, in 
the rational expectations model, private agents will not fulfill this condition 
because they put no trust in the central bank’s policy announcements 
implying a continuation of its price-stable policy. For simplicity’s sake, let us 
assume that private agents do not err in their predictions that form the basis 
of their rational expectations: 
(III.18) *t tπ π= . 
Due to the rational expectations assumption and symmetrical 
information conditions between private agents and the central bank, private 
agents form their inflation expectations as follows. 
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• First, they minimize the social objective function for a given value *tπ  
( )*0 2 2 1 0t tt
t
C n
κ π πλππ θ θ
= ⎞⎛ −∂ = + − − =⎟⎜∂ ⎝ ⎠
, 
⇔ ( )( )2 * 1 0t t t nθ π λ π π θ+ − − − = . 
• Then the definition (III.18) is applied: 
( )( )2 1 0t t t nθ π λ π π θ+ − − − = , 
(III.19) ⇔ ( )0 1D nκ λπ θ=
−= . 
The inflation rate is higher than in the trick equilibrium or the initial 
price stability equilibrium in the discretionary policy equilibrium. The new 
equilibrium is stationary because the inflation rate 0D
κπ =  is exactly what private 
agents expected. The real national income stands at its natural level ( )1rY = . 
This type of equilibrium results in the highest (so far) social costs. They 
equal: 
(III.20) ( ) ( ) ( )2 20 1 1D nC nκ λπ λθ= ⎞⎛ −= + −⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )22 20 2 1 1D nC nκ λπ λθ= −= + − , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )20 22 1DC nκ λπ θ λθ= = + − . 
Private agents’ rational reaction to the central bank’s use of surprise 
inflation to lower social costs is at the core of the monetary policy debate. If a 
central bank wants to create higher employment by printing money, rational 
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private agents will anticipate this behavior and respond appropriately 
during wage negotiations. The necessary condition for the trick equilibrium, 
that is, that the private agents are deceived into believing that inflation will be 
zero, will not be fulfilled. 
Figure III.1: Standard Model of the Time Inconsistent  
Monetary Policy. 
Author’s presentation, similar to Jarchow (2003: 282). 
 
The problem of time inconsistency can be presented with the help of a 
/rY π − diagram and a * /π π  diagram, as shown in Figure III.1. The left 
diagram depicts the incentives of the central bank and the public by society’s 
objective function. The objective functions are presented as iso-cost ellipses, 
which center on the point 0P . The further these ellipses are away from their 
origin, the higher are the costs incurred. The initial price-stable equilibrium is 
depicted by the point 1P  in the /
rY π − diagram. This graphical presentation 
makes it clear why an inflation expectation of zero is the necessary condition 
for the trick equilibrium, denoted by point 2P . This point is marked by the 
minimum social costs because it is the tangential point of the relevant supply 
function ( )*0 0s π =  and the iso-cost ellipse TC . Under the given expected 
inflation rate of zero, the best equilibrium in this one-shot game is point 2P . 
The social costs are minimized ( )R TC C> . 
In Figure III.1, the discretionary equilibrium is denoted by the 
equilibrium 3P . The necessary condition for the trick solution does not 
π
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materialize because the private agents are aware of the incentives that guide 
the central bank’s policy. To protect themselves from the resulting lowered 
real wage, private agents take into consideration the bank’s incentives and 
use the central banker’s reaction function to determine the expected inflation 
rate. This inflation rate determines the set of possible equilibria, one of which 
the central banker must choose. These equilibria are all situated on the 
supply function, ( )*1 Ds π π= . Under this condition, the central bank must 
determine what growth rate of the monetary stock will minimize the costs that 
will be incurred. This strategy is given by the discretionary equilibrium 3P . The 
expectations of the private agents are fulfilled ( *Dπ π= ) and, under the given 
condition, the central banker chose the inflation rate that lowered the social 
costs. 
The incentives of the central banker are summed up by the central 
banker’s reaction function. This function allows determining the central 
banker’s reaction to differing inflation expectations of private agents involved 
in wage negotiations. The reaction function ( )*π π  and the condition for a 
long-run stationary equilibrium ( )*π π=  are depicted in the * /π π − diagram. 
A stationary equilibrium only occurs when the two lines intersect. This is the 
case for the discretionary equilibrium 3P . 
As can be seen from the graphical presentation, the central bank’s 
optimal behavior changes over time. At first, it is socially optimal for the 
central banker to make the private agents believe that the anti-inflationary 
monetary policy, which they have become accustomed to, will continue. 
Once this expectation of price stability is fixed and reflected in labor contracts 
that cannot be changed for this period, it is optimal for the central bank to 
defect from this policy. Now it is possible for the central bank to lower social 
costs from ( )0 0Cκ =  to ( )0 0TCκ κπ= = . It will seize that opportunity and increase 
the growth rate of the monetary stock to stimulate economic activity and 
thereby employment. 
In summary, changes in a central bank’s optimal behavior are at the 
core of the term time inconsistency of optimal strategies, a situation 
introduced in the literature by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The incentive to 
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inflate is taken into account by private agents, who then force the central 
bank to raise the growth rate of the money supply even higher than the bank 
would have done by way of the trick equilibrium; the economy ends up in 
high-inflation equilibrium with the inflation rate 0D
κπ = . 
III.5. Corrupt Monetary Policy 
This section focuses on the case of a corrupt central banker. The following 
analysis is similar to the one conducted for the incorruptible central banker in 
the previous section. At the beginning of the analysis, the economy is in a 
stationary equilibrium and is in a state of price stability. In this model, if the 
central bank decides to follow a price stable path of monetary policy, the 
growth rate of the monetary stock m is equal to zero and there is no 
seigniorage income (see Equation (III.14)). In this equilibrium, the real 
national income and the inflation rate do not differ, regardless of whether the 
central banker is corrupt. The social costs of this equilibrium are the same as 
in the case of an incorruptible central bank, although the cost function of the 
corrupt central banker includes the bribe term. 
If the central bank announces that it will continue this price-stable 
monetary policy in the next period, it will not seem credible to the private 
agents. To show that it is (at least temporarily) optimal for the central banker 
to increase the growth rate of the monetary stock m and thereby the inflation 
rate, the augmented social cost function of the central banker (III.14) is 
minimized to derive the inflation rate trick equilibrium for a corrupt central 
banker 0T
κπ > . The necessary condition for the trick equilibrium is that private 
agents believe the bank’s announcement that it is aiming for price stability 
( )* 0tπ = . 
The initial step in finding the trick solution is the taking of the first 
derivative. This derivative can be transformed into the central banker’s 
reaction function: 
  ( )*2 12 1dC n k
d
λ π π θπ κπ θ θ θ
⎞⎛ − += + − − −⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )2 *2 2 2 2 1 1n kθ λ π λπ λθ κθ θ+ = + − + + , 
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(III.21) ⇔ ( ) ( )*2 22 1 122 2 2 2
n kλθ κθ θλπ πθ λ θ λ
− + += ++ + . 
Equation (III.21) is the central banker’s reaction function to private 
inflation expectations. This reaction function contains the trick solution and 
the discretionary policy equilibrium. As stated previously, a necessary 
condition for the trick solution is an expected inflation rate of zero. Setting the 
variable *π  equal to zero yields the trick solution: 
(III.22) ( ) ( )22 1 12 2T
n kλθ κθ θπ θ λ
− + += + . 
This is the inflation rate that the central banker will set in cases where 
private agents can be tricked into believing that the price-stable initial 
equilibrium is the central bank’s long-time commitment. If private agents 
believe that the realized inflation rate will be zero, it creates a situation ripe 
for exploitation by the central banker. Corruption ( )κ  increases the realized 
inflation rate in the trick equilibrium (see Equation III.22). The additional 
corrupt incentive induces the central banker to increase the growth rate of the 
monetary stock. The influence of corrupt deals on the central banker’s 
decision is captured by the weight κ . If the central banker becomes more 
interested in the proceeds from corrupt deals, the weight κ  increases. The 
influence of the bribe term is positive on the inflation rate in the trick 
equilibrium. Therefore, the inflation rate in this equilibrium increases in κ .  
What is the corrupt, or opportunistic, central banker’s rationale for 
raising the inflation rate? There are several factors that influence the corrupt 
central banker’s objective function. While increasing the growth rate of the 
monetary stock will increase the real national income and therefore help 
meet the employment target, the high inflation rate clearly increases costs as 
the social costs of inflation soar. However, this is offset for the banker 
because he obtains additional income through bribery. Seeing that he has a 
very good chance of obtaining substantial employment gains by causing an 
unexpected drop in real wages due to higher inflation rates and that he also 
has some increased revenue from seigniorage, he chooses this option and 
therefore favors high inflation policies. 
This additional corruption term leads to more mistrust in the central 
bank and its announcements. The traditional inflation bias introduced by 
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Kydland and Prescott (1977) is complemented with an additional corruption-
induced inflation bias. Rational agents mistrust the central bank because they 
are fully aware that its actions are guided by the central banker’s personal 
interests. This awareness allows them to avoid the central banker’s obvious 
trap and they will estimate the central banker’s strategy from his objective 
function. Setting the expected inflation rate *π  equal to π  yields: 
  ( ) ( )2 22 1 122 2 2 2
n kλθ κθ θλπ πθ λ θ λ
− + += ++ + , 
  ⇔ ( ) ( )22 22 1 122 2 2 2
n kλθ κθ θθπ θ λ θ λ
− + +⎞⎛ =⎟⎜ + +⎝ ⎠
, 
(III.23) ( ) ( )2 1 1
2D
n kλ κ θπ θ
− + += . 
Rationality in this context does signify that the private agents 
completely understand the incentives under which the central banker 
optimizes his strategy. This implies that the central banker cannot credibly 
commit to a course of action other than the one projected by the inflation rate 
of Equation (III.23). 
Corruption or more precisely the central banker’s preference for 
additional corrupt income strictly increases inκ . In this situation, a stronger 
preference for additional income from corrupt deals increases the inflation 
rate in the discretionary equilibrium. As shown by the studies on time 
inconsistency of optimal plans, a central bank that claims it is trying to serve 
the public by causing surprise inflation is not credible (cf. Section III.4). 
Private agents see through this claimed benevolence and force the central 
bank to fulfill their expectations. Thus, because the private agents are not 
deceived as to the bank’s intentions, surprise inflation is not possible.  
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Figure III.2: Corruption in the Central Bank. 
 
What impact does the corrupt central banker’s decision have on the 
welfare of private agents? This question can be answered with the help of the 
two diagrams shown in Figure III.2. One diagram shows the demand and 
supply function and the public’s objective function; the other is a graphical 
presentation of the central banker’s reaction function and the geometrical 
location of all stationary equilibria, the *π π= − line. The necessary and 
sufficient condition for a stationary equilibrium is that the private agents’ 
expectations are correct and they thus do not have to adjust their plans to 
correct planning mistakes. Although the fact that the corrupt incentive 
increases the inflation rate has already been discussed, the reaction function 
of the central banker must be scrutinized in further detail. The central 
banker’s reaction function enables one to deduct the trick solution for the 
incorruptible as well as the corrupt central banker: 
(III.21) ( ) ( )*2 2
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2 1 12
2 2 2 2
n kλθ κθ θλπ πθ λ θ λ
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. 
The slope of the central banker’s reaction function is not changed by 
inclusion of the corrupt incentive in the * /π π − diagram. The income 
stemming from corrupt deals increases the inflation rate in both the trick and 
the discretionary equilibria because the reaction function’s intercept 
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increases inκ . This shifts the reaction function upward and away from the 
diagram’s origin. Combining the two diagrams yields important insight into 
the social costs stemming from corruption in the central bank. 
 The /rY π − diagram is a graphical representation of the private 
agents’ objective function. The social costs of the different equilibria are 
given by the iso-cost ellipses, which center on point 0P . This point denotes 
society’s “point of bliss”, which is when its demands for high employment and 
price stability are fully met. The costs to society at this point are zero. The 
further the iso-cost ellipses are away from the point of bliss, the higher are 
the corresponding social costs. Introducing the corrupt preference into the 
central banker’s objective function shifts the central banker’s reaction 
function upward in the * /π π − diagram. 
Again, the corruption-free equilibria are given by the points 2P  and 3P , 
where 2P  denotes the trick solution and 3P  the discretionary equilibrium. The 
point 1P  indicates the initial price stability equilibrium. In the /
rY π − diagram, 
the tangential points of the relevant supply function and the relevant iso-cost 
line characterize the trick and the discretionary equilibria. Until this point, the 
graph shows the same results as did the analysis of the corruption-free 
situation. These findings are included for reference when analyzing the 
welfare costs due to corruption in the central bank. 
If the corrupt incentive is added, which means the central banker is 
suddenly interested in additional income, the inflation rates increase beyond 
the values obtained in the corruption-free situation. The diagrams make it 
obvious that corruption in the central bank increases social costs. 
The corrupt incentive causes an upward shift in the central banker’s 
reaction function that reflects this change in the −ππ /* diagram. This 
influence causes both inflation rates to be higher than in the corruption-free 
situation ( ),D D T Tκ κπ π π π< < . The intercept of the reaction function gives the 
inflation rate in the trick equilibrium 4P . It stands at the value of
κπD . The slope 
of the reaction function is not affected by the inclusion of the additional 
corrupt incentive. The discretionary equilibrium lies at the intersection of the 
line of stationary equilibria, the −= *ππ line, and the corrupt central banker’s 
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reaction function ( )κππ ,* . Because the slope of the reaction function is 
positive but smaller than 1, the location of the equilibrium for the corruption 
laden situation is shifted away from 3P , the discretionary equilibrium without 
corruption. 
The second diagram (left-hand side of Figure III.2) enables one to 
assess the welfare implications of corrupt monetary policy. As in the 
* /π π − diagram, there exists a line of stationary equilibria. This is the 
( 1rY = )-line. All stationary equilibria on this line mean that private agents do 
not have to reconsider their strategy, or, in other words, if the actual inflation 
rate meets the private agents’ expectations, the resulting real national 
income reflects the natural rate. The equilibria are therefore stationary. If the 
corrupt preference weight κ  takes on positive values, the inflation rate 
increases. The discretionary equilibrium is shifted upward on this line if the 
central banker is generating corrupt revenue, because the corruptibility of the 
central banker introduced an additional inflationary bias (see Equation III.23). 
The stronger the central banker’s preference for additional income, the 
further outward the equilibrium is shifted. Because the social cost ellipses 
only reflect the costs of society, the corrupt central banker’s trick solution and 
discretionary solution are no longer tangential points. The supply function, 
which gives the set of possible real income and inflation rate combinations for 
the given inflation expectation of ( )* Dκπ π= , intersects the iso-cost ellipse at 
the point 5P . 
The social costs increase because the location of the corrupt 
discretionary equilibrium 5P  is shifted further away from the point of bliss 0P  
as compared to 3P , the corruption-free discretionary solution (see Figure 
III.2). An increased corrupt preference on the part of the central banker has 
onerous effects on society because society does not benefit from the 
revenue realized from corrupt dealing, but it does have to bear the costs of 
the resulting increased inflation rate. 
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III.6. An Extension of the Model: The Corrupt Central Banker 
Revisited 
The central banker’s additional income from corruption is modeled along the 
lines of the seigniorage. Normally, seigniorage models take for granted that 
real money demand decreases with inflation, resulting in a Laffer-curve effect 
for seigniorage revenue, which is a common assumption. As in Easterly, 
Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) or Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), 
economists normally assume that inflation tax revenue has properties similar 
to other tax revenue functions and thus assume a kind of Laffer-curve. To 
achieve a Laffer-curve for seigniorage revenue, money demand needs to 
decrease with higher inflation rates. This assumption can be supported if 
certain money demand functions are used in the model and, indeed, a money 
demand that decreases with higher inflation rates can be introduced into the 
present model. Doing so will yield interesting insights into the behavior of 
central bankers. Therefore, it is assumed that the money demand decreases 
with the rising inflation expectations of private agents. In the underlying 
model of Sections III.4, and III.5, demand in the goods market is a positive 
function of real money balances: 
  rt t
t
M k Y
p
= ⋅ . 
To introduce a reduction in money demand caused by increased 
inflation expectations, *π , into the present model, the parameter k, which 
relates the money demand to the real national income, must decrease in *π : 
(III.22) ( )*rt t
t
M Y k
p
π= ⋅ , * 0dkdπ < . 
How does this function work in the real world? Very often, countries 
with high inflation rates experience the phenomena of currency substitution. 
To protect themselves from the ongoing devaluation of the national currency, 
local residents start to keep their money in more stable, foreign currency 
units. However, this currency substitution must be a mutual affair: buyers and 
sellers must both consent to the use of one international currency as a 
substitute for the undesired local currency. 
In the basic natural rate model, which includes the unmodified version 
of the corrupt central banker presented in Section III.4, the inflation 
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expectation always increased the inflation rate. Including a negative influence 
of the expected inflation rate on money demand changes this result. This 
negative dependency can bring about the situation that high, expected 
inflation rates have a disciplinary effect on the central banker. Utilizing 
Equation (III.22) and taking the derivative for *π , I determine conditions for 
the effect of inflation expectations lowering realized levels of inflation: 
  ( ) *'* 2 212 02 2 2 2
d k
d π
κθ θπ λ
π θ λ θ λ
+= + <+ + ,
11 
  ⇔ ( ) *'2 1 0kπλ κθ θ+ + < , 
(III.23) ⇔ ( ) *'12 kπ
κθλ θ< − + . 
What is the meaning of this constraint? A high level of mistrust from 
private agents as measured by high expected inflation rates forces the 
central banker to set lower inflation rates and, therefore, lower growth rates 
of monetary stock. The inflation-reducing effect of the inflation expectations 
will occur in the case of a central banker who has a low preference for the 
employment target. Using the expression coined by Rogoff (1985), one can 
say that a rather conservative central banker can bring about this inflation-
reducing effect. 
This use of mistrust to tame a corrupt and conservative central banker 
contradicts a common belief in the theory of monetary policy. Generally, 
economists regard trust in the institution of the central bank as one pillar of 
social capital. If the public realizes that the central banker is using his or her 
role as head of the central bank to further the banker’s own goals, the public 
begins to mistrust the central bank. This mistrust according to the 
(International Monetary Fund 2000) might be predominately bad. The public 
has to have trust in the institutions of the central bank and its ability to 
conduct monetary policy. However, trust in the central bank is not an 
absolute value; trusting the wrong people or institution is not necessarily 
welfare enhancing. In the framework of the models on time inconsistent 
monetary policy, this trust exists only if the central bank publicly 
communicates the anti-inflation convictions of its staff or if it is bound by a 
rule to a predictable policy path. 
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The result given by constraint (III.23) turns this result around. The 
conservative and corrupt central banker is not trustworthy in the eyes of the 
public. Rational private agents understand the banker’s self-centered basis 
for monetary policy, and a high expected inflation rate signifies their mistrust. 
In the modified version of the model, such mistrust can have a positive 
impact—the conservative and corrupt central banker is forced to set lower 
inflation rates. Although, ceteris paribus, the corrupt central banker has an 
incentive to raise the growth rate of the monetary stock and subsequently the 
inflation rate, inflation costs start to have an impact on the banker. The 
temporary employment stimulation from surprise inflation is of little solace 
because the central banker is only marginally interested in the employment 
rate. 
The taming effect of mistrust does not apply to central bankers who 
care little about inflation. Following Guzzo and Velasco (1999), the so-called 
populist central banker is primarily interested in the creation of jobs. I add 
that if he or she is corruptible, the banker is also interested in the revenue to 
be generated from corruption. In the context of the present model, the weight 
λ  must be larger than the constraint (III.23). Raising the employment level 
beyond its natural level will help the banker reach his or her goals. 
III.7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
An inflation bias may arise not only when the public distrusts the central bank 
commitments but also when its benevolence comes under suspicion. The 
theoretical model of the corrupt central banker shows that corruption in the 
central bank can lead to distorted policy decisions. Influential powers outside 
the central bank might hinder it in performing its duties. As central bankers 
are offered more corrupt deals from the outside, and as the outside influence 
of corrupt political leadership forces the central bank to fulfill its demands, 
inflation rates increase. The credibility of anti-inflationary announcements is 
undermined by corruption among central bankers and by these outside 
influences. Even when rejecting the standard assumptions that the desired 
level of income is above its natural rate and that central bankers are tempted 
                                                                                                                                          
11
*
'kπ  denotes the first derivative of the function ( )*k π  for the expected inflation rate, *π . 
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by short-term employment gains, as is done by Blinder (1997: 13), an 
inflation bias can occur due to the nonbenevolence of the central bank. 
The results derived from this model suggest a variety of policy 
recommendations. It appears that governments may face an uncomfortable 
choice between honest populists and corrupt central bankers. Low values for 
κ  and λ  are desirable from a theoretical point of view. Although an applicant 
for the job at central bank should be conservative and incorruptible, this 
combination is not necessarily available. In this situation, the government 
faces the dilemma of either choosing an honest populist who places a high 
value on employment, that is, his personal weight λ  is high, which will result 
in a large inflation bias, or choosing a conservative who is known to be 
corruptible. 
Huang and Wei (2003) argue that in a corrupt environment a populist 
is preferred because he or she is more likely to optimize seigniorage. But 
what happens when income from seigniorage is not passed on to the public 
but instead embezzled? 
The same uncomfortable choice might arise for a constituency 
confronted in general elections with deciding between an honest populist and 
a corrupt conservative politician who will be able to exploit the central bank. It 
is straightforward that reducing corruption by lowering κ  for both actors is 
always preferable. However, choosing between conservatism and honesty is 
a more arduous decision. Whether a populist performs better than a corrupt 
conservative largely depends on the parameter values of the model. Social 
welfare is described by the cost function—alas, this time without the corrupt 
income term. The employment term can be omitted because rational actors 
prevent equilibrium employment levels from reacting to the policymaker 
choices. Therefore, society ‘s choice will crucially depend on the level of 
discretionary inflation. A populist will be preferred if: 
(III.24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2 1 1p p c cn k n kλ κ θ λ κ θ− + + < − + + , 
with subindices denoting the populist and the conservative actor. 
Rearranging yields: 
(III.25) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1p c c pn kλ λ θ κ κ− − < + −  
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High values for θ  or k imply that the society is better off with a populist. This 
results from the corrupt incentive created by high values of these parameters. 
A large value for the parameter k implies a large monetary stock and ample 
opportunity for a corrupt actor to increase his or her own lot—at the expense 
of raising the inflation bias. The central banker (or politician) is tempted to 
deviate from his or her public duties. Society prefers an honest banker (or 
politician) who can better resist these temptations, even if he or she is a 
populist. Large values for θ  denote large increases in inflation as production 
increases or, vice versa, little possibility of raising production by deviating 
from announced inflation levels. A populist thus loses interest in raising 
inflation and is less threatening to society. In contrast, a corrupt conservative 
central banker retains his incentive. A large value of θ  therefore distracts a 
corrupt actor from social goals, making populists preferable. 
 In contrast, societies with low money demand and little price flexibility 
will prefer a corrupt central banker to an honest populist. Societies with rigid 
prices and wages, for example, due to price and wage controls, may not be 
overly concerned about corruption among their leadership due to the fact that 
corruption rarely arises when there is little to be gained from it. Thus, in such 
a society, honesty is not so important. 
Another implication of my results relates to central bank independence. 
Economists tend to trust central banks, at least more than they do elected 
governments, and believe that insulating central banks from political 
interference is helpful in fighting inflation. Even those who are critical with 
regard to the effectiveness of independence relate this more to the failure of 
achieving actual independence, rather than to intrinsic problems with the 
concept. Keefer and Stasavage (2002), for example, argue that 
independence fails to bring about favorable effects where governments can 
terminate independence at will. Even central bank accountability is 
sometimes looked upon with skepticism because it may be in conflict with 
central bank independence. But both independence and accountability may 
be inadequate safeguards where nonbenevolence of the central bank 
becomes an issue. Although providing central banks with a high level of 
independence will insulate them from troublesome political interference, such 
independence could also allow them the leeway to carry out self-seeking 
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transactions. Therefore, some checks and balances on central bank behavior 
could help to contain corruption and thus lower the inflation bias. 
The secrecy that often surrounds central bank operations equally 
deserves scrutiny, especially if the secrecy is conducive to making deals that 
benefit only the central bank. This type of secrecy will result in public distrust 
of the institution, and thus, as modeled above, in the upward revision of 
inflation expectations. Concise codes of conduct and substantial legal 
sanctions for their violation are required to make central banks less willing to 
take the risks of malfeasance. This will require recognition of vulnerable 
areas and activities and an identification of conflicts of interest. 
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IV. Insider Trading Among Central Bankers: Should 
One Condone Corruption Among Central Bankers? 
IV.1. Introduction 
Corruption can influence monetary policy. As seen in the previous model, 
central bankers may start to serve their own ends and exploit their positions 
or, alternatively, become servants of the political leadership. The present 
chapter will further explore this influence of corruption or self-seeking on 
central bank decisions. The model will include stochastic shocks, which have 
an impact on monetary policy. These stochastic shocks enter the model from 
the supply side. This model will enable the central banker to gain from 
contractive monetary policy as well by devising a modified corrupt incentive 
that will provide the central banker with a payoff if he or she decides to lower 
the monetary stock. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Two natural rate models, which 
incorporate stochastic supply side shocks, illustrate the policy decisions of a 
central banker who faces stochastic shocks. The first analysis centers on a 
corruption-free environment and derives the usual equilibria. Next, the 
modified corrupt incentive for central bankers is developed. This model is 
based on media reports of an actual corruption case in Bank of Japan in 
1998 and a second case from the Brazilian central bank, cases that involve 
the selling of inside information by the central bank’s staff. The model 
augments the known social objective function of capturing the effects 
stochastic supply shocks can have on monetary policy in a corrupt 
environment. The analysis will center on the derivation of the so-called 
discretionary equilibrium. After analysis of the economics of this equilibrium 
and an explanation of the central banker’s motives, some policy-oriented 
conclusions are offered. 
IV.2. A Basic Model of Stochastic Supply Shocks in a Natural 
Rate Model 
The model used for this analysis is taken from the textbook presentation by 
Jarchow (2003). A similar model without the stochastic supply shocks is 
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employed by Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002). The model includes a 
macroeconomic supply function and demand function. The policy objectives 
of society (or the central bank) enter the model in form of a cost function, 
which relates the prevalent employment and inflation situation in the 
economy to the social costs that they cause. In the first period, private agents 
and their trade unions form their inflation expectations. The inflation rate as 
expected by trade unions and labor suppliers enters the wage negotiations 
between private agents and companies. This inflation expectation is fixed in 
the wage contract for the consecutive period, in this way bringing a nominal 
rigidity to the model. The companies determine their supply prices by markup 
pricing on the basis of average labor costs (see Equation (III.7) on page 38); 
they simply rollover the effects of an increased nominal wage into the prices. 
The companies accept the proposed nominal wage rate because they are not 
affected by any changes due to the markup pricing. This situation has been 
set out previously in Chapter III. Here, the supply function in Chapter III 
(Equation (III.10) on page 39] is changed by including a stochastic shock 
variable w . The stochastic variable has a normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and the variance, 2wσ : 
  ( )2~ 0; ww N σ . 
With the inclusion of the stochastic shock variable, the supply function 
is: 
(IV.1)  ( )* r rt t tY Y wπ π θ= + − + , 
(IV.1`) ⇔ 
*
r rt t
t
wY Yπ πθ θ
−= + − . 
The supply function is positively sloped in a /rY π  diagram. The shock 
variable w  shifts the supply function in the diagram. If the value for w  is 
negative, the shock expands the real national income. A positive value for w  
decreases real national income — and increases the inflation rate. An 
example of a positive supply shock would be a sharp rise in raw material or 
energy prices. This actually happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
during the first and second oil crises. OPEC increased the price of oil and as 
a result, production costs in oil-dependent Western economies rose 
dramatically, leading to a recession in several of these countries. The supply 
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function is shifted to the left by such a negative supply shock in the /rY π −  
diagram. However, the supply shock does not necessarily have to be 
negative; expansive shocks can occur. Supply prices might fall due to the 
discovery of new deposits of natural resources. 
The demand function of this model is the same as the analysis in 
Chapter III (see Equation (III.4) on page on 36): 
(IV.2)  1 1
r r t t
t t
t
mY Y ππ−
−= + + . 
Equation (IV.2) shows the negative dependency of the real national 
income rtY  on the inflation rate of the same period. The function is negatively 
sloped in the /rY π − diagram. 
In deriving the demand function, the natural level of real national 
income was set to equal 1. This has direct implications for the supply function: 
(IV.1)  ( )* 1rt t tY wπ π θ= + − + , 
(IV.1`) ⇔ 
*
1r t tt
wY π πθ θ
−= + − . 
As is common in natural rate models, the third element is the social 
objective function. This relates the prevalent employment and inflation 
situation to socially desired levels of employment and inflation ( )ˆ , ˆrY π . 
Deviations from these targets result in costs to society. If the target level for 
the inflation rate is equal to 0, which means that society prefers price stability, 
the objective function (see Equation (III.11)) is: 
(IV.3)  ( )2 ˆr rt tC Y Yπ λ= + − ,  0λ > . 
This cost function has the usual properties of a cost function used in 
analysis of the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy and is 
employed in similar variants in other papers (see Lohmann 1992; Waller 
1992; Walsh 1995). The target level of real national income is assumed to 
exceeds the natural rate of the real income ( )1rY = : 
 ˆ rY n= , 1n > . 
This target level assures that the central bank is motivated to use 
monetary policy to increase employment and thus the real national income, 
which it can do because of the nominal rigidity of wages and because the 
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central bank is able to adjust or change the growth rate of monetary stock at 
any time. Therefore, monetary policy has short-term effects on employment 
in this model. 
These three functions—the supply function, the demand function, and 
the objective function—complete the macroeconomic natural rate model. In 
period (t = 0) the economy has achieved a stationary, price-stable equilibrium. 
There is no shock from the supply side of the economy 0w =  and the 
expected inflation rate equals the actual one. Real national income is equal 
to its natural level ( )1r rY Y= = . If real national income is at the natural level 
of 1, the inflation rate tπ  equals the growth rate of the monetary stock tm  
(see Equation (IV.2)). 
The following analysis assumes a certain sequence of events. First, in 
the period t = 0, private agents form their inflation expectations. At this stage, 
they expect a shock from the supply side of the economy but they cannot be 
sure of the shock’s type and strength. The model’s rational agents take the 
shock into consideration and estimate its mean correctly, including this mean 
in their inflation expectation. This inflation expectation enters the wage 
negotiations and is fixed in the wage contract. After the wage contracts for 
period t = 1 are signed, the stochastic shock happens. The central bank 
monitors the situation and adjusts its monetary policy to cope with the shock, 
a manipulation that might surprise the private agents. 
IV.3. Shock Treatment by an Incorruptible Central Bank 
Imagine that the model economy experiences a contractive supply side 
shock in the next period. The central bank’s reaction to this shock depends 
on the monetary policy regime. 
If the central bank is bound by law to pursue a noninflationary 
monetary policy, it will be forced to set the growth rate of the monetary stock 
so as to guarantee price stability in the period immediately following the 
supply side shock. The main effect of such shocks is a lowered real national 
income. The price stability rule forces the central bank to adjust its growth 
rate of the monetary stock regardless of the consequences to the current 
employment situation. It will ensure that the inflation rate of the next period is 
equal to zero. This means for the real national income of this period: 
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(IV.4)  1rR
wY θ= − . 
The stochastic shock has a direct effect on real national income. 
Compared to the situation of no shocks, as in Jarchow (2003: 293–302) or 
the analysis laid out in Chapter III above, real national income is lowered by 
such a shock. The variance of the real national income is: 
(IV.5)  ( ) ( ) 2var r r rR R RY E Y E Y⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ , 
  ⇔ ( ) 2var 1 1rR w wY E Eθ θ⎡ ⎤⎞⎛= − − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ , 
 ⇔ ( ) 2var rR wY E θ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
 ⇔ ( ) [ ]2 21var rRY E wθ ⎞⎛= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
(IV.5`) ⇔ ( ) 221var rR wY σθ= . 
The variance of the real national income in case of this strict price 
stability rule is given by Equation (IV.5`). There is a relationship between the 
variance of the shock variable w and that of the real national income in the 
rules equilibrium. Depending on the value of the coefficientθ , which captures 
the influence of real national income on the inflation rate, the real national 
income’s variance is higher or lower than the variance of the shock variable. 
For the purpose of comparing different policy regimes and their 
effectiveness in dealing with these supply shocks, the present analysis 
focuses on the mean of the social costs and on the variance of the real 
national income. Suppose that the central bank announces that it will pursue 
a price-stable monetary policy. It credibly commits itself to an inflation target 
of 0π =  for the next period. The social costs of the resulting price-stable 
equilibrium are: 
(IV.6)  ( )[ ] ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−⋅+==
2*
2 10, nwEYCE RrR θ
ππλππ , 
 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−⋅+==
2
10000, nwEYCE R
r
R θλπ , 
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 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( ) 210, ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−−⋅== nwEYCE RrR θλπ , 
 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⋅== 22
2
10, nwEYCE RrR θλπ . 
Because the mean of the squared shock variable w is equal to the 
variance of the shock variable, the mean of the social costs simplifies to: 
(IV.7)  [ ] ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⋅= 22
2
1nCE wR θ
σλ . 
The presence of the stochastic shock variable in this model increases 
social costs. As shown in the previous chapter, the social costs of this price 
stability rule equilibrium in the absence of stochastic shocks is equal to: 
(III.15) ( )21−= nCR λ .12 
This comparison between the price stability rule in a model without 
stochastic supply shocks and the model in this chapter shows that supply 
shocks directly increase the costs this policy to the public. 
If the central bank has discretionary freedom regarding its policy 
decisions, it might use its new power to further the societal goals depicted in 
society’s objective function (IV.3). In this case, it is important to keep in mind 
the time sequence of events. The players make decisions about their 
variables at different times, leading to some players having superior 
knowledge. The private agents move first. The central bank waits until the 
private agents’ strategy is fixed and then moves. 
In wage negotiations with companies, trade unions and private agents 
seek to keep their nominal wages constant. They form their inflation 
expectations *π  and include them in their wage demands. After both parties 
sign the contracts, the value of the inflation expectation is fixed. The next 
event in our time sequence is the supply shock. Only after the shock has hit 
will the central bank decide whether it will try to stabilize the economy. 
The central bank is in a position to react to the stochastic supply shock 
by adjusting the growth rate of the monetary stock m and thus surprise the 
private agents because of the nominal rigidity of the wages. The central bank 
                                                 
12 See Section III.4. Monetary Policy of an Incorruptible Central Bank. 
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and the general public share the same objective function (IV.3). The central 
bank will seek to minimize this function: 
(IV.3’)  ( )
2*
2 1wC nπ ππ λ θ
⎞⎛ − −= + − − ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
,13 
(IV.8)  ( )* 12 2 1 0d C w n
d
π ππ λπ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤−= + − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
However, the central bank’s behavior and its broader information base 
are common knowledge. The rational private agents include this information 
when they determine their inflation expectations. From Equation (IV.8) 
follows: 
  ( )* 11 0w nπ ππ λ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤−+ − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Because Equation (IV.8) contains the stochastic shock variable w, the 
agents can optimize only their expectation of this equation—the mean: 
(IV.8`)  ( ) ( )* 1 0wE E nλ π ππ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤−+ − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Equation (IV.8`) can be further simplified because the private agents` 
expectation of the inflation rate is equal to the expected inflation rate *π , 
( )( )*E π π= , the mean of the shock variable w is equal to zero ( )( )0E w =  
and the mean of the constants ( )1n −  and *π  is the value of these constants: 
 ⇔ ( )* ** 0 1 0nλ π ππ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤−+ − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
(IV.9) ⇔ ( )* 1nλπ θ
−= . 
In this case, private agents’ expectations are the same as those set 
out in Chapter III when there were no stochastic supply shocks, which at first 
glance seems counterintuitive, but is, in fact, a highly rational and optimal 
reaction. To see this, one need to remember the time sequence of events. 
The expectation calculated in Equation (IV.9) is formed at a time when the 
agents do not know whether there will be a negative supply shock, a positive 
supply shock, or any shock at all, let alone how strong it might be. In this 
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situation, the private agents’ only choice is to use the expected value of the 
shock variable w, which distribution they know from past experience. They 
realize that their best projection for the shock is the distributions mean: 
  ( ) 0E w = . 
To see how the central bank reacts to the expectations of the private 
sector and to the shock it has been monitoring, solution (IV.9) needs to be 
incorporated into Equation (IV.8’): 
  ( ) ( )2 1 1 0n w nλλ ππ θ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤−+ − − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )2 1 1 0nw nλθ π λ π θθ
⎡ ⎤−+ − − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )22 1 1 0nw nλπ θ λ λ λθθ −+ − − − − = , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )2 1w n λπ θ λ λ λ θθ ⎞⎛+ = + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
 ⇔ ( ) 22 2 1nw λλ θ λπ θ λ θ λ θ
− += + ⋅+ + , 
(IV.10)⇔ ( )2 1D w nλ λπ λ θ θ= + −+ . 
In the discretionary policy equilibrium, which is characterized by the 
inflation rate Dπ , the central bank responds directly to the shock variable w 
and to the private agents` inflation expectations. In the case of a recessive 
supply shock (w > 0), the central bank raises the growth rate of the monetary 
stock m and thereby the inflation rate Dπ . To evaluate this solution thoroughly 
it is necessary to calculate the level of the realized real national income. 
Inserting the private agents` expected inflation rate according to Equation 
(IV.9) and the inflation rate set by the central bank (IV.10) into the supply 
function, Equation (IV.1`), yields: 
(IV.1`)  
*
1r t tt
wY π πθ θ
−= + − , 
                                                                                                                                          
13 The real national income in Equation (IV.3) is substituted for with the help of the supply 
function (IV.1’). 
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 ⇔ ( )
( ) ( )
2
1 11 1rD
k nw wY
λ λλ
θ θ θ θθ λ
⎞⎛ − − ⎟⎜= + − + −⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
, 
 ⇔ ( )2 1
r
D
w wY λθ θθ λ
⎞⎛ ⎟⎜= + −⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
, 
(IV.11)⇔ 21 1rD wY λθ θ λ
⎞⎛= + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . 
A comparison of real national income under a price stability rule 
(IV.4)  1rR
wY θ= −  
and real national income in the case of a discretionary policy equilibrium 
shows that the central bank reduces the supply shock’s effect on real 
national income and acts to stabilize the economy in the discretionary 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the stabilizing effect of the central bank’s policy 
decision is highlighted by a decreased variance of the real national income 
as compared to the situation analyzed in the rules equilibrium. The variance 
of the real national income rDY  is: 
(IV.12) ( ) ( )( )2var rDrDrD YEYEY −= , 
 ⇔ ( ) 222 11var ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++= θλ
λ
θθλ
λ
θ
wYEwYEY rrrD , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) 2222 111var ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−+= θλ
λ
θθλ
θ
θ
wEwEY rD , 
 ⇔ ( ) 22var ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−= θλ θwEY rD , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )( )222var wEwEY rD −⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ += θλ θ , 
(IV.12`)⇔ ( ) 222var ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ += θλ θσwrDY . 
The central bank’s stabilization policy has two positive effects on real 
national income: (1) it reduces the impact of recessive supply shocks and (2) 
it results in lower variance of real national income when compared to the 
variance in the case of a central bank bound by rule to price stability. As 
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shown in Equation (IV.5`), the variance in the case of a zero inflation policy 
is: 
(IV.5`)  ( ) 2 22 221var rR w wY θσ σθ θ⎞ ⎞⎛ ⎛= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎝⎠ ⎠ . 
However, this comparison of real national income and its variances 
under different policy regimes has focused solely on the employment target. 
For a thorough analysis of the effects of recessive supply shocks on the 
economy, the costs of the policy regimes in question must also take into 
account the social objective function. Because uncertainty enters this model 
via the inclusion of stochastic supply shocks w, social costs caused by policy 
regimes can be evaluated only by the mean of the social objective function: 
  ( ) ( ) 22
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 Using the properties of the shock variable’s distribution, Equation 
(IV.13) can be further simplified to: 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )222
22
2
22
22
22
11 −+++
−++= n
wEnwECE D λθλ
λθ
θ
λ
θλ
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 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
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2
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2 1 θ
λθλ
θλ
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(IV.14)⇔ ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−++= 2
2
2
2
2
1 θ
θλ
θλ
σλ nCE wD . 
 A direct comparison of the two expected costs ( )DCE  and ( )RCE  cannot 
establish which regime is more costly. Society will prefer that the central bank 
be bound by law to a price-stable monetary policy if: 
  ( ) ( )DR CECE <  
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(IV.15)⇔ ( )( )222 1−+< nw θλσ . 
Equation (IV.15) describes under what circumstances society would 
be better off with a binding policy rule. This rule bans the central bank from 
implementing policies aimed at creating employment gains. Society will find 
this situation preferable to a central bank endowed with discretionary 
freedom if the variance is not too big. The shocks are closely concentrated 
around the distribution’s mean and the resulting impact on overall welfare is 
not too harsh. Under this scenario, an active central banker trying to stabilize 
output would bring about a worse welfare result. 
If the shock variable is widely different from its mean, condition (IV.15) 
is not met. Large deviations in actual value of the shock variable w from its 
mean ( )( )0E w =  imply that the resulting change in real output will be very 
high. Because these changes always take the private agents by surprise, the 
results will always be a sharp drop (increase) in real wages in case of an 
expansive (recessive) shock. This general uncertainty about the employment 
situation and the possible devaluation of nominal wages will make society 
prefer that the central bank engage in active stabilization policies. The active 
central banker will try to cushion the effects of the shocks and thereby reduce 
the chance of unpredictable changes in real wages. 
IV.4. Corrupt Central Banks—Some Evidence from the Media 
The impact of stochastic shocks on monetary policy was analyzed in the 
previous section. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to inquiring into 
what the impact of a corrupt central banker might be in an environment with 
stochastic shocks. The model has its roots in two corruption cases, which will 
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be presented first. The corrupt incentive of the central banker will be modeled 
on the basis of these cases. 
The only available source of information on the first incident of 
corruption is the media and because this case is still being prosecuted in 
court, there is no actual proof that a corrupt act took place within the Brazilian 
central bank. Nevertheless, the information gathered from the media makes it 
plausible that a case of corruption did take place in the central bank in 
January 1998. At the time of the final revision of this analysis, a search for 
new material provided no new results and thus the outcome of the 
investigation and the subsequent trial are as yet unknown. 
On February 2, 1998, the BBC News Service published a short notice 
on the Internet dealing with the surprise replacement of Francisco Lopes as 
governor of the Brazilian central bank. Mr. Lopes had held that position for 
only three weeks. Upon his appointment, he devalued the Brazilian currency, 
the Real, by 8% (BBC, February 2, 1999). Before the devaluation, Lopes 
gave advance notice of the new exchange rate to several private Brazilian 
banks, enabling them to profit from the “unexpected move” (BBC, April 14, 
1999). Furthermore, a few days after the devaluation, Lopes sold dollars at 
favorable prices to the same banks. A Brazilian weekly news magazine 
quoted Salvatore Cacciola, an owner of one of the banks, as saying that he 
had a paid informant within the central bank. This informant would alert him 
to important events, such as changes of the interest rates or currency 
movements (BBC, April 26, 1999). 
A raid on Lopes’s house by the Brazilian police revealed several 
documents showing that Lopes, while working as a public servant, had 
maintained close connections to a private consulting firm and had more than 
$1.5 million in a foreign bank account (BBC, April 26, 1999). One year later, 
in February 2000, Lopes was charged with fraud (BBC, February 3, 2000) 
and with maintaining a foreign bank account that he had not declared to the 
tax office or the central bank (BBC, January 20, 2001). 
So, it appears that the central bank governor Lopes might have sold 
inside information to several private banks about his intended plan to 
devaluate the Real. Knowing in advance about this devaluation allowed these 
banks to “speculate” without any risk on the Real/Dollar exchange rate. 
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Because the Brazilian capital market is relatively small, it is assumed 
that the banks had to duplicate an option on the Real by means of credits, 
meaning that the banks would have to borrow money in Real and then 
exchange the loan sum into US dollars. After the announced devaluation, 
they changed their US dollars back into Real at the new, higher exchange 
rate. They repaid the loan and pocketed the difference between the loan sum 
and the amount of Real they got by exchanging their US dollars after the 
devaluation. Therefore, the money supply in the Brazilian economy rose due 
to the corrupt transaction. The value of the corrupt information is the amount 
of money the private banks “earned” in this transaction. 
A second case concerning selling inside information from the 
Japanese central bank is equally enlightening. At the beginning of 1998, 
Japanese society was shocked by a major corruption scandal that involved 
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), a scandal that 
led to the suicide of the BoJ’s chief director, Mr. Takayuki Kamoshida (BBC, 
May 2, 1998). The scandal gathered momentum on March 13, 1998, when 
the Tokyo police arrested Mr. Yasuyuki Yoshizawa (Japan Economic 
Institute, March 27, 1998), who was at that time head of the BoJ’s Capital 
Market Division and well connected to other important branches within the 
BoJ. Yoshizawa was one of the very few persons within the bank with 
permission to read the Tankan Report several days before its official 
publication. The Tankan is compiled by the Bank of Japan and contains 
important information on the Japanese business cycle and economy. The 
report is a very valuable source of information for analysts and brokers 
working in the Japanese stock markets (Die Presse: March 12, 1998) 
because it contains, among other things, details about the disposable income 
of Japanese households, car sales, and the development of the consumer 
price index. 
However, Mr. Yoshizawa’s position at the center of the BoJ’s money 
market actions and his good connections to other important BoJ departments 
ensured that he had even more valuable information for someone working in 
the Yen business. He had inside knowledge on money market rates and 
tender amounts or planed exchange rate interventions by the BoJ. At dinner 
parties and golf outings, which were paid for by large Japanese investment 
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and commercial banks, Mr. Yoshizawa leaked these secrets to executives of 
the private banking sector and thus gave them advance knowledge of the 
BoJ’s actions. These dinner and golf invitations from his sponsors were worth 
about €51,600 (Die Presse: March, 12, 1998). The sponsors included the 
Industrial Bank of Japan and the Sanwa Bank (Economist, March 12, 1998). 
Mr. Yoshizawa was not the only person at the BoJ with such intimate 
ties to the private banking sector. After the scandal broke, the Bank of Japan 
began to investigate the behavior of some 600 of its employees, all of whom 
were from the management level, as was Mr. Yoshizawa (BBC, April 7, 
1998). The majority of these employees were in charge of the allocation of 
funds to private banks (CNNfn, February 9, 1998). The chief director 
Kamoshida, also known as “Mr. Clean,” disciplined about 100 of these 
employees for accepting entertainment and gifts from clients (BBC, May 2, 
1998). 
As shown by the need to discipline almost 100 staff members of BoJ, 
this information gathering by Japanese banking sector executives was 
systemic. Between them, the 146 largest banks in Japan had approximately 
230 people employed as “BoJ handlers.” It was the job of these handlers to 
maintain good relations with the Bank of Japan, meaning that these 
employees “entertained” BoJ personnel in order to obtain inside information 
(CNNfn, February 9, 1998). This knowledge advantage often triggered large 
transactions on the part of the private banks (Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 
13, 1998). 
Furthermore, failure to comply with demands made by the BoJ or its 
employees could result in severe punishment (LA Times, April 22, 1998). To 
punish these “uppity” banks, the BoJ would withhold liquidity or actively 
withdraw liquidity so that the “culpable” bank ran into problems fulfilling its 
capital requirements. The bank’s management would then have to kowtow to 
BoJ in order to receive additional liquidity and beg for a bailout. This 
treatment was called “grilled chicken” or, in Japanese, “yakitori.” 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (March 13, 1998) reports one such yakitori 
incident. In 1991, the Tokai Bank from Nagoya sacked its vice-president after 
a series of scandals. Unfortunately, the vice-president was a former 
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employee of BoJ. In a move of alleged retaliation for firing the vice-president, 
BoJ, overnight, removed liquidity amounting to 100 billion Yen from the Tokai 
Bank, which was already struggling to meet its capital requirements. 
These stories from Brazil and Japan illustrate that there are 
employees in the middle and higher ranks of a central bank’s hierarchy who 
possess knowledge of value to persons in the private banking sector. In 
contrast to the corruption case discussed in Chapter III, corrupt dealing by 
these employees does not necessarily involve an increase in the money 
supply. Central bank employees can also profit from a restricted money 
supply. Prior knowledge of a tighter money supply—for instance, reflected by 
lowered tender amounts—is of value to private banks because they can 
engage in front running. 
This model assumes that the central bank governor or an organized 
group of central bank employees (hereafter the “central banker”) sells 
information on future money tenders. The corrupt central banker sells inside 
information concerning future monetary policy to the private banking sector. 
Like Mr. Yoshizawa in the case study, the corrupt central banker has 
information about the planned development of the money supply and is able 
to influence the decision on the money supply in this model. The size of the 
central bankers’ bribe is related to the development of the monetary stock. If 
he or she keeps the money supply steady, there is no news to sell. If, 
however, the decision is made to lower the money supply, for instance, by 
reducing tender amounts, information about this decision will be as lucrative 
for the corrupt central banker as is information about an increased money 
supply. 
The additional corrupt income that the central banker is trying to seize 
is modeled in largely the same way as the social objective function is 
modeled in the basic, corruption-free approach (see Equation (IV.3)). The 
value of the information the central banker has on offer depends on the real 
change of the monetary stock, ( )1t t
t
M M
p
−− . If the incentive of additional income 
from corrupt inside deals were modeled in this simple form, the central 
banker would indulge in expansive monetary policies. Only an increase in the 
monetary stock would generate a positive extra income from corruption. 
However, the central banker does not discriminate between a supplementary 
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income that stems from an expansive monetary policy or from a restrictive 
one: the central banker is pleased to accept additional income, no matter 
how it has been achieved. He honors additional income regardless of its 
source if this incentive is squared. Either squaring the change in the 
monetary stock or using the absolute value of the change ensures that the 
central banker does not discriminate between the sources. However, the 
second approach renders solutions that do not easily lend themselves to 
economic interpretation, and so the first option was chosen for this analysis. 
Winston (1979: 840–41) argues that the risk associated with corruption 
increases with the number of transactions, the number of people involved, 
the duration of the transaction, and the simplicity and standardization of the 
procedure. But the risk does not clearly increase with the value of a 
transaction. This suggests that large transactions are a superior base for 
demanding and arranging a bribe. 
The weight κ  measures the central banker’s preference for additional 
income from selling inside information. In other words, it measures the extent 
of the central bankers’ corruptibility. For κ  approaching 1, the central banker 
will pocket the complete information rent. For κ  approaching 0, the central 
banker is not able to take advantage of insider knowledge: 
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Substituting for the growth rate of the monetary stock yields: 
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The price level pt in Equation (IV.16`) can be substituted for by 
applying the definition of the inflation rate: 
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 ⇔ 1)1( −+= tt pp π . 
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The real bribe of the central banker changes to: 
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The growth rate of the monetary stock is given by: 
(IV.2’)  ( ) ( ) ππ +−⋅+= −rtrt YYm 11 . 
Substituting for the growth rate of the monetary stock m and the price 
level tp  in Equation (IV.2’) yields: 
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Assuming that the inflation rate π  stays within reasonable limits, the 
bribe term simplifies to: 
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Given the initial value of real national income set to 1, our demand 
function (III.2)  implies 1
1
t
t
M k
p
−
−
= . Inserting this term yields: 
(IV.18) ( ) ( )2 22 1r r rt tB k Y Y π−= − + . 
Substituting for the real national income in period t according to 
Equation (IV.1) and assuming an initial equilibrium with ( )1 1r rtY Y− = =  yields: 
(IV.19) ( ) 2*22 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= πθ
ππ wkBr . 
In this model, the central banker’s behavior is subject to three 
influences. Like everybody else, the central banker feels the negative effects 
inflation has on the purchasing power of his or her income and the negative 
effects of high unemployment on society’s stability. These influences are 
captured by the social objective function, which was implemented in the 
underlying basic model. This function is now augmented by the corrupt 
income objective the central banker faces: additional income will soften the 
impact of high unemployment and rampant inflation for the central banker. 
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Therefore, the corrupt income as measured by Equation (IV.19) must be 
deducted from the costs arising from the other two influences. The corrupt 
central banker’s cost function is: 
(IV.20) ( ) ( )
2* 2 22 *
21 1
w kK n wπ π κπ λ π θ πθ θ
⎡ ⎤− − ⎡ ⎤= + − − − + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
. 
IV.5. Corrupt Central Bankers in a Stochastic World 
Derivation of the augmented cost function (IV.20) completes the model of a 
corrupt central banker who sells inside information. The solution of this model 
follows the same rationale as for the underlying basic model discussed in 
Section IV.3. In this game, private agents have the first move. Again, they 
need to predict the future course of monetary policy and inflation under the 
presence of stochastic supply side shocks. Only after the private agents 
freeze their expectations by signing wage contracts with private companies, 
will the central banker decide on the optimal response under the given 
circumstances. 
Optimization of private agents’ inflation expectation takes place in the 
first period, t = 0. These rational private agents lack reliable information on 
the nature and the strength of the stochastic shock w , which, as far as they 
know, might hit the economy in the next period, t = 1. However, the private 
agents do have complete information on the incentives that influence the 
central banker’s decisions. For their optimization, they use the augmented 
objective function of the corrupt central banker (IV.20). This means that 
private agents understand the central banker’s corrupt incentive and its 
impact on the central bank’s decisions: 
(IV.20) ( ) ( )[ ]2*22
2*
2 11 wknwK −−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+= πθπθ
κ
θ
ππλπ , 
  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0112122 *2 2* =−−++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+= wknw
d
dK πθπθθ
κ
θ
ππ
θ
λππ , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0111 *22* =−−++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+ wknw πθπθθ
κ
θ
ππ
θ
λπ . 
Applying the mean to the first derivative of the augmented cost 
function (IV.20) and recalling that ( ) *ππ =E , ( ) ** ππ =E and ( ) 0=wE  yields: 
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 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0111 *22* =−−++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+ wEknwEE πθπθθ
κ
θ
ππ
θ
λπ , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0)(111)( **22*** =−−++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+ wEknwE πθπθθ
κ
θ
ππ
θ
λπ , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) 011 *2* =+−−− πθ
θκ
θ
λπ kn , 
 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( )112* −=+− nk λθκθπ , 
(IV.21)⇔ ( )( )θκθ
λπ +−
−=
1
1
2
*
k
n . 
Let us assume, perhaps unrealistically, that the desire to strike a 
corrupt deal, κ , stays within reasonable limits. This implies that 
( )2 1 0kθ κ θ− + > —suggesting that the denominator is positive. Equation 
(IV.21) sets out the private agents’ inflation expectations, which continue to 
include the usual inflation bias of the underlying, basic model, ( )* 1nλπ θ
⎛ ⎞−=⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
This bias stems from the central banker’s preference for a rate of 
employment measured by the weight λ . However, in the present model, this 
traditional bias is aggravated if the central banker is perceived as corruptible. 
An increase in κ  increases inflation, as can be derived from the first 
derivative of (IV.21): 
  ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01 11 22
2*
>+−
−+= θκθ
λθ
κ
π
k
nk
d
d . 
Due to their standard markup pricing procedures, the raised wage 
demands triggered by a higher expected inflation rate *π  do not have an 
effect on companies because they simply roll the higher costs into the prices 
charged. In the basic shock-free model discussed in Chapter III, this acts like 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the context of the present model, there is an 
additional factor influencing the central banker’s decision: the shock variable 
w, which the private agents cannot predict. 
To determine his or her optimal policy decision based on the objective 
function (IV.20), the central banker considers two dates ( )* ,wπ . Once the 
private agents complete wage negotiations with the companies, their inflation 
expectations *π  are fixed in the sealed wage contracts and are revealed to 
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the central bank. After this, the central banker receives precise information 
on the nature and strength of the supply side shock. The augmented cost 
function (IV.25) is optimized for the inflation rate π  subject to the inflation 
expectation  *π  and the shock w : 
(IV.20) ( ) ( )[ ]2*22
2*
2 11 wknwK −−+−⎥⎦
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⎡ −−−−+= πθπθ
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ππλπ , 
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d
dK πθπθθ
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θ
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 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( )( )( )222
*2*
1
11
θκλθ
πθκθπλπ +−+
++−−++=
k
wknw , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )222
22*
1
111
θκλθ
θκλθκλπλθπ +−+
+−++−+−=
k
kwkn . 
Inserting the inflation expectation (IV.21) yields: 
(IV.22) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )222
2
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1
1
1
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θκλθ
θκλθκθ
θκλθλ
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kn
. 
Using the private agents’ inflation expectation (IV.21) further simplifies 
the inflation rate in the discretionary equilibrium (IV.22). From Equation (IV.21) 
follows: 
(IV.21) ( )( )θκθ
λπ +−
−=
1
1
2
*
k
n , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( )[ ]θκθθπλθ +−=− 11 2* kn . 
Using this term, Equation (IV.22) can be rewritten as: 
   
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )wknwk +⋅+−−++=+−+ *2*222 111 πθκλθπλθκλθπ , 
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( )( )22 2 * * 21 1k w kπ θ λ κ θ λ π θπ θ κ θ⎡ ⎤+ − + = + + − +⎣ ⎦  
        ( ) ( )2 *1k wκ θ π− + ⋅ + , 
 ⇔ ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] wkkk ⋅+−++−+=+−+ θκλθκλθπθκλθπ 111 2222*222 , 
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(IV.22’)⇔ ( )( ) wk
k ⋅+−+
+−+= 222
2
*
1
1
θκλθ
θκλππ . 
Equation (IV.22’) shows the central banker’s reaction to a given value 
of the shock variable w and the private agents’ expected inflation rate, *π . To 
ensure that this inflation rate is a true minimum of the augmented cost 
function, a second derivative test is necessary: 
(IV.23) ( ) 01222 22
2
22
2
>+−+= θθ
κγ
θ
λ
πd
Kd , 
 ⇔ ( )22
2
2 11 θθ
κγ
θ
λ +>+ , 
(IV.24)⇔ ( ) κθγ
λθ >+
+
22
2
1
. 
The corrupt preference weight κ  should not exceed this threshold 
(IV.24). In this case, Equation (IV.24) determines a minimum for the 
augmented cost function. If the corrupt incentive κ  were to exceed this 
crucial value, Equation (IV.22’) determines a cost maximum. Depending on 
the type of shock, the central banker either causes hyperinflation (positive 
shock) or endless deflation (negative shock). The following discussion 
concentrates on the cases where constraint (IV.24) is upheld. 
Analysis of the underlying corruption-free model reveals that the 
uncorrupted central banker may attempt to stabilize the economy in the wake 
of supply shocks (see Section IV.3). 14  The first derivative of the time 
consistent solution (IV.10) for the shock variable is positive. This suggests 
that the central banker raises the inflation rate if the economy suffers from a 
contractive shock ( )> 0w . Conservative central bankers who do not see a 
need to stabilize employment will refrain from changing the growth rate of the 
monetary stock or may even set negative growth rates. The strength of the 
                                                 
14 The discretionary solution (IV.10) increases in w: 
(IV.10) ( )2 1 ,D nw λλπ λ θ θ
−= ++  
 2 .
Dd
dw
π λ
λ θ= +  
The incorruptible central banker always allows the inflation rate to increase. Even if his or her 
preference for the employment target, λ , is low, the banker will set an inflation rate that 
gradually becomes higher than that of a shock-free situation, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
Section IV.4. However, this does not necessarily accompany positive growth rates of the 
monetary stock. 
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banker’s commitment to stabilization of real national income crucially 
depends on his or her commitment to the employment objective λ  and on 
the size of the parameterθ , which captures the degree of openness of the 
economy. 
If the additional corrupt incentive (IV.19) is added to the cost function, 
other reactions are possible. How will a corrupt central banker, intent on 
lining his or her own pockets, react to supply side shocks? Will the corrupt 
central banker still try to stabilize real national income or will self-interest 
induce him or her to behave pro-cyclically in regards to output stabilization? 
The terms pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical refer to the central banker’s 
decision concerning the growth rate of the monetary stock m. A pro-cyclical 
reaction in the face of an expansive shock would be to lower the growth rate 
of monetary stock. A pro-cyclical reaction to a contractive supply shock would 
be to take action that will lower the real national income more than the impact 
of the shock would on its own. On the one hand, doing so will fight the 
inflationary tendencies built up by the supply shock; on the other hand, there 
will be an even greater contraction of real national income. To determine the 
possible reaction, the first derivative of the time consistent solution (IV.22) for 
the shock variable w is taken: 
(IV.25) ( )( )222
2
1
1
θκλθ
θκλπ
+−+
+−=
k
k
dw
d . 
Judging from the derivative (IV.25), and the fact that this term might be 
negative, one cannot exclude possibility of pro-cyclical behavior on the part 
of the central banker. If a contractive shock ( )0>w  affects the economy, the 
corrupt central banker might lower the inflation rate. Because the money 
demand depends on the real national income, the corrupted central banker is 
able to bring about a change in money demand. This change in the money 
demand and therefore the equilibrium amount of money increases the value 
of the information he or she has on offer. For this pro-cyclical reaction to a 
given shock w, the derivative (IV.25) must be negative for given values of the 
coefficients θ,k  and of the weights λ  and κ  in the central banker’s objective 
function: 
  ( )( ) 01
1
222
2
<+−+
+−
θκλθ
θκλ
k
k . 
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Looking at Equation (IV.25), it is clear that there are two ways to 
prompt a pro-cyclical reaction to supply side shocks from the corrupt central 
banker. Either the denominator of the derivative (IV.25) is positive, in which 
case the numerator has to be negative, or if the denominator is negative, 
then the numerator has to be positive in order to bring about a negative 
derivative. To ensure that the discretionary solution gives a cost minimum, 
constraint (IV.24) must be met. Therefore, the denominator of (IV.25) is 
positive: 
  ( ) 01 222 >+−+ θκλθ k , 
(IV.24)⇔ ( ) κθ
λθ >+
+
22
2
1k
. 
Thus the case of a negative denominator in the derivative (IV.25) can 
be ignored. For a pro-cyclical reaction to given shocks, the numerator of the 
derivative has to be negative. From this requirement follows: 
(IV.26) ( )θ
λκ +> 12k . 
However, disinterest in stabilizing the employment rate is not enough, 
alone, for a pro-cyclical reaction: the perceived corruptibility of the central 
banker must be high. To get a pro-cyclical reaction, the central banker needs 
to fulfill the constraints (IV.24) and (IV.26) simultaneously. Although the 
−κ value must be larger than the constraint (IV.26), at the same time it has to 
be lower than the value of constraint (IV.24) to ensure a cost minimum. 
(IV.27) ( ) ( )22
2
2 11 θγ
λθκθγ
λ
+
+<<+ −cyclicalpro , 
 ⇔ ( ) λθθλ +<+ 21 , 
(IV.28)⇔ θλ < .15 
What is the economic rationale behind this behavior? In a nutshell, 
pro-cyclical behavior is an option only for conservative central bankers. The 
corrupted central banker must chart a course of action between pursuit of 
corrupt income from selling inside information and two other possibly 
                                                 
15 Observe that the same condition results when imposing our restriction ( )2 1 0kθ κ θ− + >  
from Equation (IV.21) jointly with ( )2/ 1kκ λ θ> + . 
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conflicting goals—price stability and a high level of employment. This is 
dilemma is reflected by the central banker’s augmented cost function: 
(IV.20) { ( ) ( )[ ]
444 3444 21444 3444 21
Corruption
from Income AdditionalTarget 
Target
Stability Price
wknwK
Employment
−−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+= *2
2*
2 11 πθπθ
κ
θ
ππλπ . 
If the central banker is uninterested in the effects his or her policy will 
have on the employment situation, the value assigned to the weight λ  is low 
and satisfies constraint (IV.28). This can induce the central banker to react 
pro-cyclically to supply shocks. In this situation, contributing to the shock 
could be an attractive option for the central banker under the given 
circumstances of ( )w,*π . In the corruption-free situation, the conservative 
central banker ( )λ θ<  will reduce the growth rate of the monetary stock. 
Once corrupt, the conservative banker will continue to do so, but on a larger 
scale, which will result in larger changes in money demand of the private 
agents. The stronger change in the money demand renders the information 
the banker has to offer more valuable to the private banks. At the same time, 
the corrupt central banker has little interest in the output target due to his 
conservative convictions. Receiving a higher bribe from private bankers, 
based on the more valuable information, compensates the loss of social 
stability created by high unemployment. The resulting low inflation rate is an 
additional advantage. 
This finding is supported by a simulation of the time consistent solution  
(IV.22). The results are illustrated in separate diagrams for two scenarios. 
Each scenario involves a different type of conservative banker: a “normal 
conservative” ( )0>λ =1 and the ultra-conservative central banker ( )0=λ . In 
the first stage of the simulation, the conservative central banker’s reaction to 
given values of the shock variable w for different values for the corrupt 
incentive weight κ  is simulated. These values fulfill constraint (IV.24). For 
the simulation of the time consistent solution, values for the parameters of 
the model were chosen that would bring about a range of −κ  values that 
goes from 0 to 1. 
These parameters were employed to simulate how a conservative 
central banker—note that constraint (IV.28) is satisfied—would decide on 
monetary strategy in the presence of stochastic supply side shocks. The 
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upper diagram depicts the central banker’s reaction to recessive and 
expansive shocks as well as to a shock-free environment. The lower diagram 
analyzes the impact of three different shocks (ranging from expansive to 
recessive) for varying values of the corrupt preference,κ . The results from 
this analysis are presented in the following two graphs. 
As can be seen from the time consistent solution (IV.22’), the supply shock 
influences the inflation rate linearly (cf. Figure IV.1). The incorruptible and 
conservative central banker ( )0.00κ =  always responds in the expected way. 
Deviations in the employment rate from the target value increase the 
incorruptible central banker’s social costs. The banker attempts to reconcile 
the aims of price stability and employment stabilization according to personal 
preferences. However, once one allows the corrupt incentive to influence the 
central banker’s decisions, his or her reaction becomes less oriented toward 
stabilizing shocks. With increasing κ, the slope of the central banker’s 
reaction function gradually changes from negative to positive (see Figure 
IV.1). The conservative central banker will not try to stabilize the economy if 
he is highly corrupt ( )0.75κ = , because the benefits he or she is reaping, that 
is, a low rate of inflation and high income from bribery, more than 
compensate for the costs stemming a higher rate of unemployment. 
Noncorrupt or mildly corrupt central bankers choose to cushion the 
economy from the shock by implementing counter-cyclical policies. In case of 
expansive shocks, they set low inflation rates; in a shock-free environment, 
they set a positive inflation rate.16 Thus, a mildly corrupt central banker is not 
yet behaving pro-cyclically because his corrupt incentive is not strong enough. 
However, as the central banker becomes more corrupt, he or she becomes 
less interested in stabilizing real national income. The banker will allow larger 
output changes to increment the changes in the monetary stock. This is 
depicted by the still positive but less steep slope of the graph. 
                                                 
16 Cf. Section IV.3. Shock Treatment by an Incorruptible Central Bank. 
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Figure IV.1: The Conservative Central Banker 
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The simulation employed the following values: 
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The second simulation concentrates on the question of how increasing 
corruptibility of the central banker changes the inflation rate in the 
discretionary equilibrium given by Equations (IV.22) or (IV.22’). To this end, 
two different shocks and a shock-free environment are simulated. The shock-
free environment serves as the reference situation, and illustrates that even 
in the absence of shocks, corruption tends to increase the inflation rate. This 
again supports the findings from the nonstochastic model analyzed in 
Chapter III, but for a different reason. In Chapter III, inflation was generated 
because corrupt income could be achieved only by increasing the money 
supply. Here, instead, the traditional inflation bias is aggravated. The 
standard inflation bias known since (Kydland and Prescott 1977) implies an 
increasing money supply. The outlook of a corrupt income further forces this 
increase. 
In the case of shocks to the economy, the central banker’s reaction 
changes from counter-cyclical to pro-cyclical. Although the mildly corrupt 
central banker still tries to soften the impact of the shocks to some extent, the 
highly corrupt conservative central banker reacts outright pro-cyclically. As 
can be seen from the simulation, the contractive shock induces the central 
banker to lower the inflation rate and—in the extreme case of κ  reaching the 
end of its allowed range — to bring about a deflation. The higher the 
corruptibility of the conservative central banker, the less he or she will try to 
stabilize real national income. 
This finding is further strengthened by the results of a simulation 
involving the ultra-conservative central banker. The traditional source of 
inflation bias in models of time inconsistent monetary policy has been 
removed by setting λ  to 0. Removing the employment aim deletes a 
dilemma situation, under which the normal conservative central banker has to 
optimize his policy. The ultra-conservative central banker serves two 
reconcilable aims. Setting a negative growth rate of the monetary stock 
ensures low inflation rates and a high value of the inside information. Figure 
IV.2 provides the parameter values for the simulation. In the absence of any 
shock ( )0w =  that the central banker can take advantage of, the ultra-
conservative central banker always sets the growth rate of the monetary 
                                                 
17 Cf. Section IV.3. Shock Treatment by an Incorruptible Central Bank. 
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stock m equal to 0 and therefore maintains price stability. Even if the range 
exceeds the interval [0; 1], there is no change in the pro-cyclical reaction. In a 
shock-free environment, the central banker feels no need to change the 
inflation rate. Note, however, that this is because the relative importance of 
the corrupt income aim is lower as the “numeraire” aim of price stability 
because κ  runs from 0 to 1. 
Fighting inflation and prospering from additional corrupt income are 
reconcilable aims. If there is a supply shock, the ultra-conservative corrupt 
central banker tries to take advantage of it in the only way possible, by 
adopting pro-cyclical monetary policy. The banker will work to control the 
inflationary or deflationary results of the shock. Fortuitously for the banker, 
this effort also means that he or she will be in possession of valuable 
information. Income derived from the sale of this information, however, will 
quite possibly begin to distort the banker’s policy. The more interested in 
corrupt income he or she becomes, the more the banker will use policy tools 
to create situations that result in more information to be sold. This is depicted 
by the second graph of Figure IV.2. The increasing values of κ  lead to 
higher inflation rates if the economy is subjected to an expansive shock. 
These results offer striking insight into the nature of the conservative 
corrupt central banker. Modeling the corrupt incentive prompts a pro-cyclical 
reaction from the central banker. The corrupt income stems from changes in 
the real monetary stock ( )1t tM M −− . By behaving pro-cyclically, the central 
banker increases the burdens society must bear and at the same time also 
increases the value of information he or she can sell. 
Analyzing a completely self-serving central banker will provide further 
insight into the possibility of, and reasons for, pro-cyclical behavior on the 
part of the central banker. Suppose, the central banker is only committed to 
the generation of additional corrupt income by setting 0λ =  and the weight 
assigned to the price stability aim as well. This removes the income stability 
aim and the influence of the price stability aim from the objective function 
(IV.25). 
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Figure IV.2: The Ultra-Conservative Central Banker 
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The central banker’s objective function thus simplifies to: 
(IV.11’) ( ) ( )[ ] 2*222 1 wkBU rS −−+== πθπθ . 
Equation (IV.11’) is no longer a cost function. It now measures the 
central banker’s utility SU  from the corrupt income he or she has accrued. To 
solve the model for this fully self-serving central banker, the same method 
outlined in Section IV.2 is used. The central banker uses the inflation 
expectation of the private agents *π  and the precise value of the shock 
variable w in the optimization of his or her strategy. Taking the first derivative 
of Equation (IV.11’) for the inflation rate and applying the mean yields the 
inflation expectation of the private agents: 
  
( ) ( )2 *22 1 1 0S kdUE E wd
θ π θ ππ θ
+⎞⎛ ⎡ ⎤= + − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ , 
(IV.29) ( ) 001 ** =−−+ πθπ , 
 ⇔ 0* =π . 
Again, private agents are handicapped due to their lack of accurate 
information on the impact of the shock, w. Thus, in their optimization, they 
use the best information they have, which is the shock variable’s mean 
( )( )0E w = . They fully expect that there will be a change in monetary policy 
if a supply side shock occurs but, due to their lack of information, they do not 
expect the inflation rate to change. The central banker’s optimal response to 
shock w and the private agents’ inflation expectation ( )0* =π  is: 
  ( ) 01 * =−−+ wπθπ , 
 ⇔ ( ) w=+θπ 1 , 
(IV.30) θπ += 1
w . 
Suppose a recessive supply side shock, ( )0>w , hits the economy. 
Figure IV.3 shows that the equilibrium characterized by the result (IV.30) lies 
at the intersection of the shifted supply function and a specific demand 
function. 
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Figure IV.3: The Self-Serving Central Banker. 
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Per se, it cannot be determined decided which decision, increasing or 
decreasing the money supply, the completely self-serving central banker will 
take. The other interesting characteristic of this solution of a fully self-serving 
central banker will not change the growth rate of the monetary stock. The 
location of the equilibrium P, which is characterized by the inflation rate, θ+1
w , 
can be denoted precisely in Figure IV.3. Inserting the solution (IV.30) and the 
private agents’ inflation expectation (IV.29) into the supply function and 
remembering that 1=rY , yields the resulting real national income of the 
equilibrium P: 
(IV.31) θθ
θ
θ +−=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−=
1
11
1
1 wwY rt . 
To derive the growth rate of the monetary stock that this central 
banker will set, one must substitute the real national income of the time 
consistent solution (IV.31) and the inflation rate (IV.30) into the growth rate of 
the monetary stock m, which is determined with the help of the demand 
function: 
  π−−= 1rtYm , 
 ⇔ 0
1
1
1
1 =++−+−= θθ
wwm . 
If the fully self-serving central banker followed the policy projected by 
Equation (IV.30), it would result in a revenue minimum—or, more precisely, 
zero revenue—and a policy of no intervention. The banker would keep the 
initial growth rate of the monetary stock constant. Recall that the initial 
equilibrium is stationary and that the economy has achieved price stability—
point RP  in Figure IV.3. However, a deviation from this policy will result in an 
increase in corrupt revenue. Only the most weak-hearted corrupt bankers 
would play it so safe and settle for the equilibrium set out in Equation (IV.30). 
The possibility of an increase in corrupt revenue will drive more 
industrious central bankers away from the solution in P. Thus, the self-
serving central banker could have either a pro-cyclical or a counter-cyclical 
reaction to a contractive shock. In case of a pro-cyclical reaction, the central 
banker sets a negative growth rate of the monetary stock and actively 
reduces the money supply. This policy has two effects. First, it reduces the 
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inflation rate and, second, it contributes to the contraction of real national 
income. Doing so would shift the initial demand curve ( )0=mD  to the left in 
Figure IV.3 and result in an equilibrium on the supply curve ( )01 >wS , which 
lies to the left of point P. If the central banker undertakes a counter-cyclical 
course of action in the wake of a recessive shock, he or she increases the 
growth rate of the monetary stock. This shifts the equilibrium to the right 
away from point P on the supply function ( )01 >wS . 
The measure ( )λ θ= derived in Equation (IV.28) allows a 
differentiation between the conservative type of central banker and the 
populist central banker because it also serves as a dividing line between the 
two political camps in the graphical presentation of the time consistent 
solution in a −π/rY  diagram. The case of θλ <  characterizes a conservative 
central banker. In Figure IV.4, the relevant equilibria of the conservative 
central bankers lie to the left of the λ θ= −  line. The equilibria of populist 
central bankers lie to the right of this dividing line.  
Figure IV.4: Incorruptible Conservative and 
Incorruptible Populist Central Bankers 
 
Suppose, the society’s value system is such that θλ = . If the central 
banker shares this view, he or she will choose not to change the growth rate 
of the monetary stock m in the wake of stochastic supply side shocks. If there 
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is an unexpected shock from the supply side (e.g., a sudden increase in the 
price of necessary raw materials), the central banker will not accommodate 
the economy by increasing the money supply, but instead will keep the 
growth rate constant. In this case, the time consistent solution in an 
environment with or without a supply side shock shares the same demand 
function, that is, the (noncorrupt) central banker sets the same growth rate of 
monetary stock m regardless of the shock. This can be shown in the 
following way. Setting the weight that captures the central banker’s corrupt 
preference to 0 simplifies the time consistent solution (IV.22’) to the inflation 
rate known from the underlying basic model (cf. Section IV.2): 
(IV.10) ( )12 −++= n
w
D θ
λ
θλ
λπ . 
To derive the growth rate of the monetary stock m in the equilibrium D 
characterized by the inflation rate Dπ , one has to determine the real national 
income of this solution, which is given by Equation (IV.11): 
(IV.11) 21 θλ
θ
+−= wY
r
D . 
In this equilibrium, D, the central banker sets the following growth rate 
of the monetary stock: 
  D
r
D Ym π+−= 1 , 
  22 '11 θλ
λπθλ
θ
+++−+−= wwm DD , 
  22' θλ
λ
θλ
θπ +++−= wwm DD . 
If θλ = , the growth rate of the monetary stock equals: 
  'D Dm π= , with ( )' 1D nλπ θ= − . 
Thus, the two equilibria D and D’—the corruption-free situation with 
and without stochastic supply side shocks—are on the same demand curve 
if θλ = . D and D’ represent cost minima of the same set of iso-cost ellipses, 
which are grouped concentrically around the focal point 0=CP —the point of 
bliss. Therefore, it follows that this demand curve also intersects with the 
focal point of the cost ellipses 0=CP . This is because the supply curves, 
)0( >wS  and )0( =wS , are parallel and D and D’, respectively, are tangential 
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points of the same set of concentric iso-cost-ellipses with the relevant supply 
function, a situation illustrated in Figure IV.5. The −= θλ  line intersects with 
the equilibria D, D’, and the focal point 0=CP . 
Following the argument from the time consistent solution for a 
corruptible central banker in the model with stochastic supply side shocks, a 
central banker will have a pro-cyclical reaction to shocks if θλ <  (see 
constraint (IV.28)). The trick solution and the discretionary solutions for the 
shock-free and the shock-laden environment lie on a path originating from 
the center of the concentric iso-cost-ellipses. One can differentiate between 
paths of equilibria for conservative and populist central bankers who are not 
yet corrupt. The path of equilibria of a conservative central banker lies below 
the black λ θ= − line. 
In Figure IV.4, the ellipses represent the social objective function of 
the society the central banker is supposed to serve. Let us assume that the 
preferences of society are such that θλ = . D and D’ are the respective 
optima for the situation with or without a contractive supply side shock. 
Central bankers are either more conservative or more populist than the 
society they serve. The dividing line between conservatives and populists is 
presented in the figure by the path of optima—the θλ = -line. If society were 
to hire a central banker more conservative than itself, the path of optima lies 
beneath the θλ =  line. This case is depicted by the dotted −< θλ  line. The 
ellipses of a conservative central banker are compressed as compared to 
those of the overall society. The tangential point of the conservative 
incorruptible central banker’s iso-cost-ellipses and the relevant supply curve 
is reached at a lower inflation rate. The opposite holds true for an 
incorruptible populist central banker. This case is presented by the 
intersected −> θλ line. Combining the findings of Figures IV.3 and IV.4 
explains the possible pro-cyclicity of a corrupt central banker. 
The preference set of society, in which θλ = , provides the dividing 
line between conservative and populist central bankers. A central banker who 
is more conservative than the overall society will choose an equilibrium on 
the supply curve ( )0>wS  that lies to the left of the point D . The area is 
marked by the light-gray shade in Figure IV.5. This result holds true 
regardless of whether the central banker is corrupt. An optimum of a populist 
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central banker lies in the dark-gray area on top of the demand function, 
)( DmD π= . It will lie on the shifted supply function, ( )0>wS . 
In the case of a populist central banker, the instability will induce him 
to increase the inflation rate to even higher values than he would without 
receiving a bribe. As a result from appointing this corrupt central banker, 
society will end up in an equilibrium, which lies to the right of equilibrium D in 
Figure IV.5. Form the figure it is straightforward to see that from the viewpoint 
of society all equilibria brought about by the populist central banker result in 
increased costs from not meeting society’s inflation and employment 
objectives. For the given societal preference and the given contractive shock, 
the cost minimum is denoted by the equilibrium D. Deviation from this 
equilibrium results in higher costs to society. This result is only true if there is 
a shock. The discussion of the social costs incurred by society has to take 
into account that the shocks are stochastic.  
Figure IV.5: Shock Treatment by Corrupt Central Bankers. 
 
 
Why do both noncorrupt and corrupt populist bankers react this way? 
Populist central bankers put a high priority on high employment rates and see 
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price stability as less important. To obtain a high employment rate, the 
central banker will increase the growth rate of the monetary stock. Adding the 
corrupt incentive does not fundamentally change the central banker’s 
behavior. The corrupt income incentive and the incentive to generate a high 
rate of employment both work in the same direction. The additional income 
from increasing the growth rate of the monetary stock over its initial level of 
( )0m =  and the resulting employment gains compensate for the adverse 
effects from increased inflation. Corruption generally induces the populist 
central banker to set higher growth rates of the monetary stock. Thus, 
corruption in the stochastic model again introduces a policy distortion. In 
public, the corrupt populist central banker will place a great deal of 
importance on the employment target. The banker will stress the necessity of 
an active monetary policy directed at employment gains, while in reality the 
banker has more private motivations concerned with the resulting flow of 
corrupt income. 
The behavior of conservative corrupt central bankers is not so easy to 
explain. One complication is that there are two types of corrupt 
conservatives—the moderate conservatives and the orthodox conservatives. 
The moderates are more conservative than society as a whole 
because they fulfill constraint (IV.28). By their own volition, they choose an 
equilibrium that lies between P and D on the shifted supply function ( )0>wS  
regardless of their possible corruptibility. In this situation, corruption might 
actually benefit society. The instability of the bribe term means that the 
corrupt incentive induces the central banker to increase the inflation rate, 
thus bringing the equilibrium closer to D, which is the optimum for society. 
The disutility stemming from the high inflation rate of the possible equilibria 
on the supply function ( )0>wS  between P and D is offset by additional 
income generated from inflating the money supply. 
The second group of conservatives are the fundamentally, or orthodox, 
conservative central bankers.18 Faced with the contractive shock depicted in 
Figure IV.5, these conservatives choose to set negative growth rates of the 
monetary stock ( )0<m . They stress the necessity of anti-inflation policies to 
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combat the inflation-raising effects of the supply shock. Again, the shock is 
used to disguise the central banker’s true intentions. Actively contracting the 
money supply will not only lower the inflation rate and stem the inflationary 
tide, it will also provide the central banker with valuable information to sell. 
Figure IV.5 illustrates the welfare effects a corrupt populist central 
banker has on society if a shock happens. The negative welfare impact 
created by an incorruptible central banker who does not share society’s view 
on the employment target is known and standard in the literature; however, 
the corrupt incentive creates an additional welfare effect. Because corruption 
induces further increases in the growth rate of the monetary stock, society’s 
welfare is negatively affected by the corrupt dealing of a populist central 
banker. The bribe term drives the equilibria to the right—away from society’s 
optimum in D. In Figure IV.5, the arrows that point to the right indicate the 
shift of the equilibrium. Corruption creates a policy distortion. 
The same adverse effect of corruption on welfare might arise if the 
central banker is a conservative. As previously mentioned, the conservative 
central banker’s optimal equilibrium lies on the shifted supply curve to the left 
of D. The welfare implications of the corrupt central banker’s deals depend 
on the conservative central banker political stance toward a given contractive 
supply shock. 
Conservatives will allow lower growth rates of the monetary stock than 
their populist colleagues only if their decisions solely depend on inflation and 
employment targets. As compared to the “weak-hearted” equilibrium in P of 
Figure IV.5, the conservative central banker might opt for equilibria with 
higher or lower inflation rates. If the relevant path of optima intersects with 
the shifted supply curve in the segment between points P and D, the corrupt 
incentive might actively contribute to social welfare. Adding the corrupt 
incentive influences this group of conservatives in the same way as it does 
the populists. The conservative central banker’s time consistent solution is 
driven toward the social optimum in D. In this situation, corruption may 
actually benefits social welfare. But never forget that these central bankers 
are no saints; they will exploit the situation to their own benefit. If the shock is 
                                                                                                                                          
18 The ultra-conservative central banker (λ = 0) as used in the simulations above is an 
extreme example of this group. 
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sufficiently large, they will opt for a policy that makes the shock more onerous 
by actively reducing the monetary stock, < 0m . 
If the conservative central banker’s path of optima intersects with the 
shifted supply curve to the left of P, the conservative, acting of his or her own 
volition and without the corrupt incentive, will set a negative growth rate of 
the monetary stock. Adding the corrupt incentive shifts the time consistent 
solution to the left, further away from point P. Further shrinking of the 
monetary stock increases the conservative central banker’s corrupt revenue, 
which will compensate the banker for the increased costs from lowered 
employment that result from this policy. Thus, whether conservative corrupt 
central bankers will react pro-cyclically or counter-cyclically largely depends 
on the scale of the shock. 
IV.6. The Question of Social Costs Revisited 
The question of which central banker is best for society in the case of a 
shock is answered with the help of Figure IV.5 in favor of the mildly 
conservative central banker. A concise evaluation needs to address the 
stochastic nature of the shocks. In this context, one usually refers to the 
expected costs that society incurs from monetary policy. In the case of the 
present model, one must not lose sight of the fact that the central banker and 
overall society may not necessarily share the same views on the necessity of 
stabilization policies. This section addresses the issue of whether it possible 
for central bank corruption to be beneficial to society, by which is meant that 
society benefits from the decisions of a corrupt central banker who does not 
share its views on the importance of employment gains. Thus, one must 
differentiate between society’s views on the relative importance of 
employment gains in the social cost function (IV.3), Sλ , and the views of the 
corrupt central banker, λ . 
 
Proposition: In a world where central bankers seek a 
compromise between their own moderate levels of preference 
for employment λ θ=  and more extreme preferences by society 
Sλ  such that Sλ λ θ< <  or Sλ λ θ< < , society might allow a 
nonzero level of corruption of the central bank, that is 0κ > . 
 104
 
An examination of Figure IV.5 reveals that this proposition would be 
relevant in the case where the economy suffers a positive shock (a shift of 
the supply function to the left). A conservative central banker would 
exacerbate output fluctuations. Given a large shock, corruption causes the 
central banker to decrease the money supply, acting more in line with 
society’s ultra-conservative desires. However, would this still be the case 
where the shock w is unknown? 
Proof: Society seeks to minimize the expected costs according to 
function (IV.3), which can be expressed as: 
  ( )( )22 *2 1SC w nλπ π π θθ= + − − − − . 
This time, we allow society’s preference for employment, Sλ , to differ 
from that of the central bank. 
Inserting 
( )
( )
2
*
22 2
1
1
k
w
k
λ κ θπ π θ λ κ θ
− += + + − +  and 
( )
( )* 2
1
1
n
k
λπ θ κ θ
−= − + , one 
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Rearranging and determining the expected value yields: 
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The first derivative gives the impact of a marginal increase in κ  on 
social costs: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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22 2 2
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422 2
2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2
2
422 2
1 2 1 1( )
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1 2 1 1 2 1 1
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1 1 2 1 1
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S
w
n k kdE C
d k
k k k k k
k
k k k k
k
λ θ κ θ θ
κ θ κ θ
θ λ κ θ λ κ θ θ λ κ θ θ θ σ
θ λ κ θ
λ κ θ λ κ θ θ θ λ κ θ θ
σ
θ λ κ θ
− − + +=
− +
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − + + + − +⎣ ⎦+
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⎡ ⎤− + + + − + − + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−
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Since the first term is positive, I devote more effort to investigating the 
second term. Certainly, corruption would have the dismal effect of increasing 
the inflation bias. However, if equilibrium employment equals the level 
desired by society, 1n = , or if the variance of shocks is so high that the 
resulting disutility dominates the calculus, the focus on this second term is 
justified. This term will be positive, that is, corruption would increase social 
costs, if and only if 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2
0 0
1 1 0Sk kλ θ κ θ λ θ λ λ θ κ θ
> >
− + + − − − + >144424443 1442443 . 
See for a derivation of this finding IV.8. Appendix: The Impact of 
Corruptibility on Social Costs. Given that the first term is positive, this 
inequality may be violated if the second term is negative and sufficiently large 
in magnitude. This term would be negative if either Sλ λ θ< <  or Sλ λ θ> > . 
Q.e.d. 
Simulations reveal the relevance of these findings. Given 0Sλ = , 1λ = , 
2θ = , 1k = , 1n = , 2 1wσ =  and 0κ =  I obtain expected social costs 
( ) 0.04E C = . But with increased corruption, 0.2κ =  social costs are reduced 
to ( ) 0.016E C = . Likewise, if 2Sλ = , 1.2λ = , 1θ = , 1k = , 1n = , 2 1wσ =  and 
0κ =  I obtain expected social costs ( ) 0.71E C = . But with increased 
corruption, 0.2κ =  social costs are reduced to ( ) 0.69E C = .  
The above proposition should not be interpreted as meaning that 
corruption is a good thing. The theoretical and empirical evidence on 
corruption as being a negative influence on society is strong enough to 
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withstand any idea of the sort. Rather, the proposition points to policies that 
might foster tolerance toward corruption. It may be that there are societies 
with extreme tastes ( Sλ differing considerably from θ ) that are not governed 
by central bankers with similar preferences, Sλ λ= . In such an environment, 
society may tolerate bribes to central bankers as a way of bringing actual 
monetary policies more in line with its desires. 
This finding adds some refinement to the general recommendation of 
appointing central bankers who are more conservative than the society they 
will serve. In populist societies, Sλ λ θ> > , tolerance for corruption may 
actually increase if the central banker is slightly more conservative than the 
populist society.19 
IV.7. Conclusions 
The present analysis has shown that internal central bank corruption, that is, 
corruption that originates inside the bank, instead of outside it, as discussed 
in Chapter III, can create two types of policy distortion. The first is that it can 
influence the inflation rate and affect the growth rate of the monetary stock. 
This type of distortion is in the central banker’s self-interest as it increases his 
or her additional income; however, the policy distortion is not usually in 
society’s best interest. 
This feature changes the results of the model as compared to the 
underlying model of the corrupt central banker in the non-stochastic world. 
The optimal reaction of the central banker may be in the present model to 
lower the growth rate of the monetary stock. The corrupt central banker 
actively tries to fight the inflation rate to generate larger additional income. In 
the previous model (Chapter III.) this always involves an increased growth 
rate of the monetary stock and thereby increased inflation rates. While 
corrupt populist and conservative central bankers in that model behave in a 
comparable way, their reaction differs here. It is influenced by their political 
beliefs and by the shock, which affects the economy. If the economy were 
suffering from a recessive shock, the conservative central bankers set lower 
                                                 
19 To avoid creating tolerance for corruption, a truly conservative choice according to λ θ≤  
would also be a choice. However, society’s overall tolerance toward corruption is likely to 
increase even more if the policy distortion induced by bribery is in line with its own 
preferences. These considerations, however, are beyond the scope of the current model. 
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inflation rates as the populists would do. As compared to the corruption-free 
reference situation, corruption may induce higher inflation rates (populists) or 
lower inflation rates (ultra-conservatives). 
The second policy distortion is a pro-cyclical impact of corruption on 
central bank policy, where employment fluctuations are exacerbated rather 
than dampened. Boosting production by increasing the money supply 
becomes more attractive in the event of an expansive supply shock because 
the profit obtained by the central banker increases, but the risk of being 
caught does not. I showed that this pro-cyclical incentive could dominate 
central bank policy in the sense that fluctuations of production are no longer 
attenuated but, rather, amplified. However, this situation can occur only when 
the central banker is conservative. 
The reason conservatives are more vulnerable to pro-cyclical behavior 
has to do with their reduced willingness to smooth output fluctuations. This 
characteristic of conservatives is a standard in the literature and relates to 
the optimization of social goals, where conservatism tends to prefer inflation 
stability to output stability. Given their relative unwillingness to stabilize 
output, conservatives are more easily induced to pro-cyclical behavior. 
Central bankers of this type may cultivate a public persona of ultra-
conservativism. The banker will strive to make it appear that his or her 
actions are guided by principle, that he or she is very concerned about price 
stability, while, in reality, the banker’s self-interest and a negative supply 
shock are at play. 
One very interesting result from my model is that central bankers who 
have different tastes than the society they serve might actually create a 
climate of tolerance for corruption. This would happen, for instance, if the 
central banker’s corrupt acts lead to a monetary policy that is more in line 
with what society desires than would be the case were the banker completely 
honest and acting in what he or she believed society’s best interests to be, 
regardless of whether society actually agreed. I thus recommend that central 
bankers should be representative of the society they are to serve: 
conservative serving conservatives, populists serving populists. 
The cases I have discussed are dramatic instances of corruption, but 
these are rare; much more frequent, no doubt, are many minor variations on 
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simple self-seeking. However, by focusing on extreme cases of corruption, 
we also sharpen our understanding of these more moderate types of 
individual-maximizing behavior. Central bankers may not necessarily sell 
inside information, but they may feel undeservedly unimportant. They may 
wish for public attention and recognition of their important function. These 
feelings have the potential to produce results very similar to those created by 
the type of corruption discussed above. The bankers may feel that if they 
could show themselves to be more active participants in shaping the 
economy, for example, by constantly interfering with the money supply or 
making policy that adjusts the inflation rate up or down, they would get more 
of the attention and tribute they feel they deserve. In short, money is not the 
only thing that motivates central bankers, and I believe that my model of 
corrupt central bankers is also valid for more subtle forms of behavior. 
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IV.8. Appendix: The Impact of Corruptibility on Social Costs 
The derivative of expected social costs, ( )E C , is determined with respect to 
changes in κ : 
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Since the first term is positive, we devote more effort to investigating 
the second term. This will be positive, that is corruption would increase social 
costs, if and only if 
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Division by the term ( )22 1 0k θ+ >  yields: 
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We denote the term in angular brackets by 
( )( ) ( )( )2 21 1S k kψ λ κ θ θ λ θ θ κ θ= + − − − + − +  and expand the inequation by 
adding θ θ− +  where appropriate: 
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Division by 1 θ+  yields: 
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The term ψ  can be rearranged to ( ) ( )( )21 1S kψ λ κ θ θ θ λ= + + − + −  or 
( ) ( )21 1S Skψ λ κ θ λ θ λ= + + − − . Inserting this, we obtain: 
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Simplifying this expression, we obtain: 
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Multiplication by ( )1 θ+  brings about:  
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V. Why Corruption Drives Inflation—Malicious vs. 
Benevolent Motivation 
V.1. Introduction 
This chapter makes an empirical investigation into the impact of corruption on 
monetary policy. Two models offer explanations of how corruption may 
influence central bank policy. The models offer two possible avenues by 
which corruption may distort the decisions of this policy-making body. One 
possibility discussed in the theoretical literature is the central banker’s 
tendency toward corrupt dealing, that is, the banker’s desire for the revenue 
he or she can attain by selling inside information. In this case, the central 
banker’s objective function differs from society’s objective function. The 
corrupt incentive leads the central banker to set higher growth rates of the 
monetary stock and thereby increase inflation rates. 
 The other avenue postulates that the central banker is not corrupt 
himself or herself. Instead, the banker works under a coercive government 
that orders an increase in monetary growth. This model by Huang and Wei 
(2003) employs a natural rate model similar to the one used in Chapters III 
and IV. Their paper postulates that the central bank is free of corruption, but 
society is not. Following Al-Marhubbi (2000), Huang and Wei argue that 
corruption decreases the state’s revenue from taxes and the selling of 
licenses. To compensate for the lower revenue, the government orders the 
central banker to increase the money supply and bring about higher inflation 
rates. 
In this chapter, I will test the validity of these two theories empirically 
using two different samples: a large sample of 80 countries and a smaller 
sample of 26 transitional economies. The structure of the chapter is the 
following. The next section describes the corruption-related data used for the 
large sample. Section V.3 presents the working assumptions drawn from the 
two models of Huang and Wei (2003) and Chapters III and IV, including 
details on methods used to compile average inflation rate data. Section V.4 
gives a brief review of some basic econometric concepts. Section V.5 
describes the actual regressions and provides their results and validity, 
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dealing with the Huang and Wei (2003) model and those of Chapters III and 
IV individually. Section V.6 runs comparative tests between the two 
competing models; Section V.7 describes the results drawn from the smaller 
sample. Section V.8 concludes. 
V.2. The Data: The World Economic Forum Socio-Economic 
Indicators and the Average Inflation Rate 
To test the model empirically, it is necessary to discover how corruption 
affects the inflation rate. Empirical data on central bank corruption is scarce. 
Apart from a survey by the World Bank (WB) and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) run in 26 transition economies, 
there is no broad cross-country data on corruption-related issues available. 
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS 
2002) contained a question touching on the issue of corruption and central 
banks. Respondents had to assess the impact on their businesses of fund 
mishandling by the central bank. This question was in the context of several 
other corruption-related questions dealing with issues such as the selling of 
votes in parliament and court decisions. The BEEPS focused solely on 
transitional economies. Some empirical results drawn from the BEEPS will be 
given in Section V.7. 
Because I wanted to take a broader cross-country approach to the 
issue of central bank corruption, I used data from the World Economic 
Forum‘s Socio-Economic Indicators in the World Competitiveness Report 
2002–2003. The World Economic Forum (WEF) surveyed 8,000 business 
professionals from 80 countries.20  The sample is comprised of local and 
foreign residents in each country. In the survey, respondents state their 
perceptions of the corruption situation in different sectors of government and 
                                                 
20  The analysis of this chapter focuses on the following countries: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe. Taiwan had to be dropped from the analysis because of missing data. Thus, the 
final sample was comprised of 79. 
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in the banking sector. Among others, these included loan applications, public 
utilities, import and export permits, and tax authorities. In the question 
concerning corruption in the loan application process, interviewers asked 
respondents to rate on a scale ranging from one to seven to what extent they 
thought corrupt payments are involved in the process of loan applications. 
The precise question asked is: 
 
In your Industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
loan applications? (1 = Common, 7 = Never occurs). 
 
The way this question was phrased leads to some difficulties for my 
analysis of central bank corruption. The general definition of corruption is the 
misuse of public power for private benefit. The problem here is that the WEF 
question asks specifically about corruption in loan applications, and not all 
loan applications necessarily take place in or involve the central bank. 
However, I argue that this variable can be interpreted to measure corruption 
or the possibility for corrupt exchanges in the sphere of the central bank. If 
loan applicants frequently need to pay bribes to obtain loans from private 
banks, this opens the way for central bankers to ask for bribes, seeing as it is 
the central bank’s obligation and duty to monitor the loan business of 
commercial banks. Once central bank supervisors uncover problems in the 
loan contracts, they are in a strong position to demand a share of the bribes 
because they can threaten punishment or to close the bank. The Bank of 
Japan (BoJ) corruption case revealed that BoJ bankers had an informally 
institutionalized system for punishing banks perceived as too rebellious or 
that failed to comply with BoJ’s demands (see Section IV.4). In one instance, 
BoJ withdrew liquidity from an already struggling bank.21 In certain cases, the 
central bank may even be directly involved in the negotiation of loans at 
commercial banks. If large banks that are important to the national economy 
are in danger of bankruptcy or have a large number of nonperforming loans, 
the central bank will step in to handle negotiations, claim settlement, and so 
                                                 
21 Cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung (March 13, 1998). 
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forth, and in the course thereof, put itself and its officers in a prime position 
for demanding bribes and kickbacks. 
In the second part of the analysis, regressions are run to discern which 
of the two competing theories can be supported by empirical evidence. The 
WEF’s question concerning absence of corruption in the tax collection 
process is used to test the Huang and Wei (2003) or Al-Marhubbi (2000) 
model. The specific question asked was: 
 
In your Industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
annual tax payments? (1 = Common, 7 = Never occurs). 
 
These undocumented payments might influence the tax burden of a 
company or an individual. Pervasive corruption in tax collection should go 
along with low tax revenue and an increased dependence by the government 
on the inflation tax. 
It must be noted that the correlation of these WEF corruption-related 
socioeconomic variables is rather high. The correlation of the two indicators 
is 0.93. A scatterplot of both WEF indicators is illustrative (see Figure V.1). 
The data points are largely concentrated in one line. Therefore, some results 
obtained from using the indicator on the absence of corruption in loan 
applications might also be obtainable by using the data set on the absence of 
corruption in tax collection. However, there are some interesting differences, 
particularly in countries with high levels of corruption. The actual data are 
provided in Section V.9. 
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Figure V.1: Indicators on the Absence of Corruption in Loan  
Applications” and the Absence of Corruption in Tax Collection 
 
V.3. Inflation and Corruption: Two Hypotheses 
The regressions concentrate on the impact of corruption on the inflation rate. 
The analysis of the two influence channels identified by Lambsdorff and 
Schinke (2002,  2004) and Huang and Wei (2003) is run simultaneously. The 
argument as to why corruption influences central bank decisions draws on 
Klitgaard’s observation that corruption flourishes in institutions that combine 
three necessary factors: (1) monopoly power, (2) discretionary freedom, and 
(3) almost no public interference in the form of checks and balances.22 All 
these factors can be found in central banks. The central banker is in a 
position to sell valuable information to the private banking sector and will do 
so if he or she is corrupt, resulting in a policy distortion. The central banker 
systematically inflates the monetary stock to increase the value of his or her 
inside information.23 This leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
In countries that are perceived as less corrupt according to the 
WEF question on absence of corruption in loan applications, a 
                                                 
22 See Klitgaard (1988: 75). 
23 The model of Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002) can also apply to the situation in which the 
central banker is simply the loyal servant of a corrupt administration. Even so, he or she 
could still be personally corrupt. In this respect, the model is reconcilable with both theories. 
The present empirical analysis neglects this possibility. 
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corrupt central bank staff member has a lower motivation to 
extract bribes and increase his or her personal income. These 
countries have lower inflation rates as compared to countries 
that are perceived as more corrupt in this respect. 
 
The second hypothesis concentrates on the model of Huang and Wei 
(2003). Corruption—so goes the argument—causes a drop in the state’s 
revenue and leads to increased inflation tax revenue. Huang and Wei 
included this idea, first expressed by Al-Marhubbi (2000), in a model by 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987). The model’s basic reasoning is as follows. 
Countries with a higher degree of corruption tend to have problems with 
corruption in their tax authorities. Corruption deteriorates the tax base 
because constituents who wish to escape tax payments or lower their tax 
burden might prefer to pay a bribe rather than paying their full tax debt. As 
tax revenues become ever lower, the state needs new ways of generating 
income. The government might start putting pressure on the central bank to 
increase the money supply. The government could force the central bank to 
buy government bonds or, less subtly, just force the central bank to print and 
hand over new currency. The inflation tax revenue can be used to 
compensate for revenue lost when taxpayers bribe tax collectors instead of 
paying their taxes. This method of income generation allows the state, in 
effect, to levy taxes on the underground economy (very often a fast-growing 
sector of a corrupt country’s economy) because such an economy is highly 
dependent on cash. These theoretical considerations give rise to the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Countries in which corruption erodes tax revenue have higher 
inflation rates. The increased inflation rates generate higher 
inflation tax revenue, which is intended to make up for the 
deterioration of the ordinary tax revenue. 
 
This argument assumes that the government is strong enough to impose its 
will on the central bank or, alternatively, that the central bank views sufficient 
public revenue as an important goal. 
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The WEF question concerning the absence of corruption in tax 
collection can be used to test Huang and Wei’s (2003) theory only if poor 
performance on this indicator also goes along with a high degree of tax 
evasion in the respective country. Unfortunately, the WEF did not ask its 
respondents directly for such an assessment. The BEEPS (2000) did include 
a question on this issue but, again unfortunately, the combined sample of the 
BEEPS and WEF World Competitiveness Report 2002/03 would be too small 
to draw any valid conclusions. 
The WEF compiled an indicator of the perceived extent of the shadow 
economy. A large underground economy offers many opportunities for 
corrupt tax officials to demand and receive bribes. The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2002/03 included a question related to this issue: 
 
What percentage of businesses in your country would you 
guess are unofficial or unregistered? Less than 5% of all 
business, 6–10%, 11–20%, 21–30%, 31–40%, 41–50%, 51–
60%, 61–70% or more than 70%. 
 
The report provides the estimated average percentage of unofficial or 
unregistered business in a country. The variable on the absence of corruption 
in tax collection and the data on the percentage of unregistered or unofficial 
business correlate at –0.76. A regression of the absence of corruption in tax 
collection and the variable on the extent of unregistered business highlights 
the negative functional relationship between the two variables.24 Following 
the model of Huang and Wei (2003), the WEF indicator on corruption in tax 
collection seems useful for testing the model. 
To test the two hypotheses, the growth rate of the consumer price 
index as provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s International 
Financial Statistics is used to depict the inflation rate of 80 countries. The 
analysis focuses on the average inflation rate for the period 1994–2003. 
During this timeframe, some of the included countries reported negative 
                                                 
24 The regression coefficient of –0.61 (t-value: –9.97) shows the negative impact. Note that 
the variable captures the absence of corruption. If most of the companies do register with the 
tax authorities, the tax collectors are not in a position to demand bribes. A high value for the 
variable on the absence of corruption in tax collection reflects this issue. The residuals are 
normally distributed (JB = 0.88). 
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inflation rates. This presents a problem in that the geometric mean cannot be 
applied to calculate the average inflation rate. An arithmetic mean is not an 
option because the analysis focuses on growth rates. This study uses a 
technique that has rather similar properties and, in the case of low and 
moderate inflation rates, provides similar results. The inflation rates were 
added to the value of 1. This ensures that the values for countries that 
experienced deflation are positive. With these new “transported” inflation 
values, the geometric mean concept can be used because all the values are 
nonnegative: 
  ( )'0310
'94
1 1t
t
π π
=
+ = +∏% . 
A table containing the inflation rate date is included in Section V.9. 
V.4. Some Basic Concepts in Econometrics 
This analysis involves a cross-section of 80 countries. The set includes 
transition economies, industrialized economies, and developing countries. On 
average, the industrialized countries experienced low inflation rates between 
1994 and 2003. Average inflation rates vary more in developing countries 
and these countries also have a higher level of corruption. There is often a 
problem of heteroskedastic error terms in cross-country analyses, which is 
the case here due to this variability between the two groups of countries. A 
heteroskedastic error term produces the problem that the estimators obtained 
from the ordinary least squares regression method are not efficient. 
Efficiency is one desirable property of a regression’s estimators in that the 
estimators have the lowest possible variance. Thus, the regressions 
presented here are White-heteroskedasticity corrected. The basic 
assumption of an error term with a constant variance can be rejected.  
The lack of bias property means that on average the estimator )ˆ(θE  
obtained through a regression is the same as the true value of the parameter, 
θ . Thus, the distribution of the estimator has the value of the parameter as 
its mean. On average, the estimates are correct: 
  0)ˆ( =−θθE . 
In econometric models with heteroskedastic error terms, the 
regression line obtained from the ordinary least square (OLS) procedure can 
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place too strong an emphasis on observations with higher error variances. 
This is because the sum of the squared residuals of high variance error terms 
is likely to be higher and have a more significant impact in the OLS 
regression than are observations with a lower error variance. This implicit 
favoring of the high variance error term leads to unbiased and inefficient 
estimators (cf. Pindyck and Rubinfeld: 145–48). Thus, the regression line 
“favors” the information from the “high variance” group. Because this group is 
given a large weight in the OLS regression, the fit of the model for this group 
will appear overly good.  Therefore, statistical tests such as the t-statistic or 
the construction of confidence intervals are not reliable (Hackl 2004: 173–78). 
Before presenting the actual regressions, let us take a more detailed 
look at the average inflation rate data. The histogram of the average inflation 
rates (see Figure V.2) shows that they are not normally distributed. The 
descriptive statistics of the distribution, shown to the right of Figure V.2, 
provide support for this observation. The assumption of a normal distribution 
is easily rejected based on the Jarque-Bera statistic, which is a formal test of 
the normality of a distribution. The Jarque-Bera statistic has a chi-square 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom where N depicts sample size, S stands 
for the sample’s skewness, and K is for its kurtosis. 
 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+=
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If the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic is greater than 5.99, the null 
assumption of normality of a variable’s distribution, for instance, the residuals 
from a regression, is rejected at the 5% level. 
The skewness statistic S depicts whether the distribution of a 
stochastic variable is symmetrical. In the case of true symmetric or 
approximately symmetric distribution, the S will be 0, or very close to 0.25 
                                                 
25 If a distribution of a variable is not symmetrical enough to be approximately a normal 
distribution, there will be a large difference between the sample’s mean and its median. 
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Figure V.2: The Average Inflation Rates. 
 
The Jarque-Bera statistic incorporates another descriptive statistic, 
kurtosis (K). Kurtosis measures the thickness of the tails. If a variable’s 
distribution has thick tails it means that large deviations of this variable from 
its mean are common. Thin tails are desirable because if the tails are thin, 
observations of a stochastic variable are concentrated around its mean. A K 
value of close to 3 generally indicates that a distribution has acceptably thin 
tails. 
Because the Jarque-Bera-statistic combines kurtosis and skewness 
checks, it will be very useful in assessing the regression results. The Jarque-
Bera-statistic will also be used to check the normal distribution of the 
regression’s residuals. If the normality assumption is not met, the coefficients 
can still be used. However, the t- and F-tests and constructed confidence 
intervals for the coefficients will not be meaningful because these tests 
demand that the normality assumption be valid (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
1998: 58–59).  
V.5. An Empirical Inquiry into the Link Between Corruption 
and Inflation 
The nonnormality of the average inflation rate data seen in Figure V.2 is 
hardly surprising. Low or mid levels of inflation are far more common than 
high inflation. To get an idea of the relationship between the WEF data on 
absence of corruption and average inflation rate between 1994 and 2003, 
correlation and various scatterplots are necessary. As postulated by Huang 
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and Wei (2003), Lambsdorff and Schinke (2004), and the models presented 
in Chapters III and IV, there appears to be a link between corruption in tax 
collection or the banking sector and the inflation rate: if corruption is rampant 
in one of these crucial sectors, it appears more likely than not that the 
country will experience a high inflation rates as well. 
Looking at the average inflation rate data and the absence of 
corruption variables, there seems to be a weak and negative relationship 
between the WEF data on the absence of corruption in loan applications and 
the average inflation rate. The data correlate with each other at low, but 
negative, level. The overall correlation coefficient is –0.34. Several outliers—
countries that experienced periods of high inflation (e.g., Ecuador) and the 
concentration of low-inflation countries—appear to have a huge impact on 
the analysis. 
 
Figure V.3: Absence of Corruption and Inflation. 
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This property of the data is also reflected by the scatterplots provided 
in Figure V.3. Because lower inflation rates are by far more common than 
high inflation rates, it is tempting to fit a very steep regression line that 
incorporates most of low-inflation countries while casting aside outliers such 
as Ecuador. However, applying the logarithm to the average inflation rate 
data softens this effect. The correlation coefficient drops to – 0.52. The 
connection between the logarithm of the average inflation rate and this 
indicator is stronger. As reflected by the negative correlation, a linear 
regression equation might fit the data. The weight of countries that achieved 
lower inflation rates is somewhat reduced. Another positive side effect of 
using logarithmic data is that the distribution of the average inflation rates is 
approximately normal. The logarithm also ensures that the regressions’ 
residuals are normally distributed. 
The correlation of inflation data against the WEF indicator on the 
absence of corruption is strong; however, the WEF indicator on the absence 
of corruption in tax collection does not fare so well. As illustrated by the 
Table V.1: The Impact of Corruption in the Sphere of the Central Bank.  
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 1st LS  
1 
2nd LS  
1 
3rd LS 1,2 4th LS  
1,2 
5th LS 1,3 6th LS 1,2, 7th LS 1,2 8th LS 
1,2,3 
Constant 0.53 
(0.85) 
3.13 
(2.58) 
2.72 
(1.96) 
2.07 
(1.29) 
4.19 
(2.27) 
2.16 
(2.02) 
1.08 
(1.32) 
0.73 
(0.97) 
Corruption in Loan 
Applications, WEF 
-0.64 
(-5.40) 
-0.33 
(-1.69) 
-0.33 
(-1.72) 
-0.17 
(-0.69) 
-0.14 
(-0.61) 
-0.17 
(-1.56) 
-0.14 
(-1.55) 
-0.19 
(-1.61) 
Log. GDP per head, ppp. 
corrected 
 -0.46 
(-2.29) 
-0.46 
(-2.26) 
-0.50 
(-2.21) 
-0.51 
(-2.10) 
-0.18 
(-1.24) 
-0.05 
(-0.39) 
-0.02 
(-0.19) 
Log. M1 Growth Rate, 
Average 1993 to 2003 
     1.20 
(7.28) 
1.34 
(14.98) 
1.25 
(9.44) 
Dummy Variable Ecuador       2.96 
(15.93) 
 
Dummy Variable Japan       -3.22 
(-33.51) 
 
Central Bank Independence    3.50 
(1.62) 
2.87 
(1.59) 
  0.54 
(0.60) 
Log. Openness, World 
Bank 
  0.11 
(0.38) 
 -0.50 
(-2.30) 
   
Observations 79 79 79 47 47 78 78 46 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.52 0.58 0.68 0.83 0.85 
R2, adjusted 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.49 0.54 0.67 0.82 0.83 
Jarque-Bera 4.23 3.22 2.64 2.43 3.48 131.46 5.38 0.07 
 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White corrected t -
statistic (in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 IFS data on the growth rate of the monetary stock did not include Sweden. 
3 Japan is excluded. 
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scatterplots and the correlation coefficients, this connection is weaker but still 
negative. Again, the use of logarithmic average inflation rates ensures a 
better interpretation of the link between the absence of corruption in tax 
collection and average inflation rate. A linear regression equation fits the data 
well. 
The results of the first set of regressions on the impact of the absence 
of corruption in loan applications are presented in Table V.1. The negative 
impact of corruption in the banking sector as measured by the WEF variable 
on inflation is largely supported by the results. In the first regression, along 
with a constant, the absence of corruption in loan applications variable is 
included as an explanatory variable. The regression result shows that a 
higher degree of corruption in the banking system and in the central bank 
raises the inflation rate. The regression line estimates the impact of the 
corruption variable on the average inflation rate at –0.64. The t-statistic is 
very significant at its –5.4. 
If Nigeria were to improve from its current absence of corruption level 
of 3.7 to France’s level of 5.8, a significant reduction in the annual average 
inflation rate would result. The Nigerian inflation rate would drop by the factor 
e(0.64*2.1)=3.8. This demonstrates that there is indeed a link between 
corruption in the banking sector and inflation, but such evidence must be 
taken with a grain of salt. The fit of the model as given by the R2 is 0.27, 
meaning that although the corruption level in the banking industry has an 
influence on the inflation rate, it is not the only influence. The residuals are 
normally distributed. The Jarque-Bera statistic is below the 5.99 threshold. 
Therefore, at the 5% significance level, the null hypothesis of normality of the 
regressions residuals cannot be rejected. 
Other regressions will further analyze the impact of corruption on 
inflation. Sturm and de Haan (2001) observe that there is insufficient use of 
control variables in cross-country regressions on central bank performance 
and inflation in developing countries. They argue that the impact of these 
performance indicators does not hold if other explanatory variables are 
included in the regression. Campillo and Miron (1996) make a similar point. 
In their paper, they conclude that, overall, a measure of central bank 
independence or information on the exchange rate regime do not exert a 
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strong influence on the inflation performance of developing countries once 
information on the degree of openness of the economy or optimal tax 
considerations are included in the regressions. To take this conclusion into 
consideration, Sturm and de Haan (2001) suggest that one should employ 
other potentially important explanatory variables such as income per head, 
openness, and the ratio of external debt to GDP. They argue that these 
variables might capture the impact of central bank quality on inflation. 
Following this line of reasoning, it might also be important to check for the 
impact of GDP per head. Less developed countries often show higher 
inflation rates than well-off industrialized countries and they tend to have a 
more pressing corruption problem.  
The second regression uses GDP per head as another explanatory 
variable. The result shows that this variable does have some explanatory 
power. However, corruption in loan applications retains a lower but still 
significant influence on the inflation rate. The t-statistic dropped to 
–1.69, significance at a 10% confidence level. GDP per head as a measure 
of poverty or development also has an impact. Its t-statistic is at 
– 2.29. Countries with a higher level of income and a lower level of 
corruptibility in the banking sector have lower inflation rates. Adding GDP per 
head improved model fit; the R2 is 0.31. The t-statistics are reliable because 
the residuals are approximately normally distributed (JB = 3.22). 
The impact of absence of corruption in loan applications called for a 
further test of its robustness. Regressions 3 to 5 included important variables 
that affect the decisions of the central banker. Romer (1993) focuses on the 
link between openness and inflation. He writes: 
 
the larger, and hence less open, an economy is, the greater is 
the incentive to expand, and so the higher is the equilibrium 
rate of inflation. (Romer 1993: 871) 
 
Romer uses a natural rate model in the tradition of the model first 
proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Romer’s model is drawn from 
 
Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b). Romer postulates that openness of an 
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economy influences the tradeoff between inflation and the output target set 
by the society or the government. In a closed, large economy, if policymakers 
wish to increase output, they can resort to expansive monetary policies. 
Inflation comes at a higher cost in an open economy, however. As the 
domestic output increases relative to the output in the other economies, the 
relative price of the domestic goods lessens. The lowered relative price 
affects inflation through two channels. The real depreciation of the domestic 
goods leads to rising prices of imported goods (denominated in the domestic 
currency). The rise in the import prices is higher than the rise of domestic 
goods is. Therefore the Consumer Price Index in the economies rises. This 
development is than rolled over into the domestic prices because the workers 
try to shield themselves from the real depreciation of their wages and 
demand higher nominal wages. The production costs in the economy 
increase further. Therefore open economies pay more dearly for a given 
increase of domestic output brought about by monetary expansion. Currency 
fluctuations caused by monetary surprises are more painful and less effective 
in open economies. The data on openness used in this study come from the 
World Bank’s world development indicators.26 
Another variable that might have an impact on central bank corruption 
is the bank’s level of independence. Unfortunately, including Romer’s (1993) 
data set on central bank independence gives rise to two problems. First, the 
data is available for only a limited number of countries, causing a significant 
drop in sample size. Second, including Japan in the regressions leads to 
trouble, because although Japan has a rather expansive monetary policy, at 
the same time it shows signs of deflation. Including Japan caused problems 
with the distribution of the regressions’ residuals in that when Japan is 
included in the sample, the resulting Jarque-Bera statistic of the residuals 
exceeds the 5.99 threshold. This renders the linear regression invalid. It was 
therefore decided to remove Japan from the sample. 
The regressions were made in three steps. Regressions 3 and 4 make 
use of openness and central bank independence separately. Regression 5 
                                                 
26 A value for Singapore’s degree of openness is not available in the World Bank’s world 
development indicators. The value for Singapore was taken from the Penn World Tables 
(see Heston, Summers, and Aten (October 2002),). 
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adds both indicators. The logarithm of openness as a further explanatory 
variable on its own is not significant (t = 0.38) in Regression 3. The 
regression shows that openness has a positive influence on the average 
inflation rate, which is counterintuitive to Romer’s theory. The inclusion of 
openness exerts little influence on the absence of corruption in loan 
applications. The regression coefficient is unchanged as compared to 
Regression 2. Its significance is now increased to a p-value of 0.09. GDP per 
head still exerts a negative impact on inflation; the regression coefficient 
stands at –0.46 and its significance falls in a comparable region. Its t-value 
drops a little to –2.26—still significant at the 5% confidence level. Including 
the openness variable does not really improve model fit; the R2 is 0.32. The 
adjusted R2 of 0.30 indicates that the model as such is marginally better 
compared to Regression 2. The normality assumption for the residuals holds 
(JB = 2.64). 
Adding the central bank independence variable in Regressions 4 and 
5 causes the number of observations to almost halve, going from 78 to 47. 
Thus, the following results should be interpreted with caution. Central bank 
independence wields some influence on the performance of the absence of 
corruption in loan applications variable. The impact of central bank 
independence on the average rate of inflation is positive (3.50) in Regression 
4. Countries with less independent central banks receive higher scores on 
Romer’s (1993) index. A high degree of independence accompanies a low 
average rate of inflation. The variable barely misses being significant at the 
10% level (p-value = 0.11). However, its inclusion has strong consequences 
for the way absence of corruption in loan applications drives the results. The 
impact of absence of corruption in loan applications is nonsignificant (t = 
–0.69) and the coefficient has halved (–0.17). Model fit is improved; the R2 
and the adjusted R2 increase to 0.52 and 0.49, respectively. When both 
variables (openness and central bank independence) are included, as in 
Regression 5, the trend of decreasing significance for the absence of 
corruption in loan applications variable continues. The coefficient of this 
model is –0.14 and the t-value is –0.61. However, the importance of GDP 
 
per head in explaining the average rate of inflation continues unabated. For 
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the first time, openness has the correct sign (–0.50) and contributes support 
to Romer’s theory. It is significant at the 5% level. Central bank 
independence has little explanatory power regarding the average inflation 
rate. It misses significance at the 10% confidence level (p-value of 0.12). It 
does, however, at least suggest that high inflation rates might go along with 
low levels of central bank independence. The residuals of the two last 
regressions are normally distributed. 
Central bank independence is an issue in analyzing the inflation rate. 
Fischer (1995) points out that among industrialized countries the inflation rate 
is considerably lower in countries that have a higher degree of central bank 
independence. Alesina and Summers (1993) arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Their findings are backed by a theoretical model of (Alesina and Gatti 1995) 
showing that an independent central bank achieves low average inflation 
rates and lowered variations of output. In the present discussion, I will test 
whether central bank independence aids central bankers in the pursuit of 
self-serving goals Including central bank independence causes a reduction in 
sample size, which poses problems for the subsequent analysis. The use of 
Romer’s (1993) indicator on central bank independence results in a sharp 
drop in the influence of the corruption variable and its significance. It is 
necessary to find out whether the reported drop in the significance of 
absence of corruption (Regression 4) is due to the new, smaller subsample 
or if it is the consequences of the variable itself. To find out, a new sample is 
drawn that includes only countries for which the indicator on central bank 
independence is available. This new sample contains a less heterogeneous 
mix of countries. One of its drawbacks is that several countries, such as Haiti, 
Paraguay, and Romania, are not included and yet these countries have a 
rather high average inflation rate and seem to have a problem with corruption 
in their banking sector because they score low values in the indicator on the 
absence of corruption in loan applications (see V.9. Appendix: The Data). 
Regression 3 was re-run for this smaller set of countries.27 In this 
smaller sample, absence of corruption is again insignificant at the 10% 
                                                 
27 The regression shows that the absence of corruption in loan applications has a negative 
(–0.22) but insignificant influence on the average inflation rate (t = –0.97). GDP per head 
continues to have a negative impact on inflation (–0.55), which is almost significant at the 1% 
confidence level (p = 0.013). Openness now has a negative value 
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confidence level, indicating that the sudden drop in significance is related to 
the exclusion of a large portion of the original sample, a problem that recurs 
throughout this chapter when dealing with data on central bank 
independence. 
The odd behavior of the degree of openness variable raises a similar 
question (see Regressions 3 and 5). Why does the openness variable retain 
its predicted influence when central bank independence is added to the 
regression? One possibility is that Romer’s (1993) theory is only suited for 
the new smaller sample, as the countries in this sample have been assessed 
for central bank independence. Terra (1998) also questions the link between 
openness and inflation proposed by Romer (1993). She finds that the link 
between inflation and openness may depend largely on the inclusion in the 
sample of countries that became highly indebted during the debt crisis of the 
1980s. 
When Regression 3 is re-run for this smaller sample of 47 countries,28 
the logarithm of openness has the predicted negative impact on the average 
inflation rate. The coefficient of openness (–0.57) and the t-statistic (–2.40) 
point to the significance of this variable in explaining the average inflation 
rate for this reduced set of countries.29 The coefficient of GDP per capita 
drops to –0.55, pointing to its significant influence on inflation (p-value = 
0.01). The absence of corruption retains its negative impact (coefficient = 
–0.22) but the t-statistic of -0.97 shows that this factor is no longer significant. 
The now predictable behavior of openness in the regression is indicative of 
the possibility that Romer’s theory on the impact of openness appears most 
valid for higher developed countries for which data on central bank 
independence is available. The impact of openness on inflation so far 
remains a puzzle. Recent econometric research by Gruben and McLeod 
(2003) suggests that the openness-inflation correlation grew stronger and 
more robust in the 1990s for both developing and OECD countries.  
Corruption appears to increase the inflation rate. However, does this 
apparent impact of corruption on inflation really occur, as postulated, through 
                                                                                                                                          
(–0.57)—in line with Romer (1993). Its t-statistic is —2.40. This will be scrutinized later. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic is  3.74; model fit is 0.54. 
28 The sample does not include Japan. 
29 For the results of this regression, please refer to footnote 27. 
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the central bank channel. If corruption in the bank sector leads to high 
inflation rates in an economy, this would show up as a high growth rate of the 
monetary stock. To introduce data on monetary growth into the analysis the 
growth rate of money (M1) in the respective economies was collected from 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). For 
consistency, the same method is used for averaging money (M1) growth 
rates as was used to average inflation rates. As the IFS does not report M1 
data for Sweden in a manner consistent with the other M1 data, Sweden was 
dropped from this analysis, meaning that the sample size decreased 79 to 78. 
Also note that members of the European Monetary Union are included in the 
analysis as individual countries, even though the IFS reports on monetary 
conditions at the aggregate European level. Therefore, the analysis covers a 
shorter time period for the group of countries that were first to replace their 
traditional currencies with the Euro; the observations for this group stop in the 
years 1998 or 1999.30 The Greek series continues until 2001, the year of 
Greece’s accession to the Euro Area. 
Table V.1 reports the findings from this sixth model. A constant, the 
WEF corruption in loan applications indicator, GDP per head, and the growth 
rate of money (M1) are used as explanatory variables. As predicted from 
Lambsdorff and Schinke’s (2004) model, the growth rate of money (M1) 
captured the impact of corruption on the inflation rate. The t-statistic of –1.56 
is insignificant even at the 10% level. The factor GDP per head is also 
insignificant at the 10% level; its t-statistic is –1.24. Including M1 renders the 
impact of corruption on the inflation rate insignificant. This finding offers some 
empirical support for the link between corrupt behavior of the central banker 
and inflation, but the result should not be overestimated. Due to the high 
positive correlation (+0.93) of the absence of corruption in loan applications 
and absence of corruption in tax collection variables, one should also find a 
similar impact. Unsurprisingly, model fit improved. There is bountiful evidence 
on the link between money growth rate and inflation in the theoretical and 
                                                 
30 Because the IFS web-based database did not provide data on the French M1 or its growth 
rate, M1 for this country was calculated by adding the amount of cash balances (currency in 
circulation) to the value of demand deposits. The values were available until 1997. 
31 Because the IFS web-based database did not provide data on the French M1 or its growth 
rate, M1 for this country was calculated by adding the amount of cash balances (currency in 
circulation) to the value of demand deposits. The values were available until 1997. 
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empirical literature. McCandless and Weber (1995), as well as King (2002),32 
who replicated their study, point out that there is a very strong positive 
correlation between the growth rate of the monetary stock and the inflation 
rate in the long run (between 10 to 30 years). In fact, this link over the long 
run in both studies was so strong that there was almost unity between 
inflation and monetary growth for the 30-year average. 
Even though the results of Regression 6 replicate previous findings on the 
link between monetary growth and inflation, there are a few problems. The 
assumption of normality of the regression’s residuals does not hold. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic is 131.46, evidence of a breach of the assumptions of a 
multivariate regression model. A closer look at the regression’s residuals 
reveals that Japan and Ecuador are the cause of this extraordinarily poor 
Jarque-Bera statistic. Japan reported very low inflation rates in the wake of 
the breakdown of the Japanese asset inflation; Ecuador reports rather high 
inflation rates despite dollarization. The discrepancy is reversed for the 
average growth rate of M1. Ecuador has tried to clamp down on the high 
inflation inherited from the 1980s and early 1990s, whereas Japan’s central 
 
Figure V.4: Scatterplot of Inflation and Monetary Growth. 
 
bank and government were eager to help the Japanese economy out of the 
post-bubble gloom. This situation of Ecuador and Japan is illustrated by the 
scatterplot of Figure V.4. Using dummy variables for Japan and Ecuador 
corrects the problem.  
                                                 
32 McCandles and Weber (1995) analyze the correlation between the inflation rate and the 
growth of the monetary base for a sample of 116 countries. 
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The results of this analysis are provided in Table V.1. The results from 
the previous analysis (Regression 6) are confirmed. High corruption in the 
negotiation of loans continues to bring about high inflation. However, this 
factor is insignificant and its influence is again captured by the average 
growth rate of M1. The factor continues to have a strong positive effect on 
the inflation rate. The regression coefficient is 1.34. An increase in the 
average growth rate of M1 will drive the inflation rate higher by a factor of 
1.34. The t-statistic for the average growth rate of M1 is 14.98, indicating a 
strong influence on the average inflation rate. The dummy variables for 
Japan and Ecuador are both highly significant. 
Model 8 mirrors Regression 6 but also includes the indicator on central 
bank independence. The resulting sample design again renders the absence 
of corruption variable insignificant (t=-1.61), while central bank independence 
itself is also insignificant (t=0.60). The growth rate of M1 is the driving force in 
this model (t=9.44). 
As an additional test for the sensitivity of the link between absence of 
corruption in loan applications, data on the prevalence of an unregistered or 
unofficial economy (the shadow economy) is included in the following 
regressions. This can be seen as test of the model of the malicious central 
banker first proposed by Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002, 2004). This theory 
would appear questionable if including data on the prevalence of the shadow 
economy changes the regression coefficients from negative to positive 
values (cf. Table V.1) because such a reversal in values would show that the 
impact of the malicious central banker works through the same channel—the 
tax system. This possibility must be investigated. The findings from these 
regressions are given in Table V.2. 
The shadow economy data also wield a strong influence in these 
regressions. The coefficients for absence of corruption in loan applications in 
the two regressions are still negative, but insignificant (see Regressions 9 
through 11). The variable on the prevalence of the shadow economy 
decreases the corruption variable’s influence, bringing into question the 
theory of the malicious central banker proposed by Lambsdorff and Schinke 
(2002, 2004). 
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The impact of absence of corruption in loan applications is sensitive to 
the inclusion of other explanatory variables. As further explanatory variables, 
the logarithm of GDP per head, the logarithm of the degree of openness, and 
central bank independence are considered. It can be seen from the results in 
Table V.2 that absence of corruption in loan applications is sensitive to the 
new variables. GDP per head lowers the influence of the corruption variable 
to –0.11 and causes a further drop in the t-statistic but a high degree of 
corruption in loan applications is still related to more inflation; it has a 
negative influence but is insignificant throughout Regressions 10, and 11. 
The logarithm of openness does not alter these results (see Regression 11). 
The coefficient of absence of corruption in loan applications is (almost) 
unchanged and the same holds true for its t-statistic. Openness itself has 
again a positive and counterintuitive regression coefficient of 0.32. Its impact 
is not significant. 
Romer’s indicator on central bank independence as used in 
Regression No. 12 reduces the sample size to 47, which causes a sample 
design problem mentioned previously in the discussion of the results in Table 
V.1. The regression coefficient of the corruption variable stands at 0.17. The 
Table V.2: The Interaction of Unregistered Business with  
Absence of Corruption in Loan Applications 
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 9th LS 1 10th LS 1 11th LS 1,2 12th LS 1 13th LS 1,2 
Constant -3.83 
(-3.83) 
-3.65 
(-2.02) 
-5.36 
(-2.52) 
-4.31 
(-2.01) 
-2.36 
(-1.04) 
Corruption in Loan 
Applications, WEF 
-0.12 
(-0.87) 
-0.11 
(-0.62) 
-0.11 
(-0.61) 
0.17 
(0.86) 
0.16 
(0.82) 
Unregistered Business as 
Percentage of all Business 
0.51 
(4.74) 
0.51 
(4.19) 
0.55 
(4.46) 
0.58 
(3.77) 
0.52 
(3.44) 
Log. GDP per head, ppp. 
corrected  
 -0.02 
(-0.11) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.19 
(-0.92) 
-0.22 
(-1.00) 
Log. Openness, World Bank   0.32 
(1.18) 
 -0.32 
(-1.68) 
Central Bank 
Independence , Romer 
   2.72 
(1.50) 
2.38 
(1.45) 
Observations 79 79 79 47 47 
R2 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.67 0.70 
R2, adjusted 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.64 0.66 
Jarque-Bera 1.76 1.67 0.31 1.92 4.41 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White 
corrected t -statistic (in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 Japan is excluded from the data set. 
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variable is still insignificant (t = 0.86). However, the change in the impact of 
the corruption variable on the average inflation rate should not be 
overestimated as it seems due to sample design more than anything else. 
The shadow economy continues to be the driving force behind the average 
inflation rate. Its impact is steadfastly positive (coefficient of 0.58) and 
significant (t = 3.77). The final test shown in Table V.2 incorporates all 
variables (cf. Regression 13). Not surprisingly, the positive impact of absence 
of corruption in loan applications is persistent, as is its insignificance. Again, 
its coefficient is positive (0.16). The impact of corruption in loan applications 
is insignificant (t-value of 0.82). Combining the logarithm of openness and 
central bank independence does not result in much change, apart from its 
impact on openness. Once the sample is reduced to 47 countries, openness 
obtains a negative impact. Its significance is boosted; it has a p-value of 0.10. 
Central bank independence is insignificant. The shadow economy has an 
important and positive impact on the explanation of the average inflation rate 
(coefficient of 0.52, t-value of 3.44). 
The empirical evidence presented here offers some support for the link 
between corruption in the banking sector and the inflation rate as well as 
arguments against the validity of this link. This supports to some extent the 
models developed in Chapters III and IV and in Lambsdorff and Schinke 
(2002, 2004). However, this should not be taken as evidence that corruption 
is the main force behind inflationary processes, but instead interpreted to 
mean that corruption is one contributing factor among others. Its negative 
impact continued throughout these tests on the sensitivity in the first set of 
regressions (Table V.1). Unfortunately, in some tests the variable was 
insignificant. Results of the test for the effect of the shadow economy (see 
Table V.2) are not supportive of this theory. The absence of corruption in 
loan applications retained its negative influence in the whole sample (that is, 
when the sample did not have to be reduced due to use of the central bank 
independence indicator). It failed to be significant in all these regressions (cf. 
Regressions 9 – 11). In the smaller sample, the impact of the shadow 
economy as additional explanatory variable was such that the influence of 
absence of corruption in loan applications was reversed. In Regressions 12 
and 13, its positive coefficients imply that less corruption in the banking 
 134
sector actively increases the average inflation rate, a finding that is 
contradictory to the theory under study. 
The link proposed by Al-Marhubbi (2000) and Huang and Wei (2003) 
regarding the impact of corruption in tax collection, is examined next. The 
regression results are presented in Table V.3. Again, the regressions have 
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. When 
testing the relationship between corruption in tax collection and inflation, it is 
important to keep in mind the very strong positive correlation between the 
two indicators that capture the extent of corruption in the two sectors. The 
data correlates +0.93. Therefore, it is no surprise that the regressions run for 
this part of the analysis have results roughly similar to those of the previous 
set of regressions. A negative impact of the absence of irregular payments in 
tax collection on inflation should be expected, judging from the results 
reported in Table V.1 and given the correlation of the two WEF indicators. 
 
Table V.3 reports the results from regressions based on the Huang 
and Wei (2003) approach. Figure V.3 illustrates that a logarithmic approach 
improves the correlation between the Absence of corruption in tax collection 
Table V.3: The Impact of the Absence of Corruption in Tax Collection 
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate Between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 14th LS 1 15th LS 1 16th LS 1 17th LS  18th LS 1,2 19th LS 1 20th LS 1,2,3 
Constant -0.35 
(-0.68) 
3.88 
(3.04) 
-3.36 
(-2.03) 
2.55 
(1.50) 
2.23 
(1.34) 
3.43 
(2.26) 
-1.18 
(-0.59) 
Corruption in Tax 
Collection, WEF 
-0.47 
(-4.76) 
-0.05 
(-0.34) 
0.25 
(1.61) 
-0.04 
(-0.30) 
-0.06 
(-0.39) 
-0.07 
(-0.44) 
0.22 
(1.32) 
Log. GDP per head, ppp. 
corrected 
 -0.69 
(-3.61) 
-0.28 
(-1.55) 
-0.64 
(-3.10) 
-0.58 
(-2.99) 
-0.69 
(-3.63) 
-0.36 
(-1.88) 
Central Bank 
Independence , Romer 
   4.12 
(1.93) 
3.71 
(1.77) 
 2.38 
(1.51) 
Unregistered Business as 
percentage of all Business 
  0.60 
(4.71) 
   0.51 
(3.19) 
Log. Openness, World 
Bank 
     0.11 
(0.36) 
-0.36 
(-1.90) 
Observations 79 79 79 48 47 79 46 
R2 0.21 0.29 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.29 0.75 
R2, adjusted 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.26 0.72 
Jarque-Bera 2.57 2.83 1.02 7.26 2.55 2.68 2.16 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White corrected t -
statistic (in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 Japan is excluded from the data set. 
3 Panama is excluded from the data set. 
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indicator and the average inflation rate. The scatterplots hint at a possible 
negative impact of the absence of corruption in tax collection on the logarithm 
of the inflation rate. Once again, the logarithm was used so as to obtain a 
better comparison between the two sets of regressions. Regression 14 tests 
the impact of corruption in tax collection on the average inflation rate. As 
expected, this variable has a negative impact. The regression coefficient has 
a value of –0.47, demonstrating a highly significant influence. The t-statistic is 
– 4.76. Countries facing corruption problems in their tax authorities are 
identified by this analysis as the ones that also suffer from high inflation rates. 
These values are more or less comparable to the results obtained in the first 
regression is to be expected. The regression coefficients are negative and 
the t-statistics are similar. However, the fit of the new model is not as good as 
the model based on the absence of corruption in loan applications. While the 
R2 is 0.21 in this case, the fit of the first model is 0.29 (cf. Table V.1). 
Comparable results in terms of inflation reduction are also obtained here. As 
in the case of corruption from within the central bank, corruption in tax 
collection cannot be seen as the sole driving force behind inflationary 
processes. The fit indicates that this socioeconomic indicator of perceived 
corruption in tax authorities has some power to explain inflation. Whether the 
link really works through deterioration in tax revenues requires further 
empirical testing. 
The result implies that curbing corruption can result in a reduced 
inflation rate. Arguments similar to the previous analysis on the effects of 
corruption in loan applications can be made. Again, Indonesia and Nigeria 
are used for illustration because both countries showed high average inflation 
rates. Indonesia’s average inflation rate stands at 13.6%. Indonesia’s ranking 
in the absence of corruption in tax collection indicator is 2.9. The average 
rank for all 80 countries is 5.0. Indonesia would profit from a reduction in 
corruption in tax collection. If Indonesia were to improve to Estonia’s level, it 
would experience a reduction in the average inflation rate to 4.4%. Nigeria 
fared even worse in the rankings. Nigeria ranks as 78 out of 80, with a value 
of 2.5. If Nigeria were to improve conditions by 4 points and realize the level 
of Canada, the United Kingdom, or Norway—all with scores of 6.5—the 
resulting average inflation rate would be 3.3 percent. The JB coefficient of 
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this regression is 2.57, well below the 5.99 threshold. The regression 
residuals are approximately normally distributed. 
These findings offers some support to Huang and Wei’s argument. 
They note: 
 
we model corruption as an erosion of a government’s ability to 
collect revenue through formal tax channels. (2003: 4) 
 
To check for the robustness of the result, some further explanatory 
variables were included in Regression 15. To avoid stigmatizing poor 
countries, the analysis controls for poverty or obtained development level. 
The GDP per head measure, derived from the WEF 2003–03 Report, was 
chosen as a measure of obtained development level. The inclusion of GDP 
per head to control for overall development level renders absence of 
corruption in tax collection insignificant. While the regression coefficient 
retains its negative value, indicating that a drop in the corruption-related 
variable leads to a reduced average inflation rate, the influence of the 
variable on the regression results dropped sharply. The coefficient stands at 
– 0.05. The t-statistic indicates that the variable is insignificant ( – 0.34). 
Poverty or a low development level seems to drive the inflation rate. The 
logarithm of GDP per head has a negative impact on the inflation rate. 
Conversely, a high per capita income level reduces the inflation rate. The t-
statistic (–3.61) shows that this influence is highly significant. It captures the 
influence of corruption in tax collection. 
Using the percentage of business made up by the shadow economy 
one can test if the Huang and Wei (2003) hypothesis is valid. Their 
hypothesis can be split in two parts: 
 
1. Tax evasion drives the shadow economy. 
 
2. The shadow economy drives the inflation rate through pressure to 
increase seigniorage revenue. 
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A high degree of tax evasion should provide ample opportunity for tax 
collectors and the investigative branch of the tax authority to demand bribes. 
The absence of corruption in tax collection variable and the shadow economy 
percentage variable correlate at –0.76. The shadow economy percentage 
renders insignificant the influence of the corruption in tax collection variable 
and, even more important, it also changes the direction of its impact (cf. 
Regression 16). This supports Huang and Wei’s (2003) theory. The absence 
of corruption variable now exerts a positive influence on the average inflation 
rate (0.25). It barely misses significance at the 10% level. This result 
indicates that the influence of corruption in tax collection works through the 
shadow economy. The formerly important influence of GDP per head is 
reduced to impotence with the inclusion of data on the shadow economy. It 
still has a negative effect on the average inflation rate (–0.28), but it is no 
longer the driving force. The t-statistic (–1.55) and the p-value (0.13) both 
show that it misses being significant even at the 10 % confidence level.33 The 
increase of the R2 and the adjusted R2 over the values in Regression 15 
show that the model benefits from the additional regressor. The normality 
assumption for the residuals holds. 
This finding supports the theory proposed by Huang and Wei (2003) 
and Al-Marhubbi (2000). Once the shadow economy data is included in the 
regression, the impact of absence of corruption in tax collection becomes 
counterintuitive. Because the two variables correlate at a high level (–0.76), 
multicollinearity is an issue. This multicollinearity is exploited to check 
whether the shadow economy lowers tax revenue (and increases the 
average inflation rate) because it leads to an increased bribing of tax 
collectors. This notion was rejected. The impact seems to be a direct one. 
Once a measure for the possibility of engaging in corrupt deals is 
implemented in the regressions, the absence of corruption in tax collection 
variable does not behave in the way theory would predict. The shadow 
economy variable has taken over the role of absence of corruption in tax 
                                                 
33 In addition, a modified version of Regression 14 was tested. It produced the same results 
when the data on the shadow economy were included. The variable on the absence of 
corruption in tax collection was insignificant (p-value of 0.30). The influence from absence of 
corruption in tax collection was positive (0.12). The shadow economy variable was 
completely dominate. The coefficient of this variable is 0.65. It is highly significant in 
explaining corruption (t = 5.66). The residuals are normally distributed (JB = 1.21). 
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collection. This finding indicates that the proposals of Al-Marhubbi (2000) and 
Huang and Wei (2003) appear to be valid. 
Regression 17 adds data on the independence of the central bank as an 
additional explanatory variable. In the context of the Huang and Wei (2003) 
model, the impact of central bank independence should be the following. If 
corruption in tax collection brings about reduced tax revenue, the government 
must find different ways to generate the funds needed to cover its expenses. 
The model postulates that the government will order the central bank to 
increase seigniorage revenue. 
Including central bank independence serves as a test of the model’s 
validity. Because countries with an independent central bank have lower 
scores for independence the impact of this variable should be positive. 
Furthermore, the government must have the power to order changes in 
central bank monetary policy to suits its funding needs. Therefore, the index 
should capture some of its influence. 
Regressions 17 and 18 combine the variable on corruption in tax 
collection, the development measure of GDP per head, and the indicator on 
central bank independence. (Note that, due to previously mentioned sample 
design problems concerning the central bank independence data, the 
regressions do not have the same number of observations.) Again, Japan 
produces problems when its inflation data is combined with GDP per head 
and the Romer (1993) indicator on central bank independence. For reasons 
of completeness, both regressions are reported here to show that the 
exclusion of Japan has consequences for the results but does not change 
them fundamentally; the results for Regression 18, which excludes Japan, 
will be given in parentheses. The results from the two regressions are as 
follows. The impact of corruption in tax collection is considerably reduced. 
The regression coefficient is – 0.04 ( – 0.06). This indicates that fewer 
corruption incidents reduce inflation, but the t-statistic shows that this impact 
is no longer significant. GDP per head is still important. The regression 
coefficient of –0.64 (–0.58) shows that a lower income per head increases 
the average inflation. The t-statistic of –3.10 (–2.99) indicates that this 
influence is very important in explaining the average inflation rate. 
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Central bank independence also has a significant impact. A country 
with a more dependent central bank has higher inflation rates. The t-statistic 
of 1.93 (1.77) shows that the influence of central bank independence on the 
average inflation rate is valid at the 10% level. The fit of the model gradually 
increased to 50%. The Jarque-Bera statistic indicates that there are problems 
with the distribution of the residuals as at 7.26, it exceeds the 5.99 threshold. 
Distribution of the residuals is not normal. However, removing Japan from the 
sample solves this problem and reduces the Jarque-Bera statistic to 2.55. 
Including the shadow economy data in Regression 1834 has the usual 
effect of reversing the impact of the absence of corruption in tax collection 
variable. The regression coefficient of the corruption variable is 0.24; it is not 
significant at the 10% confidence level. The other two explanatory variables, 
GDP per head and central bank independence, still have the same influence, 
as theory predicts, but are insignificant. The shadow economy variable 
bleeds the significance out of all the other variables. Its influence is, as 
expected, positive and it is significant at the 1% confidence level. This 
regression lends further support to Huang and Wei’s (2003) theory: the 
impact of a large shadow economy is positive and results in more inflation. 
Openness may also be an influence on a central banker’s decisions. 
Regression 19 employs the logarithm of openness, instead of central bank 
independence, as an additional explanatory variable to test the robustness of 
Huang and Wei’s (2003) model. Openness increases the impact of absence 
of corruption in tax collection in explaining the average inflation rate a bit over 
the results from Regression 15 (t = –0.44). It does retain a negative influence 
(–0.07). Fewer incidents of corruption in the tax authorities are still related to 
lower inflation rates. GDP per head again confirms its importance as an 
explanatory factor; its t-value is at –3.63 and its influence is still negative. 
Openness has no explaining power on its own. The regression coefficient 
obtained actually contradicts the Romer’s (1993) theory because it is positive. 
                                                 
34 The following table provides the results from this regression: 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic p-Value 
Constant -4.24 -2.04 0.05 
Corruption in Tax Collection, WEF 0.24 1.44 0.16 
Log. GDP per Head, ppp. Corrected -0.25 -1.30 0.20 
Central Bank Independence 2.71 1.56 0.13 
Unregistered Business as Percentage of all Business 0.61 3.79 0.0005 
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The model’s R2 is 0.29. The normality assumption for the residuals holds (JB 
= 2.68). 
How will these influences be affected if the shadow economy variable 
is included (see Regression 20)? The negative influence of the absence of 
corruption in tax collection variable on average inflation rate is once again 
reversed and insignificant at the 10% confidence level (t = 1.32). Openness, 
GDP per head and the shadow economy drive the results in this regression. 
The overall result is that neither the theory of a malicious central 
banker (see Chapters III and IV) nor the theory of Huang and Wei (2003) 
received complete empirical backing. Initially, both theories seem to explain 
average inflation rates; however, once other explanatory variables enter the 
regressions, the impact of absence of corruption in loan applications and in 
tax collection is not completely convincing. In particular, the variable 
concerning the shadow economy wields strong influence on both models. It 
now seems questionable that corruption plays much of a role in explaining 
average inflation rates. Some further testing on the robustness of the results 
is needed. 
V.6. Further Tests on the Link Between Corruption and 
Inflation 
The initial tests used only one of the two indicators on the absence of 
corruption. The following section will combine the two indicators in the same 
regressions. As highlighted previously in Section V.2, the two indicators are 
highly correlated, which implies that there is a problem of multicollinearity and 
this is why the two factors have been dealt with separately until now. 
However, using both corruption indicators in the same regression will test 
which of the two competing models (Huang and Wei (2003) or Lambsdorff 
and Schinke (2002, 2004)) is validated by empirical evidence. The 
regressions are White-heteroskedasticity corrected. Table V.4 provides the 
results of the first set of regressions. This analysis will again touch on the 
issue of the influence of the shadow economy. 
The first regression (21) from this set concentrates on the two 
corruption indicators and provides interesting results. Although the absence 
                                                                                                                                          
The R2 is 0.69. The adjusted R2 is 0.66. The residuals are normally distributed (JB = 2.80). 
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of corruption in loan applications turns out as expected, the influence of 
corruption in tax collection is surprising. The coefficient of absence of 
corruption in loan applications (–0.90) still has a negative impact; a high 
value in the WEF indicator appears to accompany a low average inflation 
rate. This influence is significant (t=-3.24). The results for absence of 
corruption in tax collection point in the opposite direction. 
The regression results indicate that absence of corruption in tax 
collection increases the average inflation rate, which contradicts Huang and 
Wei’s theory. The regression coefficient (0.24) shows that countries 
perceived as corrupt in their tax authorities have lower inflation rates. The 
WEF ranking awards high grades to countries that are apparently clean. The 
p-value of the t-statistic (1.02) is 0.31. The influence of the WEF indicator on 
corruption in tax collection is insignificant. The fit of the model is comparable 
to the fit of Regressions 1 and 14 (see Tables V.1 and Table V.3, 
respectively). The R2 stands at 0.28. The Jarque-Bera statistic is below the 
5.99 threshold. The residuals have a normal distribution. 
In the next regression (22), I again control for the countries’ 
development level by adding GDP per head. Openness and central bank 
independence are included as further control variables in later regressions 
(23–25). However, the resulting drop in number of observations due to 
inclusion of central bank independence motivates its omission in some of 
these regressions. The resulting smaller sample again renders the 
corruption-related variables insignificant. 
The results from the regressions are striking. Regression 22 shows 
that GDP per head and absence of corruption in loan applications still have 
the same influence on the average inflation rate, which was also the finding 
from Regression 2. GDP per head exerts a negative influence. In the new 
regression, this influence is highly significant (t-value of –2.99). 
The regression coefficient (–0.80) of absence of corruption in loan 
applications and the t-statistic of this variable ( – 2.75) imply that fewer 
corruption incidents in loan applications lead to low inflation rates. The 
importance is lowered by the inclusion of GDP per head, as compared to the 
previous regression (21), but remains significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Interestingly, the positive influence of the absence of corruption in tax 
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collection increased in this regression. The regression coefficient (0.53) 
illustrates that a very corrupt tax authority would reduce the average inflation 
rate — a fact that is hard to reconcile with the theory. The influence is 
significant at the 5% confidence level. Model fit improved with the inclusion of 
GDP per head. The R2 is 0.35. 
 
To test the robustness of the results, the logarithm of openness is 
added to the model in Regression 23. The inconsistency in the influence of 
absence of corruption in tax collection remains. Absence of corruption in loan 
applications still has a negative impact on the average inflation rate with 
almost the same regression coefficient of –0.79. Its significance drops a bit, 
but it continues to be powerful in explaining the average inflation rate (t = 
–2.61). The corruption in tax collection variable’s coefficient is still positive 
(0.53) and significant at the 10% confidence level. The new variable, 
openness, is not significant even at the 10% level. The coefficient of 
openness shows that a higher degree of openness again seems to increase 
Table V.4: Tests for Robustness I 
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate Between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 21st LS 
1 
22nd LS  
1 
23rd LS  
1 
24th LS 
 1,2 
25 th TSLS 
1,2,3 
26th LS  
1,2 
27th TSLS 
1,2,3 
Constant 0.65 
(1.01) 
4.33 
(3.20) 
4.25 
(2.62) 
4.57 
(2.38) 
7.15 
(1.14) 
-3.25 
(-1.91) 
-10.98 
(-1.93) 
Absence of Corruption in 
Loan Applications, WEF 
-0.90 
(-3.24) 
-0.80 
(-2.75) 
-0.79 
(-2.61) 
-0.36 
(-0.81) 
-2.28 
(-4.46) 
-0.86 
(-4.19) 
-2.08 
(-3.79) 
Absence of Corruption in Tax 
Collection, WEF 
0.24 
(1.02) 
0.53 
(2.06) 
0.53 
(1.93) 
0.21 
(0.78) 
1.82 
(1.56) 
0.87 
(3.95) 
1.41 
(-1.91) 
GDP per head, ppp. 
corrected 
 -0.62 
(-2.99) 
-0.62 
(-3.01) 
-0.54 
(-2.30) 
-0.59 
(-0.54) 
-0.15 
(-0.79) 
0.91 
(1.12) 
Log. Openness, World Bank   0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.51 
(-2.36) 
-0.47 
(-1.13) 
  
Central Bank Independence    2.80 
(1.52) 
   
Unregistered Business as 
Percentage of all Business 
     0.59 
(5.17) 
1.04 
(2.97) 
Observations 79 79 79 47 78 78 78 
R2 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.58 0.16 0.56 0.15 
R2, adjusted 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.53 0.11 0.53 0.11 
Jarque-Bera 5.05 4.92 4.63 3.65 1.96 1.26 1.43 
 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White corrected t -statistic 
(in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 Japan is excluded. 
3 Instruments are the dummies for the regions Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
South-East Asia.  
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the average inflation rate, a finding again related to the sample design 
problem addressed above. In the present model, the main influence is GDP 
per head. 
Central bank independence has the expected effect (see Regression 
24). The importance of the two absence of corruption variables on the 
inflation rate is lowered, both in significance and impact. Both variables retain 
their previous type of influence (see Regressions 21, 22, and 23), but the 
absolute values of their coefficients are lower, compared to the previous 
regressions. The inconsistent behavior of absence of corruption in tax 
collection remains. A very corrupt tax authority seems indicative of low 
average inflation rates. In Regression 24, the inclusion of central bank 
independence benefits openness, as in previous regressions, but this time 
the coefficient has the correct sign, signifying a negative influence. It is 
significant at the 5% level. The influence of GDP per head is also confirmed. 
A high per capita gross domestic income goes along with low inflation rates. 
This influence is significant at 5% confidence level (t = –2.30). The normality 
assumption for the residuals holds. 
However, these regressions are troubled by two problems: 
 
1. The corruption-related data suffer from endogeneity. 
 
2. The corruption data might contain measurement errors. 
 
Corruption in loan applications and corruption in tax collection can be 
endogenous. For example, inflation could increase the real tax burden, which 
might lead taxpayers to resort to bribery of tax officials so as to decrease this 
burden. It is thus not clear whether corruption results in higher inflation rates, 
or if high inflation rates lead to corruption. 
Similarly, high inflation rates might be the cause of high bribe 
payments in the banking sector. For example, prolonged high inflation rates 
may make banks reluctant to make loans, a situation private parties in need 
of funds might overcome by offering bribes. Again, it is not clear whether 
corruption causes the high inflation rates or whether the inflation rates are the 
result of corruption. 
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The two-stages least square (TSLS) model can help solve this sort of 
endogeneity problem. Because the previously employed first-stage model 
provided better results for the data on the absence of corruption in loan 
applications, only this variable is seen as possibly endogenous in the 
following set of regressions. The forecasted values for absence of corruption 
in loan applications enter the second regression along with the logarithms of 
GDP per head and openness and the indicator on the absence of corruption 
in tax collection. 
TSLS is also useful in overcoming the second problem mentioned 
above—the possibility of measurement errors in the corruption-related data, 
which, if present, could have a severe impact on the regression output. The 
obtained coefficients tend to be smaller if an explanatory variable with a 
stochastic error term enters the regression. Furthermore, the basic linear 
regression model cannot be used in this case because all the explanatory 
variables must be nonstochastic. 
It is quite possible that the corruption data used here suffers from 
measurement errors. The WEF polls 8,000 individuals to obtain the data for 
its indicators. This introduces a possible stochastic measurement error. 
Regional spillover might come into play. Such a spillover can arise if a certain 
region lacks a clean and transparent central bank as an example to the other 
central banks. Because of the lacking good example from neighboring 
countries, there is no public pressure on the central bank to reduce its 
corruption level. To check for such spillovers, the regional dummies35 will 
serve as instruments in the following TSLS-models. 
                                                 
35 The sample from the WEF 2002/03 World Competitiveness Report includes five regions: 
1. Western Hemisphere: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States of America. 
2. Latin American Countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
3. Southeast Asia: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
4. Africa and the Middle East: Botswana, Israel, Jordan, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. 
5. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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For the TSLS model, it is necessary to have a suitable model for the 
corruption variable so as to run the first-stage model. Choosing a suitable 
model is not always straightforward. For the given case of possible errors in 
the measurement of the corruption variable the model will need to address 
regional discrepancies. As further explanatory variables, the logarithms of 
openness and GDP per head will be included.36 The model’s fit is R2 = 0.67 
and the residuals are normally distributed. Using the same model for the 
absence of corruption in tax collection produces inconclusive results.  
However, running the TSLS for the absence of corruption in loan 
applications leads to striking results, clearly pointing out that measurement of 
the absence of corruption in loan applications can have stochastic influences 
that need to be filtered out. 
In TSLS Regression 25, the inconsistency of the influence of absence 
of corruption in tax collection is again persistent. Absence of corruption in 
loan applications exerts a negative influence (–2.28) on the average inflation 
rate, while the absence of corruption in tax collection again increases inflation 
(1.82). Absence of corruption in loan applications is highly significant (t = 
–4.46). Absence of corruption in tax collection, as well as the influences from 
the logarithms of GDP per head and openness, are insignificant. The 
regression coefficients for openness and GDP per head are negative—as 
predicted by the theoretical models. 
The inconsistent impact of corruption in tax collection survived the 
inclusion of several explanatory variables. Its coefficient was positive and the 
impact significant in some cases. Absence of corruption in loan applications 
behaved as follows. As expected, this variable has a negative impact on the 
average inflation rate. It only failed to be significant when data on central 
bank independence was included (cf. Regression 24). How will these results 
fare if data on the prevalence of the shadow economy in included? 
Regressions 26 and 27 answer this question. 
Both corruption-related indicators have are higher significance in 
Regression 26. While a high degree of absence of corruption in loan 
applications seems to be responsible for low average inflation rates (–0.86), 
the opposite is true for corruption in tax collection (0.87). The shadow 
                                                 
36 Note that the logarithm of GDP per head and the logarithm of openness will enter the 
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economy data exerts a positive influence on the average inflation rate (0.59), 
which is highly significant (p-value of 0.00).37 
An analogous picture emerges if one runs a TSLS model with the 
shadow economy data set (cf. Regression 27). The explanatory variables of 
the second stage model are the two absence of corruption variables, GDP 
per head (log), and the shadow economy data set. Absence of corruption in 
loan applications still exerts a negative influence on the average inflation rate 
(–2.08) and is highly significant (p-value of 0.0003). The coefficient of the 
absence of corruption in tax collection is still positive (1.41) and significant at 
the 10% confidence level. The shadow economy data again wield a positive 
and highly significant influence (p-value of 0.004). Interestingly, GDP per 
head has a positive but insignificant influence (coefficient of 0.91, t-statistic = 
1.12). 
The findings from these regressions are supportive of the theory set 
out in Chapters III and IV. Including the shadow economy data fails to make 
the impact of absence of corruption in loan applications insignificant or to 
change its impact on the average inflation rate. On the other hand, it 
increases the positive impact of corruption in tax collection. The finding of a 
persistently inconsistent impact for absence of corruption in tax collection in 
Regressions 21 – 27 contradicts Huang and Wei’s (2003) theory. More 
corruption seems to be beneficial in driving down inflation and thereby 
reducing the inflation costs to society. How can it be that corruption in one 
sector is beneficial while in the other sector it is harmful? Before drawing any 
conclusions from the regression results, one must remember that the 
correlation between the two explanatory corruption variables is very high. 
These variables on the absence of corruption in loan applications and on the 
absence of corruption in tax collection are correlated with each other at 0.93. 
Such high correlations are an indication of multicollinearity. 
                                                                                                                                          
second stage as well; they should not be interpreted as instruments. 
37 A comparable model including openness was also tested. Including this variable does not 
change the results much. Absence of corruption in loan applications continues to lower the 
inflation rate significantly (coefficient of –0.78; t-statistic = –3.40). Absence of corruption still 
exerts a positive influence (coefficient of 0.80, t-statistic = 3.43). GDP per head retains its 
negative influence (–0.19) and, again, its impact is insignificant (t = –0.96). Openness exerts 
a positive influence. Its coefficient is 0.21. The t-statistic of 0.71 reveals that this influence is 
not important. The importance of the shadow economy continues unabated (coefficient of 
0.62, t-statistic = 5.37). The model does not gain from the inclusion of this variable; the 
adjusted R2 drops to 0.51. The normality assumption holds (JB = 2.29). 
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The basic assumption of the multivariate regression model is that 
there is no linear relation between the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity 
leads to the problem that the regression coefficients cannot be interpreted 
because, ceteris paribus, a change in just one of the collinear variables is not 
possible: a change in one variable always leads to a change in the other 
variable. 
There are two possible way of dealing with this problem. The first way 
is to subtract the absence of corruption in tax collection indicator from the 
absence of corruption in loan applications indicator. A second way to 
overcome the multicollinearity problem is to use a model that fits the value of 
the absence of corruption in loan applications variable on the basis of the 
absence of corruption in tax collection variable. This regression’s residuals 
are then used in the regressions on the impact of corruption and inflation.38 
                                                 
38 The results of this technique are not much different from the results presented here. The 
error term from the regression 
Loan Applications = α +β1(Tax Collection) + ε 
has a negative impact on the average inflation rate. Its coefficient stands at –0.78. The t-
statistic shows it is significant (t = –2.64). GDP per head still exerts its negative and 
significant influence (coefficient = –0.72, t-statistic = –6.15). 
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The first method allows for a comparative test on the two models. 
Taking the difference of these two types of corruption reveals whether a 
diverging perception of corruption in the banking sector and in tax collection 
influences the average inflation rate. Thus, one can directly test Huang and 
Wei’s (2003) model against the models developed in Chapters III and IV. 
The difference between the two indicators is the corruption-related 
explanatory variable Regression 28. The logarithm of GDP per head is also 
included in the regression. If the banking sector is perceived as cleaner than 
the tax collection sector, this new indicator reduces inflation. On the other 
hand, if the corruption problem is seen as more endemic in the banking 
sector, the variable increases inflation. As Table V.5 shows, the new indicator 
has a negative impact on the average inflation rate. India and Romania are 
used as examples to illustrate this point. In the Romanian case, the new 
indicator is negative (–0.9), while the Indian value is positive (0.8). This 
indicator is now introduced in a regression with White-heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard deviations and error terms. 
 
Table V.5: Tests for Robustness II 
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate Between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 28th LS 
1 
29th LS 
1,2 
30th 
TSLS 
1,2,3 
31st 
TSLS  
1,3 
Constant 5.28  
(4.19) 
5.33 
(3.38) 
7.00 
(4.74) 
8.21 
(3.53) 
Absence of Corruption in Loan Applications 
– Absence of Corruption in Tax Collection 
-0.60 
(-2.22) 
-0.61 
(-2.09) 
-1.78 
(-3.90) 
-1.77 
(-2.69) 
Log. GDP per head, ppp. corrected -0.87 
(-6.54) 
-0.87 
(-6.26) 
-1.05 
(-6.72) 
-1.09 
(-6.91) 
Log. Openness, World Bank  -0.01 
(-0.04) 
 -0.21 
(-0.52) 
Observations 79 79 78 79 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.18 
R2, adjusted 0.31 0.30 0.13 0.15 
Jarque-Bera 3.73 3.85 5.00 6.41 
 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White corrected t -
statistic (in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 Japan is excluded. 
3 Instruments are the dummies for the regions Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and South-East Asia.  
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Average 
Inflation 
Rate, 
1994–
2003 
Average 
Monetary 
Growth, 
1994–2003
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Loan 
Application 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Tax 
Collection 
WEF GDP 
per head, 
ppp-
corrected 
Central 
Bank 
Indepen
dence, 
Romer 
(1993) 
India 0.069 0.146 4.2 3.4 2464 0.19 
Romania 0.653 0.522 3.3 4.2 7036  
 
Romania ranks worse in the socioeconomic indicator on the absence 
of corruption in loan applications than for the tax collection indicator. Because 
Romania is perceived as more corrupt in loan applications than in its tax 
collection, a shift from more corruption in loan applications to more corruption 
in tax collection would result in an increased inflation rate for this country. 
The values of this indicator are provided in Section V.10. The regression 
coefficient is – 0.60; the t-statistic’s p-value is 0.03. This new index is 
significant at the 5% level in explaining the average inflation rate. A reduced 
corruptibility in and around the central bank reduces the inflation rate. This 
finding confirms the influence of the WEF indicator on the absence of 
corruption and is a confirmation of the findings from the first set of 
regressions (cf. Table V.1). 
A high degree of absence of corruption in tax collection seems to 
increase the average inflation rate, which is contrary to the theory. The 
logarithmic value of GDP per head retains the same influence as has been 
reported throughout this section. Again, a higher per capita income level 
goes along with lower average inflation rates. The t-statistic of 
–6.54 shows the high significance. The fit of the model is in the same range 
as for previous models (R2 =0.33). The Jarque-Bera statistic (3.73) shows 
that the regression residuals are approximately normally distributed. 
The results of Regression 28 need to be validated by some further 
checks on robustness. Regression 29 adds the openness measure. The 
corruption variable continues to be significant at the 5% level, a continuing 
indication that less corruption in and around the central bank and banking 
institutions goes along with lower average inflation rates. The results are 
driven by GDP per head, which exerts a strong negative and highly 
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significant influence on the average inflation rate, whereas openness fails to 
be significant. 
The possibility of endogeneity and/or measurement error in the 
corruption-related data is dealt with by using a TSLS model. TSLS 
Regressions 30 and 31 use the same instrument variables to explain the 
difference between the two absence of corruption indicators as did 
Regression 25. The two TSLS models differ in the number of explanatory 
variables. Regression No. 30 employs the corruption-related variable and the 
logarithm of GDP per head; Regression 31 adds the logarithm of openness 
measure. Both regressions show that the absence of corruption in loan 
applications is an essential contributing factor in explaining the average 
inflation rate. Its impact continues to be negative and significant at the 1% 
confidence level. GDP per head is highly significant in both regressions and 
continues its expected negative influence. In Regression 31, openness is 
insignificant but strengthens the impact of GDP per head. The residuals of 
Regression 31 regression are not normally distributed; it narrowly misses the 
5.99 threshold of the Jarque-Bera statistic. 
We have yet to control for the shadow economy in this series of 
regressions. If the inconsistent influence of absence of corruption in tax 
collection shown in the previous regressions survives the inclusion of the 
shadow economy data, it will be further proof of the results’ robustness. This 
would be important empirical evidence in support of the theory of the 
malicious and corrupt central banker as proposed in Chapters III and IV. The 
results for these regressions are given in Table V.6. The first test, Regression 
32, employs the difference between absence of corruption in loan 
applications and in tax collection and the shadow economy data. 
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Both variables have powerful explanatory effect for the average 
inflation rate and both are significant at the 1% level. More importantly, 
however, the negative influence of the corruption-related variable continues. 
Its regression coefficient is – 0.84. A low degree of corruption in loan 
applications is still connected to low average inflation rates, while less 
corruption in tax collection appears to be connected to higher inflation rates. 
The R2 is 0.55. The normality assumption for the residuals holds. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic is below its 5.99 threshold, implying that the residuals 
are normally distributed. Comparing these results to those of Regression 28 
reveals that the impact of the difference between the two absence of 
corruption variables due to the inclusion of the shadow economy data as an 
Table V.6: Tests for Robustness III 
Dependent Variable: Log(inflation), 
Average Inflation Rate Between 1993 and 2003 
Variable 32nd LS 1,2 33rd LS 1,2 34th LS 1,2 35th LS 1,2 36th LS 1,2,3 37th LS 1,2,3 38th TSLS 
1,4 
Constant -4.82 
(-21.99) 
-3.25 
(-1.92) 
-3.93 
(-1.76) 
-4.12 
(-2.01) 
-2.42 
(-1.09) 
-2.25 
(-1.26) 
-2.64 
(-1.00) 
Absence of Corruption in 
Loan Applications – 
Absence of Corruption in 
Tax Collection 
 
-0.84 
(-4.48) 
 
-0.87 
(-4.38) 
 
-0.34 
(-1.52) 
 
-0.79 
(-3.70) 
 
-0.34 
(-1.53) 
 
-0.31 
(-1.56) 
 
-1.76 
(-3.30) 
Unregistered Business as 
Percentage of Business 
0.65 
(9.61) 
0.58 
(5.56) 
0.56 
(4.20) 
0.62 
(5.77) 
0.46 
(3.67) 
0.46 
(5.12) 
0.68 
(6.14) 
GDP per head, ppp 
corrected, log 
 -0.15 
(-0.98) 
-0.12 
(-0.62) 
-0.17 
(-1.13) 
-0.24 
(-1.29) 
-0.25 
(-1.09) 
-0.33 
(-1.50) 
Central Bank Independence   2.39 
(1.32) 
 2.07 
(1.23) 
  
Log. Openness, World 
Bank 
   0.21 
(0.72) 
-0.37 
(-1.98) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.28 
(-1.17) 
South-East Asia      -0.51 
(-0.96) 
 
East Europe      1.35 
(3.23) 
 
Africa and the Middle East      0.24 
(0.58) 
 
Latin America      0.12 
(0.32) 
 
Observations 78 78 47 79 46 77 79 
R2 0.55 0.56 0.68 0.54 0.75 0.76 0.44 
R2, adjusted 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.52 0.72 0.70 0.41 
Jarque-Bera 1.63 1.29 2.12 2.37 2.51 3.89 3.59 
 
The values given in the variable section show the coefficient (without parenthesis) and White corrected t-statistic 
(in paranthesis).  
1 Taiwan had to be dropped due to the unavailability of data. 
2 Japan is excluded. 
3 Panama is excluded. 
4 Instruments are the dummies for the regions Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and South-East Asia.   
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additional explanatory variable. The impact of corruption in tax collection is 
now controlled by the shadow economy. 
In Regressions 33–37, several robustness tests are performed. These 
tests involve the inclusion GDP per head, central bank independence, and 
openness. Almost all these additional explanatory variables fail to be 
significant even at the 10% level, with the exception of openness in 
Regression 36. The impact these additional variables have on the inflation 
rate more or less confirms the theory. One noteworthy exception is the 
behavior of the openness indicator. If openness alone, that is, without central 
bank independence, is included in the regression, it achieves a positive, but 
insignificant, influence. GDP per head always wields a negative influence, 
whereas central bank independence has the expected positive influence in 
Regression 36. More politically dependent central banks receive higher 
scores. The more control the ministry of finance has, the higher is the 
inflation rate. A possible explanation for this result could be that the 
government might be tempted to use the central bank to finance its 
expenditure via the creation of additional money. 
Regression 37 shows that the regional dummies have a strong impact 
on the difference between the absence of corruption in loan applications and 
in tax collection:39 this formerly highly significant explanatory variable is now 
insignificant. The regional dummies also increase the regression coefficient 
from its former value of around –0.80 to –0.31. The emerging picture is one 
of the average inflation rate being strongly dependent on regional 
characteristics and the shadow economy. Again, it is possible that the 
corruption-related variable itself is stochastic. To test for this, another TSLS 
model is calibrated, which largely parallels TSLS Regression 31. Added to 
the instruments on the difference between the absence of corruption in the 
loan application and tax collection sectors is data on the shadow economy. It 
is essential to include this data in the model because the shadow economy 
exerts a strong impact on absence of corruption in tax collection. 
TSLS Regression 38 highlights that the difference between the two 
absence of corruption indicators has a significant impact on the average 
inflation rate (t = –3.30) and, as expected, the impact is negative. The 
                                                 
39 For a description of the regional dummy variables, see footnote 35. 
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inconsistency in the behavior of absence of corruption in tax collection 
indicator continues despite including the shadow economy as an additional 
explanatory variable. The other explanatory variables behave as expected. A 
high prevalence shadow economy continues to be connected to high average 
inflation rates. The logarithms of openness and GDP per head retain their 
formerly reported negative influence, but are insignificant. 
What is the relevance of these robustness test results carried out in 
this section? There is some inconsistency in the way corruption in tax 
collection influences the average inflation rate. Section V.5 found out, that 
countries that are more corrupt in tax collection tend to have higher inflation 
rates. This influence is not robust to the inclusion of GDP per head or 
openness. Some doubt has been cast on the empirical validity of Huang and 
Wei’s (2003) model. Yet, other tests for the robustness of the channel 
proposed by Huang and Wei support their model. Once the prevalence of the 
shadow economy (Unregistered Business as Percentage of all Business) 
enters the regressions along with absence of corruption in tax collection (cf. 
Table V.3), absence of corruption in tax collection has a positive impact on 
the average inflation rate, as result of the multicollinearity problem. While the 
absence of corruption indicator attempts to measure actual (perceived) 
corruption, the other indicator, the shadow economy, measures the possibility 
of corruption. The fact that the importance of the shadow economy captures 
the influence of absence of corruption supports their theory.  
The tests of the present section, which combine both absence of 
corruption indicators, are less supportive of this channel. The robustness 
tests performed in this section exploit the multicollinearity of the two absence 
of corruption indicators. This comparative study of the models under study 
(Huang and Wei (2003) and Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002, 2004)) shows 
mixed results for both theories. The hypothesis that corruption in the central 
bank increases the average inflation rate is not fully supported by the 
empirical results. Three findings are of special interest.  
First, the impact of absence of corruption in loan applications 
continues to be negative despite the inclusion of absence in corruption in tax 
collection and other variables. The variable is significant in explaining the 
average inflation rate in most models. Only the inclusion of the data on 
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central bank independence or the regional dummy variables rendered the 
impact of corruption in loan applications insignificant. In the case of 
regressions that include central bank independence indicator, this result is 
due to sample design; in the case of the regional dummies, it led to the use 
of TSLS models to control for endogeneity or for measurement errors of the 
corruption-related data. These TSLS models revealed that a high degree of 
absence of corruption in loan applications tends to be accompanied by low 
average inflation rates. These findings offer some support to the theory of the 
intrinsically corrupt, malicious central banker proposed by Lambsdorff and 
Schinke (2002, 2004) and Chapters III and IV. The influence of absence of 
corruption in tax collection is inconsistent with the theory proposed by Huang 
and Wei (2003). 
Second, the results may be due to multicollinearity. The two absence 
of corruption indicators correlate at 0.93. This problem was addressed by 
using the difference of the two variables. However, the inconsistent 
performance of absence of corruption in tax collection continues. The impact 
of the new variable is mostly significant in describing the average inflation 
rate. 
Third, the prevalence of the shadow economy was included in the 
regression as a final test for the validity of the two competing models. Despite 
the fact that the prevalence of the shadow economy is highly significant, 
inconsistency in the impact of absence of corruption of tax collection remains. 
V.7. Corruption and Inflation in Transitional Economies 
The empirical tests on the validity of the models proposed in Chapters III and 
IV offered some backing. This section attempts to test the models for a 
different sample of transitional economies. The effects of corruption on 
monetary policy remain a conjecture until there is an empirical check for 
validity. The previous section investigated these effects by using a proxy. 
Until recently, there was a lack of data useful for conducting empirical 
research into the causes and consequences of central bank corruption. 
However, the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development included the following question in BEEPS: 
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Use this scale (No Impact; Minor Impact; Significant Impact; Very 
Significant Impact; Don’t Know; Not Applicable): To what extent the 
following forms of corruption had an impact on your business? 
The Central Bank’s mishandling of funds … 
 
This question was included in the survey conducted for 26 transition 
countries. The countries included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Republic Serpska, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. 
About 4,104 senior businesspeople were polled on corruption-related 
issues in these 26 countries. In the following empirical investigation into the 
impact of central bank corruption on the average inflation rate, Republic 
Serpska, Bosnia, and Uzbekistan had to be omitted because the International 
Monetary Fund does not report inflation rates or, more precisely, the year-by-
year percent change of the Consumer Price Index, for them. Thus the final 
sample is comprised of 23 countries. 
Figure V.5: Relation Between Corruption in the Sphere of the  
Central Bank and Central Bank Quality. 
World Business Environment Survey (BEEPS 
2002): Central Bank Corruption and Quality
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As a first glance at the corruption-related data used in this analysis, a 
scatterplot of the BEEPS central bank corruption indicator and an indicator 
on central bank quality from the same survey is presented in Figure V.5. As 
can be seen from the scatterplot, the two data sets are positively correlated 
at 0.62. Thus, there is a link between the perception of central bank quality 
and central bank corruption. A central bank perceived as highly corrupt was 
also judged as of rather poor quality by the respondents. The upward sloping 
regression line in Figure V.5 reflects this result. The term “mishandling of 
funds” is somewhat vague. It might include the embezzlement of funds from 
the central bank’s employees or the selling of funds or inside information, but 
it could also encompass things not as obviously corrupt, for example, 
incompetence of central bank staff. Incompetence could lead to bad 
decisions in the course of seigniorage maximization or poorly constituted 
central bank portfolios. However, In the context of the BEEPS questionnaire, 
the question regarding the central bank’s mishandling of funds occurred in a 
section that dealt with several other corrupt issues, such as the sale of 
parliamentary votes, presidential decrees, court decisions, and the extent of 
bribery and patronage among public officials and thus the term “mishandling” 
was likely interpreted by the respondents as relating to illegal acts where 
benevolence is absent. 
The model of the intrinsically corrupt central banker hypothesizes that 
corruption in the sphere of the central bank leads to increased inflation rates. 
To check this hypothesis for 23 countries, data on their annual inflation rates 
were retrieved from the International Financial Statistics website for the 
period from 2000 to 2004. This period corresponds to the period (2002) in 
which the corruption-related data were collected. To balance out asymmetric 
shocks and their impact on the regression results, an average inflation rate 
for the given period was established with the technique described in Section 
V.4: 
 ( )20045
1999
1 1n t
t
π π
=
= + −∏ . 
The regression results are presented in Table V.7. As hypothesized by the 
model of the corrupt central banker, corruption may exert an inflation-
augmenting influence. 
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In Regression 39, the BEEPS variable on corruption in the sphere of 
the central bank is included along with a constant factor. The regression 
results show that both regressors have a significant impact on the inflation 
rate. Corruption in the sphere of the central bank retains a positive impact on 
inflation in all 23 transition economies. The t-statistic demonstrates that this 
influence is significant. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level. 
 
Table V.7: Corruption and Inflation in Transitional Economies 
Dependent Variable: Log(Inflation) 
Average Inflation Rate Between 1999 and 2004a 
Independent Variable OLS 39 OLS 40 OLS 41 OLS 42 OLS 43 OLS 44 
Constant -3.78 
(-8.41) 
-9.13 
(-3.38) 
-5.27 
(-1.45) 
-5.17 
(-1.52) 
-5.48 
(-1.56) 
0.75 
(0.23) 
Central Bank Mishandling of 
Funds, BEEPS, log 
1.89 
(2.37) 
2.61 
(3.34) 
3.07 
(3.53) 
3.09 
(3.53) 
3.26 
(3.35) 
 
GDP per Head, ppp-corrected, 
log 
 0.57 
(1.95) 
0.25 
(0.72) 
0.36 
(0.96) 
0.42 
(1.07) 
-0.11 
(-0.30) 
Percent of Tax Evaded, 
BEEPS 
  -0.06 
(-1.90) 
-0.08 
(-2.45) 
-0.08 
(-2.47) 
-0.09 
(-2.57) 
Openness, WDI 
 
   -0.01 
(-1.64) 
-0.01 
(-1.40) 
-0.01 
(-1.39) 
Ratio of External Debt to 
GDP 
    -0.58 
(-0.55) 
 
Central Bank Mishandling of 
Funds, correctedb 
     3.40 
(3.11) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 22 23 
R2 0.17 0.25 0.44 0.49 0.51 0.43 
R2, adjusted 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.30 
Jarque-Bera c 0.38 0.12 0.80 0.12 0.08 0.12 
aWhite corrected t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
bThe logged variable has been regressed on the perception of central bank quality and a constant. The 
residuals from this regression are employed as the explanatory variable. 
cThe Jarque-Bera statistic measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its 
skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal distribution can clearly be rejected for results 
greater than 6. 
 
To cross-check the simple regression, further explanatory variables for the 
set of 23 transition countries are employed. These follow the suggestions of 
Sturm and de Haan (2001) and Campillo and Miron (1996).40 Regression 40 
employs GDP per head as additional explanatory variable. Although this 
variable increases the influence and the significance of the corruption-related 
variable, its impact is positive, which is contrary to the findings from the 
                                                 
40 The suggestions from Sturm and de Haan (2001) and Campillo and Miron (1996) already 
guided the choice of additional explanatory variables in Section V.5. 
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previous sets of regressions presented in Sections V.5 and V.6. In later 
regressions (41–44), this positive impact is not significant. 
The theoretic literature contains two reasons why corruption could 
lead to higher inflation rates. First, corruption inside the central bank itself, for 
example, a corrupt staff, might lead to increased levels of inflation, an idea 
that is at the core of the theoretical models presented in Chapters III and IV. 
Second, corruption might lead to higher inflation rates (cf. Huang and Wei 
2003) because the government needs to replace corruption-induced lower 
tax revenue by higher seigniorage revenue. Regression 41 tests this notion. 
Fortunately, data on perceived tax evasion was collected BEEPS. 
Respondents were asked: 
 
What percentage of the sales of a typical firm in your area of 
activity would you estimate is reported to the tax authorities, 
bearing in mind difficulties with complying taxes and other 
regulations? 
 
The following regression uses an average perception of taxes evaded 
for each of the countries. The results from the regression fail to support the 
theory. In theory, inflation should increase with a government’s greater 
dependence on the seigniorage revenue, that is, with the extent of tax 
evasion. However, the coefficient of –0.06 reveals an unexpected negative 
influence, which is significant at least at the 10% level (p-value of 0.07). The 
corruption-related variable, mishandling of funds by the central bank, is the 
only significant influence. The impact is—as predicted—positive and the t-
statistic of 3.35 means that it is significant even at the 1% confidence level. In 
summary, the result of this regression is that the link between corruption and 
inflation via tax evasion does not hold. 
This result should be interpreted with some caution, however. The 
negative impact of corruption might stem from a public misperception of the 
central banker. Due to underreporting of economic activity, which is a direct 
offshoot of tax evasion, the official GDP is lower than the actual GDP. In this 
situation, the official GDP data might lead central bankers to set inflation 
rates that are too low. Then, so as to meet their announced (or unofficial) 
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inflation targets, central bankers could set lower growth rates of the monetary 
stock, leading to an insufficient money supply. 
Following the advice of Sturm and de Haan (2001), this study adds 
degree of openness as an additional explanatory variable (Regression 42). 
The data on openness is based on the World Bank’s world development 
indicators and is calculated as the sum of imports and exports of goods and 
services as percentage of GDP. To soften the impact of special influences, 
the data from 1996 to 2002 were used. The arithmetic mean is used to 
calculate the average degree of openness. Romer (1993) suggests that 
openness can be influential in explaining the inflation rate in a cross-section 
of countries. Currency fluctuations caused by monetary surprises are more 
painful and less effective in open economies. In the context of the models 
developed in Chapters III and IV, it is assumed that for an open economy the 
coefficient θ  is higher than it is in closed economies (see Equations (III.10) 
and (IV.1) respectively). 
The data on openness was included in Regression 42 along with the 
data on the mishandling of funds by the central bank, GDP per head, and the 
percentage of taxes evaded. The inclusion of the new explanatory variable 
saw the R2 increase to 0.49. The adjusted R2 also increased—indicating that 
the econometric model benefited from the inclusion of this variable. The 
variable itself, however, proves insignificant for the results. Its impact is 
slightly negative; the regression coefficient is at –0.01. The t-statistic barely 
misses significance at the 10% level (p-value of 0.12). As is true for the other 
variables, mishandling of funds by the central bank retained its positive 
impact. The regression coefficient stands at 3.09 and its significance was 
also bolstered. The t-statistic of 3.53 indicates significance at even the 1% 
level. The regression coefficient of taxes evaded increased to –0.08 and the 
t-statistic grew to – 2.45. The impact is now significant at 5 and 10% 
confidence levels. The residuals of the regression are normally distributed. 
Sturm and de Haan (2001) emphasize that another influential factor in 
the study of central bank quality and inflation in developing countries is the 
ratio of external debt to GDP. Highly indebted countries might prefer to 
generate additional income from seigniorage. However, the effect of adding 
this variable was not significant and its influence was negative. As was the 
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case for the 42nd regression, mishandling of funds by the central bank and, to 
a somewhat lesser extent, percentage of taxes evaded remained the only 
significant influences. 
Despite the results of these regressions, some skepticism is warranted. 
In most empirical analyses on corruption involving subjective data, which is 
the case here where we use respondents’ assessment of central bank 
corruption, the problem of an endogeneity bias arises. In the BEEPS, 
respondents might have ranked central banks as more satisfactory if the 
banks were responsible for lower inflation rates. This would result in an 
upward bias of the coefficient. However, the subjective assessment of central 
bank quality is susceptible to the same bias. To work around this problem, 
the variable on mishandling of funds has been regressed on the BEEPS 
variable for central bank quality and efficiency. This regression’s residuals 
are employed as the variable “central bank mishandling of funds, corrected” 
in Regression 44. The residuals now represent the strength of the 
relationship between the central bank’s mishandling of funds and perceived 
central bank quality and efficiency. Because both variables are susceptible to 
the same bias, the residuals from this regression should be free of the bias. 
This variable exerts a positive and significant influence on the logarithm of 
the inflation rate. The regression coefficient of 3.40 and the t-statistic of 3.11 
show that the influence is highly significant (p-value less than 0.01). 
Comparison of Regressions 43 and 44 shows that the data do not suffer from 
an endogeneity problem. The influence of this corrected mishandling of funds 
variable is comparable to the impact in Regression 43, where it was not 
“corrected.” The other explanatory variables in the regression are also 
comparable in terms of coefficients and significance. The only other 
significant explanatory variable is the percentage of taxes evaded, an 
influence in contradiction to theory. 
V.8. Conclusion and Discussion 
Corruption and inflation are at the core of this study. Theoretical models 
suggest that there is a link between corruption and inflation and this work has 
investigated two competing strands of thought on how this link is forged. It 
has been hypothesized either that (1) the central banker is outright corrupt 
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and benefits directly from selling inside information or (2) various external 
corrupt forces have decreased the state’s revenue and the banker decides 
(or is pressured) to make up the revenue by pursuing a monetary policy that 
is quite possibly not in the best interest of society, if not outright illegal. The 
present study tested these two theories empirically with data from the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2002–2003 (Cornelius, Porter, and Schwab 2003) 
and BEEPS (World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 2002).  
The empirical data lent partial confirmation to one model. As 
hypothesized in Chapter III and IV, corruption in the sphere of the central 
bank may exert a positive influence on inflation. However, in achieving this 
result, certain assumptions were necessary. Because the WEF’s Global 
Competitiveness Report does not report directly on corruption in the central 
bank, data derived from answers to its question regarding “irregular 
payments in loan applications” were used as a proxy for central bank 
corruption. Even taking this limitation into consideration, however, the 
measure has some power in explaining the average inflation rate. Countries 
appear to be prone to high average rates of inflation if their banking 
institutions are corrupt. In this situation, the central banker and his or her staff 
are able to generate additional income from corrupt dealing. For example, the 
central banker could sell valuable information about future monetary policy or 
use his or her supervision power to influence the actions of commercial 
banks, possibly forcing or enabling them to over-lend, both of which would 
have an effect on the money supply and the inflation rate. For a cross-section 
of 80 countries, this influence, corruption in loan applications, was shown as 
one possible factor that could affect the inflation rate. When this measure is 
the single corruption-related indicator in the regression, the results are 
sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. 
The competing model of a benevolent central banker who fulfills the 
demands of the government but pursues societal goals in the fight against 
unemployment and inflation also does not receive full empirical support. The 
impact of the variable for this model — absence of corruption in tax 
collection—confirms the theory if it enters the regression model alone, but its 
influence is sensitive to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. GDP per 
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head seems to catch some of the influence. The indicator however proves to 
be robust to the inclusion of a measure of central bank independence.  
The impact of the absence of corruption indicators was tested in 
combination with data on the prevalence of a shadow economy. The shadow 
economy data correlate at –0.76 with the data on absence of corruption in tax 
collection. Thus the inclusion the shadow economy data confirms the theory 
because when these data enter the regression, it not only annihilates the 
impact of absence of corruption in tax collection, but also renders the impact 
of the absence of corruption variable positive on the average inflation rate. 
This effect was persistent for all robustness tests. The shadow economy data 
were also used in the model of the malicious central banker. In this case, 
although the relative importance of the shadow economy removes some 
influence, it does not reverse the impact, but renders the explanatory variable 
impotent. This finding supports Huang and Wei’s (2003) theory, but makes 
questionable the theories put forth in this study. 
When the model included only the absence of corruption in tax 
collection indicator, it produced results fairly consistent with the theory, but 
these results change once both indicators on the absence of corruption are 
combined (see Section V.6). When both indicators on corruption are included, 
corruption in loan applications retains its influence. However, in a direct 
contradiction to the previous regression results and the underlying theory, 
corruption in tax collection exerts a positive influence. This impact also 
survives the inclusion of the data on the prevalence of the shadow economy. 
The results from these comparative tests offer some support for the theory 
expounded in Chapters III and IV. 
I next tested the validity of the competing theories (Huang and Wei 
(2003) and Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002, 2004)) using data from BEEPS, 
which was a smaller sample of 23 countries with transition economies. This 
analysis had no need of a proxy for central bank corruption because the 
BEEPS specifically asked for about the “mishandling of funds by the central 
bank.” The pertinent question was asked in a section of the survey devoted 
to other forms of corruption, such as the sale of political decisions, and thus I 
believe that respondents would have interpreted the “mishandling” question 
as one related to corruption, and not as about some other sort of more 
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benign behavior, such as mere incompetence. The indicator on corruption in 
the central bank increased the average inflation rate in all 23 countries. This 
is strong support for the theory propounded in Chapters III and IV as well as 
for that of Lambsdorff and Schinke (2002, 2004). Huang and Wei (2003) did 
not fare so well; the validity test of their theory failed to convince. 
In summary, neither of the two theories concerning the link between 
corruption and inflation was confirmed beyond doubt by the data analyzed in 
this study. Even though the data used in this study are the best available to 
date, certain limitations may have influenced the results. It could be that use 
of the proxy, mentioned above, created problems for the model of the 
malicious central banker (cf. Chapters III and IV). Perhaps the respondents 
incorrectly assessed the prevalence of corruption in their respective banking 
sectors or, alternatively, perhaps the data on the absence of corruption in 
loan applications did not actually reflect corruption in the sphere of the central 
bank. One thing is clear, though. Comparative studies resulted in findings 
that contradict the benevolent central banker theory—this theory should be 
rejected. 
 164
V.9. Appendix: The Data 
 
 
Average 
Inflation 
Rate, 
1994–
2003 
Average 
Monetary 
Growth, 
1994–
2003 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Loan 
Application 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Tax 
Collection 
WEF GDP 
per Head, 
ppp-
corrected 
Central 
Bank 
Indepen
dence, 
Romer 
(1993) 
Argentina 0.048 0.135 4.3 3.9 12098 0.39 
Australia 0.026 0.120 6.4 6.6 26552 0.06 
Austria 0.020 0.083 6.0 6.0 27518 0.05 
Bangladesh 0.049 0.118 2.7 2.1 1644  
Belgium 0.019 0.042 5.8 5.3 27912 0.07 
Bolivia 0.058 0.148 3.9 3.4 2439  
Botswana 0.092 0.150 5.1 5.3 8196 0.22 
Brazil 0.932 1.007 5.0 4.7 7759 0.33 
Bulgaria 0.633 0.636 5.6 6.0 6182  
Canada 0.019 0.092 6.3 6.5 28611 0.06 
Chile 0.060 0.130 6.1 6.2 9753 0.33 
China 0.057 0.190 5.0 5.2 4329  
Colombia 0.149 0.180 5.2 4.9 6202 0.17 
Costa Rica 0.126 0.191 4.7 4.8 8490 0.22 
Croatia 0.417 0.269 4.5 4.8 8414  
Czech Republic 0.059 0.115 3.6 4.2 14885  
Denmark 0.022 0.057 6.8 6.8 28342 0.05 
Dominican Republic 0.090 0.167 4.5 4.1 6189  
Ecuador 0.340 0.045 3.9 3.8 3295  
El Salvador 0.059 0.063 5.1 5.0 4603  
Estonia 0.183 0.236 5.7 5.9 10380  
Finland 0.015 0.090 6.8 6.8 25611 0.07 
France 0.016 0.038 5.8 5.7 25074 0.07 
Germany 0.018 0.075 6.0 6.1 25715 0.04 
Greece 0.062 0.141 5.1 3.6 17482 0.17 
Guatemala 0.082 0.179 4.0 3.6 3879  
Haiti 0.208 0.165 4.1 2.3 1444  
Honduras 0.150 0.194 4.1 3.7 2505 0.14 
Hong Kong SAR 0.023 0.091 6.0 6.3 25581  
Hungary 0.147 0.147 4.9 5.5 12941  
Iceland 0.032 0.109 6.5 6.8 30725 0.06 
India 0.069 0.146 4.2 3.4 2464 0.19 
Indonesia 0.136 0.205 2.6 2.9 3059 0.17 
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Average 
Inflation 
Rate, 
1994–
2003 
 
Average 
Monetary 
Growth, 
1994–
2003 
 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Loan 
Application 
 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Tax 
Collection 
 
WEF 
GDP per 
Head, 
ppp-
corrected 
Central 
Bank 
Indepen
dence, 
Romer 
(1993) 
Ireland 0.029 0.153 6.2 6.2 32133 0.06 
Israel 0.065 0.136 5.4 5.8 19867 0.17 
Italy 0.031 0.055 5.3 4.9 24510 0.07 
Jamaica 0.142 0.151 5.1 4.9 3890  
Japan 0.001 0.098 5.8 6.1 27101 0.07 
Jordan 0.026 0.053 4.6 4.4 4080  
Korea 0.041 0.093 4.9 4.7 18149 0.25 
Latvia 0.165 0.165 4.7 4.5 7750  
Lithuania 0.300 0.197 6.2 6.3 7764  
Malaysia 0.028 0.110 5.1 5.7 8424 0.17 
Mauritius 0.065 0.099 5.1 5.6 10400  
Mexico 0.145 0.171 4.8 4.9 8969 0.19 
Morocco 0.027 0.087 3.5 3.8 3787 0.16 
Namibia 0.089 0.206 4.5 4.8 6650  
Netherlands 0.026 0.090 6.3 6.3 26242 0.06 
New Zealand 0.020 0.090 6.6 6.8 20725 0.07 
Nicaragua 0.100 0.186 4.5 4.1 2514 0.22 
Nigeria 0.248 0.283 3.7 2.5 898 0.14 
Norway 0.022 0.082 6.4 6.5 30727 0.07 
Panama 0.010 0.078 4.8 4.6 5986 0.17 
Paraguay 0.116 0.142 3.6 3.2 4379  
Peru 0.104 0.201 5.0 5.3 4797 0.2 
Philippines 0.064 0.145 3.8 2.6 4113 0.17 
Poland 0.149 0.220 3.9 4.1 9327  
Portugal 0.036 0.117 5.6 5.1 17571 0.2 
Romania 0.653 0.522 3.3 4.2 7036  
Russian Federation 0.859 0.571 4.3 4.6 8948  
Singapore 0.012 0.069 6.4 6.6 23250 0.28 
Slovak Republic 0.083 0.117 4.2 4.8 11739  
Slovenia 0.116 0.245 5.6 6.0 18233  
South Africa 0.074 0.164 5.4 5.6 9565 0.17 
Spain 0.033 0.083 5.9 5.8 20374 0.07 
Sri Lanka 0.094 0.112 4.2 4.4 3634  
Sweden 0.016  6.5 6.6 24978 0.06 
Switzerland 0.011 0.096 6.2 6.2 29587 0.05 
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Average 
Inflation 
Rate, 
1994–
2003 
Average 
Monetary 
Growth, 
1994–
2003 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Loan 
Application 
WEF 
Absence of 
Corruption 
in Tax 
Collection 
WEF 
GDP per 
Head, 
ppp-
corrected 
Central 
Bank 
Indepen
dence, 
Romer 
(1993) 
Taiwan   5.6 5.9 22559  
Thailand 0.036 0.120 5.1 4.8 6630 0.14 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.052 0.113 5.2 5.0 10018  
Tunisia 0.035 0.087 5.0 4.9 6769  
Turkey 0.672 0.668 3.6 4.1 6716 0.22 
Ukraine 1.307 1.041 3.8 3.5 4224  
United Kingdom 0.025 0.115 6.6 6.5 24421 0.07 
United States 0.025 0.037 5.8 6.0 34888 0.05 
Uruguay 0.215 0.185 5.9 5.9 8781 0.19 
Venezuela 0.390 0.458 3.9 3.7 5966 0.25 
Vietnam 0.031 0.252 4.0 3.7 2130  
Zimbabwe 0.439 0.802 4.5 4.4 2406 0.14 
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V.10. Appendix: Absence of Corruption in Loan Applications 
Versus Absence of Corruption in Tax Collection 
 
Country 
Absence of Corruption 
in Loan Applications – 
Absence of Corruption 
in Tax Collection Country 
Absence of Corruption 
in Loan Applications – 
Absence of Corruption 
in Tax Collection 
Argentina 0.4 Latvia 0.2 
Australia –0.2 Lithuania –0.1 
Austria 0 Malaysia –0.6 
Bangladesh 0.6 Mauritius –0.5 
Belgium 0.5 Mexico –0.1 
Bolivia 0.5 Morocco –0.3 
Botswana –0.2 Namibia –0.3 
Brazil 0.3 Netherlands 0 
Bulgaria –0.4 
New 
Zealand –0.2 
Canada –0.2 Nicaragua 0.4 
Chile –0.1 Nigeria 1.2 
China –0.2 Norway –0.1 
Colombia 0.3 Panama 0.2 
Costa Rica –0.1 Paraguay 0.4 
Croatia –0.3 Peru –0.3 
Czech Republic –0.6 Philippines 1.2 
Denmark 0 Poland –0.2 
Dominican Republic 0.4 Portugal 0.5 
Ecuador 0.1 Romania –0.9 
El Salvador 0.1 
Russian 
Federation –0.3 
Estonia –0.2 Singapore –0.2 
Finland 0 
Slovak 
Republic –0.6 
France 0.1 Slovenia –0.4 
Germany –0.1 South Africa –0.2 
Greece 1.5 Spain 0.1 
Guatemala 0.4 Sri Lanka –0.2 
Haiti 1.8 Sweden –0.1 
Honduras 0.4 Switzerland 0 
Hong Kong SAR –0.3 Taiwan  –0.3 
Hungary –0.6 Thailand 0.3 
Iceland –0.3 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 0.2 
India 0.8 Tunisia 0.1 
Indonesia –0.3 Turkey –0.5 
Ireland 0 Ukraine 0.3 
Israel  –0.4 
United 
Kingdom 0.1 
Italy  0.4 
United 
States  –0.2 
Jamaica 0.2 Uruguay 0 
Japan –0.3 Venezuela 0.2 
Jordan 0.2 Vietnam 0.3 
Korea 0.2 Zimbabwe 0.1 
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VI. A Concluding Summary 
The present study analyzed the effects a corrupt central banker might have 
on monetary policy and the results of that policy. To this end, the study used 
case studies of actual corruption in Brazil, Indonesia, and Japan, among 
others, to illustrate that there is indeed evidence for the existence of a corrupt 
central banker. 
The case study of the Indonesian Bank Bali scandal deserves special 
mention. Against the background of the Asian Current Account Crisis in 1997, 
Bank Indonesia was implicated in a string of corruption cases. The corruption 
took root during the Soeharto era, a time when Bank Indonesia was at the 
beck and call of Soeharto and his cronies. This case study (see Chapter II) 
might suggest that corruption is only possible if the central banker is the 
vicarious agent of a powerful government and the country is in a state of 
turmoil stemming from the reverberations of an economic shock. 
However, the other case studies reveal that corruption can also occur 
in less dramatic situations. Even in a shock-free environment, the central 
banker can be self-seeking. In the first model tested, an additional corrupt 
incentive induced the central banker to increase the growth rate of the 
monetary stock, which led to increased inflation rates. An empirical test 
confirmed this hypothesis for a cross-section of 23 transition economies. The 
regressions revealed that corruption systematically increases inflation rates. 
Once the central banker engages in corrupt dealing, a new, added inflation 
bias emerges. The malicious central banker has a low level of concern for 
how the bank’s policy will affect the larger society because the additional 
income the banker is receiving from his or her corrupt dealing more than 
compensates the banker for any personal hardship he or she may 
experience. Society suffers the most from the banker’s corrupt dealing as it 
has to cope with an increased inflation rate. 
The second model (developed in Chapter IV) involves a situation in 
which stochastic shocks occur, and the central banker can sell inside 
information. The model is illustrated by a cases from Brazil and the Bank of 
Japan, where a bank employee did precisely that. Corruption in this model 
distinguishes between two types of central banker, the conservative and the 
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populist. These two kinds of banker have very different reactions to the same 
stochastic shock. The conservative might choose to engage in pro-cyclical 
action and thus exacerbate the shock’s impact on employment; the populist 
will prefer to stabilize employment. These reactions are a result of the corrupt 
incentive, which tempts the central banker into making decisions that are 
contrary to the best interests of the larger society. 
These results must be interpreted with caution. For one thing, the term 
“corruption” here may not necessarily mean truly criminal acts but may also 
encompass activity falling in a gray area. For example, a central banker 
might choose to bail out banks run or owned by bankers with whom he or she 
is well acquainted and connected. This would not necessarily be illegal 
because it is one of the central banker’s tasks to insure the functioning of the 
country’s financial system. However, which banks the central banker chooses 
to aid could be a decision falling into a gray area. The bailout could be 
viewed as an unjustified favor, at least by the bank’s competitors, which did 
not receive such help. Such a bailout could also provide an opportunity for 
the central banker to be inappropriately “thanked,” that is, to receive so-called 
gifts or bribes. 
Actions taken to enhance the central bank’s budget may also be cause 
for suspicion but, again, not strictly criminal. A big budget can benefit the 
bank in various and fairly subtle ways. For example, employees may feel 
more important and powerful if they work for a well-funded bank; working 
conditions might be improved by, say, more attractive offices and staff 
facilities. This could lead to employees with decision-making power 
attempting to “optimize” their standing by increasing seigniorage, which 
would increase the bank’s budget. 
It is also conceivable that mere suspicion that a central banker is 
corrupt can lead to the results found in this empirical study. Such a suspicion 
could lead to distrust of the bank on the part of private agents, who would 
then raise their inflation expectations and thus, ironically, actually cause an 
increase in the real inflation rate. The arousal of suspicion, not to mention 
acts of favoritism as discussed above, is facilitated by the level of secrecy 
that surrounds the central bank. As noted by Greenspan (2002), despite 
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recent efforts toward more transparency, central bank policy still involves a 
considerable amount of secrecy. 
 
The undeniable, though regrettable, fact is that the most effective 
policymaking is done out-side the immediate glare of the press. 
But that notion and others have been used too often in the past to 
justify a level of secrecy that turned out to be an unnecessary 
constraint on our obligation to be transparent in conducting the 
public’s business. (Greenspan 2002: 5) 
 
Obviously, a veil of secrecy can be very conducive to corrupt dealing, 
including that undertaken by central bankers entirely at their own volition, as 
was the case with Brazilian central banker Lopes who allegedly sold inside 
information to commercial banks (see Chapter IV). However, secrecy may 
also lead the public to suspect corruption when, in fact, there is none. The 
central bank’s actions may be entirely above board even though not public, 
but because ordinary people cannot see and perhaps, cannot understand, 
what the bank is doing, they suspect the worst. 
Bofinger (2001: 365–38) raises this issue in a discussion of monetary 
targeting. Bofinger observes that central banks tend to favor complicated 
money market instruments. In the framework of the New Political Economy, 
the central bank is seen as a form of bureaucracy and, like all bureaucracies, 
it strives to conserve and expand its power. Bofinger notes that: 
 
central banks can be expected to 
1. choose particularly labor-intensive instruments, and 
2. adopt a targeting method characterized by a general lack 
of transparency. (Bofinger 2001: 366) 
 
By choosing labor-intensive instruments with which to do its work, the 
central bank ensures its need for a large staff, which, in turn, strengthens the 
bank’s prestige and political power. The adoption of nontransparent monetary 
policy also increases the bank’s political power because such obfuscatory 
policy makes proper oversight by the public or politicians nearly impossible. 
 171
The combination of nontransparent monetary policy and labor-intensive 
instruments such as “securities repos in the form of variable rate tenders” 
(Bofinger 2001: 366)41 creates a fertile environment for corruption. 
In the final chapter, the inflation-raising effect of corruption was further 
tested. Two competing theories attempt to explain why corruption increases 
the inflation rate. One postulates a benevolent central banker; the other 
assumes that the central banker is somewhat malicious in that he or she acts 
purely for his or her own benefit, with little regard to what is in the best 
interests of the society the banker serves. The results from an analysis of 80 
countries generally demonstrate that corruption does indeed increase the 
inflation rate and that this effect can be explained by the models developed 
and presented in this study on corruption in central banks. 
In summary, this study has shown that corruption in the sphere of the 
central bank has an adverse effect on society. When the central bank is 
involved in corrupt dealing, either within itself or due to outside influences, it 
loses sight of its chief goal and reason for being—the pursuit of sound 
monetary policy that will benefit the larger society. This conclusion is 
supported by findings from empirical analyses using a sample of 23 transition 
economies as well as a larger sample of 80 countries. The findings should 
serve as a warning about the negative effects to society of corruption in the 
central bank. 
                                                 
41 Bofinger (2001) notes that this tender type is use by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
Japan. 
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